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III. Criminal Law  
 
In This Section: 
 
New Case: Kahler v. Kansas  
 “SUPREME COURT TO EXAMINE INSANITY DEFENSE, NEED FOR JURY UNANIMITY” 
Jess Bravin  
“KANSAS QUADRUPLE KILLER’S SCOTUS APPEAL COULD CHANGE INSANITY DEFENSES 
NATIONWIDE” 
Nick Viviani  
“CONSENSUS OF CONFUSION: DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE” 
Rafael Santa Maria 




New Case: Kelly v. United States 
“HIGH COURT TAKES ON ‘BRIDGEGATE’ APPEAL” 
Bill Wichert  
“EX-CHRISTIE AIDE GETS SUPREME COURT HEARING ON BRIDGE SCANDAL” 
Greg Stohr 
“SUPREME COURT TO HEAR APPEAL IN BRIDGEGATE CASE” 
Ryan Hutchins 
“WHY THE ‘BRIDGEGATE’ SCANDAL COULD BACKFIRE ON PROSECUTORS” 
Nick Corasaniti  
“BARONI SENTENCED TO 2 YEARS IN PRISON FOR ROLE IN BRIDGEGATE SCANDAL; KELLY 
GETS 18 MONTHS” 
Ryan Hutchins 
“BRIDGEGATE CONVICTIONS FOR BARONI AND KELLY MOSTLY UPHELD” 
Matt Friedman  
 
New Case: Ramos v. Louisiana  
“SUPREME COURT TO EXAMINE WHETHER UNANIMOUS JURIES ARE REQUIRED FOR 
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS” 
Robert Barnes 
“JURY UNANIMITY BID GETS HIGH COURT LOOK” 
Jordan S. Rubin  
“ARE UNANIMOUS JURIES REQUIRED IN STATE CRIMINAL CASES? SCOTUS WILL 
CONSIDER OVERRULING PRECEDENT” 
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DESERVES NEW SENTENCING” 
Robert Barnes  
“SUPREME COURT TO CONSIDER LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE FOR TEEN DC SNIPER” 
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Kahler v. Kansas 
 
Ruling Below: State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105 (Kan. 2018).  
 
Overview: Kahler was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He argued that the 
prosecution violated his right to a fair trial. He also argued that Kansas law violated his 
constitutional rights of claiming insanity under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
 
Issue: Whether the Eighth and 14th Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense. 
 




James K. KAHLER, Defendant- Appellant 
 
Supreme Court of Kansas 
 
Decided on February 9, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted James Kraig Kahler of 
aggravated burglary and capital murder 
under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) for fatally 
shooting his wife, his wife's grandmother, 
and his two daughters. Kahler appeals the 
capital murder conviction and the ensuing 
sentence of death; our review is automatic 
under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6619. 
Kahler raises 10 issues on appeal. Some of 
the raised issues present questions decided 
unfavorably to Kahler in prior cases, and 
Kahler presents no new argument or 
authority that would persuade us to change 
our holdings on those issues. Likewise, 
Kahler fails to convince us that his other 
challenges warrant a reversal of his capital 
murder conviction or a vacation of his death 
sentence. We summarize our specific 
holdings as follows: 
• The State did not commit 
prosecutorial error by objecting 
during Kahler's closing argument. 
• The district court judge engaged in 
one incident of judicial misconduct 
that does not require reversal. 
• The district court judge erred in 
refusing to give a requested expert 
witness instruction, but the error was 
harmless. 
• K.S.A. 22-3220, which adopted the 
mental disease or defect defense, did 
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not unconstitutionally abrogate 
Kansas' former insanity defense. 
• Because felony murder is not a 
lesser included offense of capital 
murder, the district court judge did 
not err in failing to give a lesser 
included instruction on felony 
murder. 
• The district court judge did not 
prohibit defense counsel from 
questioning prospective jurors during 
voir dire about their views on the 
death penalty. 
• The cumulative effect of trial errors 
did not substantially prejudice Kahler 
so as to deny him a fair trial. 
• The Kansas death penalty is not a 
categorically disproportionate 
punishment for offenders who are 
severely mentally ill at the time they 
commit their crimes. 
• The two aggravating factors relied 
upon by the State to support the death 
penalty are not unconstitutionally 
vague or duplicative. 
• There was sufficient evidence 
presented by the State to establish that 
the killings in this case were 
committed in a heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel manner. 
Consequently, we affirm Kahler's capital 
murder conviction and his sentence of death. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A recitation of some family history preceding 
the murders is necessary to put Kahler's 
crimes in context. In 2008, the 
Kahler family—husband, Kahler; wife, 
Karen; teenage daughters, Emily and Lauren; 
and 9-year-old son, Sean—was living in 
Weatherford, Texas. Kahler was the director 
of the public utilities department, and Karen 
was a personal trainer. Both adults had 
successful careers. Acquaintances described 
the Kahlers as a perfect family. Kahler was 
extremely proud of his family; it was his top 
priority. 
That summer, Kahler took a new job as the 
director of water and light for the city of 
Columbia, Missouri. He moved to Columbia, 
while Karen and the children stayed in Texas, 
planning to follow him in the fall. Before 
Kahler left for Columbia, Karen told him she 
was interested in experimenting by engaging 
in a sexual relationship with a female trainer 
with whom she worked. Kahler assented to 
the sexual relationship. 
Kahler thought the affair would end when 
Karen and the children moved to Missouri; 
however, it did not. At a New Year's Eve 
party in Weatherford, Kahler was 
embarrassed by Karen and her lover's 
behavior, and the evening resulted in a 
shoving match between the Kahlers. The pair 
attempted marriage counseling, but by mid-
January 2009, Karen filed for divorce. In 
mid-March, Karen made a battery complaint 
against Kahler, which resulted in an arrest 
warrant being served on Kahler at a city 
council meeting. Because Kahler held public 
office, his arrest was widely publicized. 
Shortly thereafter, Karen took the children 
and moved out of Kahler's residence. 
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The disintegration of his marriage and family 
relationships affected Kahler's conduct, both 
personally and professionally. Kahler's 
supervisor and another colleague both noted 
Kahler's increasing preoccupation with his 
personal problems and decreasing attention 
to his job. By August 2009, the city had fired 
Kahler. Concerned about Kahler's well-
being, his parents traveled to Columbia and 
moved Kahler back to their ranch near 
Meriden, Kansas. 
Later that year, at Thanksgiving, Sean joined 
Kahler at the family ranch in Meriden, while 
Karen and the girls went to Karen's sister's 
home in Derby. The family had a long-
standing tradition of spending the weekend 
after Thanksgiving at the home of Karen's 
grandmother, Dorothy Wight, in Burlingame, 
Kansas. Arrangements had been made for 
Karen to pick up Sean in Topeka 
on Saturday, November 28, and take him to 
Wight's residence in Burlingame. That 
morning, Sean, who had been enjoying his 
time at the Meriden ranch, fishing and 
hunting with his father, called Karen to ask if 
he could stay at the ranch. Karen denied 
permission, and while Kahler was out 
running an errand, Kahler's mother took Sean 
to meet Karen in Topeka. 
Between 5:30 and 6 that evening, in 
Burlingame, a neighbor of Wight's called 
police about a man in a red Ford Explorer 
near her home whom she suspected of 
criminal activity. The Explorer was later 
determined to be Kahler's vehicle. Around 6 
p.m., Sean and Karen were standing in the 
kitchen of Wight's home, while Emily, 
Lauren, and Wight were elsewhere in the 
house. Kahler entered Wight's house through 
the back door, into the kitchen, and started 
shooting. He shot Karen twice but did not 
attempt to harm Sean. After Kahler moved 
through the kitchen to shoot the other 
victims, Sean ran out the back door and to a 
neighbor's home where the police were 
called. 
About the same time, Wight's Life Alert 
system activated a call for emergency 
assistance and that in turn resulted in a 911 
call to law enforcement. The system also 
created a recording of the events in the house. 
When officers arrived, Karen was lying on 
the kitchen floor, unconscious and barely 
breathing. Emily, who had also been shot 
twice, was dead on the living room floor. 
Wight was sitting in a chair in the living 
room, suffering from a single gunshot wound 
to the abdomen, but conscious. Lauren, who 
had been shot twice, was found upstairs, 
conscious but having trouble breathing. 
Kahler was no longer in the house, but both 
Wight and Lauren told the first responders 
that Kahler was the person who had shot 
them. Karen and Lauren died from their 
wounds later that evening. Wight survived a 
few days but ultimately succumbed to her 
wounds as well. 
Kahler managed to elude law enforcement 
that evening but was found walking down a 
country road the next morning. He 
surrendered without incident. The State 
charged Kahler with one count of capital 
murder, or, in the alternative, four counts of 
premeditated first-degree murder, as well as 
one count of aggravated burglary for the 
unauthorized entry into Wight's house. 
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At trial, the defense did not dispute that it was 
Kahler who shot the victims. Rather, the 
defense attempted to establish that severe 
depression had rendered Kahler incapable of 
forming the intent and premeditation required 
to establish the crime of capital murder. The 
defense presented testimony from Dr. 
Stephen Peterson, a forensic psychiatrist, 
who testified that Kahler was suffering from 
severe major depression at the time of the 
crime and that "his capacity to manage his 
own behavior had been severely degraded so 
that he couldn't refrain from doing what he 
did." Defense counsel, however, did not 
specifically ask Dr. Peterson whether Kahler 
had the capacity to premeditate or to form the 
requisite intent to commit the crimes. The 
State countered with the expert testimony of 
Dr. William Logan, also a forensic 
psychiatrist, who opined that Kahler was 
capable of forming the requisite intent and 
premeditation. 
During closing arguments, defense counsel 
asserted that Kahler was incapable of 
forming the requisite premeditation or intent 
at the time of the killings. In return, the State 
argued that the defense expert had failed to 
specifically address that point, while the 
State's expert had directly stated that 
Kahler was capable of premeditating the 
murder and forming the requisite intent to 
kill. 
The jury convicted Kahler of capital murder. 
After hearing additional evidence in the 
penalty phase, the same jury recommended 
the death sentence. 
As noted, Kahler raised 10 issues on appeal, 
all of which are argued in the context of the 
capital murder conviction and the ensuing 
death sentence. Consequently, we will review 
only that conviction and sentence and will 
address each issue in the order presented. 
 
I. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR 
In his first issue, Kahler alleges that the 
prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial 
misconduct when she objected during 
defense counsel's closing argument. Defense 
counsel was discussing the 
recording produced during the commission 
of the crime by the Life Alert system. A male 
voice, presumably Kahler's, had been 
captured on the recording. Defense counsel 
was about to state the words spoken by that 
male voice, when the prosecutor interrupted, 
objecting that defense counsel's argument 
constituted improper unsworn testimony 
based on what defense counsel thought the 
voice had said. The district court sustained 
the objection. 
Standard of Review/Error Analysis 
At oral argument, both parties acknowledged 
that this court's decision in State v. Sherman, 
although decided after the briefs in this case 
were filed, now controls the analysis of this 
issue. Sherman ended the practice followed 
by State v. Tosh, overruled by Sherman, of 
attempting to factor a prosecutor's ill will and 
gross misconduct into the prejudice step of 
the two step error/prejudice analysis when 
reviewing an allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct on appeal. Sherman substituted 
an analysis that is focused on the defendant's 
due process right to receive a fair trial. 
 151 
Sherman continues to utilize a two-step 
error/prejudice framework and the first 
step—the error analysis—remains the same. 
"Under the first step, we will continue to 
analyze whether the prosecutor's statements 
'fall outside the wide latitude afforded 
prosecutors to conduct the State's case and 
attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner 
that does not offend the defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair trial.'" If error 
occurred, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that "'the error complained 
of will not or did not affect the outcome of 
the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., 
where there is no reasonable possibility that 
the error contributed to the verdict.'"  
 
Analysis 
Kahler maintains that his right to a fair trial 
was violated when the prosecutor objected to 
defense counsel's attempt in closing 
argument to repeat what was said by the male 
voice on the Life Alert recording. The 
prosecutor's objection was based on the 
assertion that defense counsel was not 
allowed to state his opinion of the content of 
the tape and doing so amounted to improper 
testimony. 
At oral argument, Kahler argued that the 
objection was error because it was motivated 
by bad faith and attempted to liken it to a 
misstatement of law. In other words, Kahler 
attempts to move the bad faith analysis 
previously conducted under the prejudice 
step to the error step. But ill will has never 
been part of the error determination. 
And Sherman is clear that measuring 
prejudice by attempting to discern the 
prosecutor's motivation has been problematic 
in the past and is no longer appropriate to our 
analysis of prosecutorial error within a 
criminal appeal. Thus, the question before the 
court under Sherman, as it was under 
previous caselaw, is simply whether making 
an objection, even one based on an erroneous 
application of law, was outside the wide 
latitude afforded the prosecutor in making 
her case to the jury. 
We conclude that it is within the prosecutor's 
permissible latitude to object that the defense 
is about to go beyond the admitted evidence 
in its summation to the jury. As we discuss 
below, the district court's ruling on the 
prosecutor's objection may have been 
erroneous. But this fact has no bearing on the 
determination of whether the objection itself 
was prosecutorial error. 
II. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT 
Kahler alleges that the district court judge 
engaged in misconduct throughout the trial, 
which cast his defense in a bad light, favored 
the State's case, and denied him his right to a 
fair trial. Kahler points to six specific 
instances to illustrate his argument. 
At trial, defense counsel failed to object to 
any of the claimed misconduct. But an 
appellate court will review allegations of 
judicial misconduct that were not preserved 
at trial when the defendant's right to a fair 
trial is implicated. In addition, we are 
statutorily obligated to review this issue 
because of the death sentence imposed. 
Standard of Review 
Our standard of review on claims of judicial 
misconduct is unlimited. We examine the 
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particular facts and circumstances of the case 
to determine whether judicial conduct 
including comments, other than jury 
instructions, rise to the level of judicial 
misconduct.   
Analysis 
The Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct 
(KCJC) requires a judge to act in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  
An erroneous ruling by a judge, standing 
alone, will not establish judicial misconduct. 
Rather, the reviewing court will look for 
conduct that manifests bias, prejudice, or 
partiality, or otherwise significantly 
undermines the fairness or reliability of the 
proceedings. The complaining party has the 
burden to establish that judicial misconduct 
occurred and that the misconduct prejudiced 
the party's substantial rights. "'If a proper and 
reasonable construction will render the 
remark unobjectionable, the remark is not 
prejudicial.'"  
With those ground rules to guide us, we turn 
to the individual instances alleged by Kahler 
to be judicial misconduct, followed by a 
consideration of their cumulative effect. 
A. Warning a voir dire panel against 
outbursts of opinion 
Kahler first complains of remarks the district 
judge made to a panel of the jury pool during 
voir dire. Four panels of venire members 
were questioned. The remarks Kahler finds 
objectionable were made to the third panel 
and were part of the district judge's 
preliminary remarks explaining voir dire. In 
addition to asking the panel members to 
speak clearly for the court reporter and to pay 
attention to all the questions asked whether 
directed specifically to them or not, the 
district judge added the following caution: 
"It's also important that you be 
careful. We want you to talk frankly, 
we want you to answer questions and 
speak from your heart, but we don't 
want any outbursts of opinions that 
might prejudice the rest of this panel 
so before you speak in any manner 
like that, think twice. And I warned 
you, anyway, regarding that, 
regarding your personal opinions." 
Kahler argues these remarks to the third panel 
dissuaded the panel members from 
expressing their opinions and inhibited the 
voir dire process. The State counters that, put 
in context, the district judge's remarks were 
nothing more than a reasonable admonition 
to prevent one of the potential jurors from 
tainting the rest of the panel and were well 
within the district judge's responsibility to 
control the courtroom. We agree with the 
State. 
A district judge is charged with preserving 
order in the courtroom and with the duty to 
see that justice is not obstructed by any 
person. The record establishes that 
throughout the voir dire of the first two 
panels, the district judge had expressed 
concern about questioning by the defense that 
might elicit panel members' views on the 
death penalty. We have approved of similar 
remarks in other cases where the district 
judge sought to prevent contamination of the 
jury pool.  
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We note, however, that the better practice 
would have included a clarification by the 
district judge that panel members would 
have an opportunity to raise any personal 
concerns outside the presence of the other 
venire members. But it is clear that the 
district judge's failure to include such a 
clarification to the third panel was an 
oversight, as his comments to the fourth 
panel included just such a statement. 
In sum, we find no misconduct in the district 
judge's comments to the third panel. 
 
B. Asking defense counsel to move along 
Kahler complains that the district judge 
committed misconduct when he asked 
defense counsel to speed up his voir dire 
questioning. During the defense voir dire of 
the third panel on the second morning of jury 
selection, the district judge told defense 
counsel, "we need to move through this a 
little faster if we can. I realize you have a 
right to all your questions but we're running 
behind now." Kahler argues this shows bias 
because the judge did not make a similar 
request of the State and the defense 
questioning had not exceeded the time 
afforded the prosecutor. 
The trial judge has broad discretion in 
controlling the courtroom proceedings. 
"When it is necessary to comment on 
counsel's conduct, especially in the jury's 
presence, the trial court should do so in a 
dignified, restrained manner; avoid repartee; 
limit comments and rulings to those 
reasonably required for the orderly progress 
of the trial; and refrain from unnecessarily 
disparaging persons or issues."  
Kahler argues that his counsel took no more 
time for voir dire than the prosecution had 
taken. For support, Kahler compares the 
number of transcript pages that contain voir 
dire questioning by the prosecutor to the 
number taken by defense counsel's 
questioning. This method of quantifying time 
is inherently unreliable. More to the point, 
however, there is nothing in the district 
judge's comments that reflects negatively on 
defense counsel's conduct. The statement 
concerned the orderly progress of the trial, 
and nothing suggests that the statement was 
delivered in anything less than a dignified 
and restrained manner. The statement was a 
request, not an order, and clearly recognized 
that defense counsel was entitled to ask his 
questions. 
We once again note the better practice, which 
would have the district judge make such 
administrative requests out of the presence of 
the venire panel. Nonetheless, merely 
requesting trial counsel to move a little faster, 
if possible, does not amount to judicial 
misconduct.  
 
C. Comments on instructing the jury 
following opening statements 
Both parties gave relatively straightforward 
opening statements. The prosecutor gave a 
brief overview of the shootings and then 
summarized testimony he expected to elicit 
from each of the State's witnesses about the 
crime and the crime scene. The defense 
focused on painting a picture of the events 
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that led up to the crime: Kahler's professional 
success, the many happy years of the Kahlers' 
marriage and family life, the breakdown of 
the marriage, and Kahler's obsession with 
saving it. 
There were no objections during the State's 
opening; however, the State objected three 
times during Kahler's opening. After defense 
counsel had attributed statements to Karen, 
the prosecutor asked to approach the bench. 
At the bench, the prosecutor lodged an 
objection based on hearsay. The district judge 
sustained the objection and instructed 
Kahler's counsel to set out the expected 
evidence and not to testify. The objection and 
discussion were had out of hearing of the 
jury. 
Almost immediately after the bench 
conference, the prosecutor objected a second 
time, saying only "same objection" when 
counsel for Kahler again attributed 
statements to Karen. This time the district 
judge responded within hearing of the jury: 
"All right. [Defense counsel], we talked. 
Unless you intend to call witnesses to support 
what you're saying, they're not allowed." 
Later, the prosecutor requested to approach 
the bench again to lodge an objection to 
defense counsel using the word "crazy" to 
describe Kahler's behavior. The discussion 
and the judge's admonition not to use the 
word were outside the jury's hearing. 
Immediately following Kahler's opening 
statement, the district judge said: 
"All right. Ladies and gentlemen of 
the jury, I'm going to read an 
instruction to you at this time. I 
normally don't do this, but I am going 
to ask that you listen carefully. This is 
one of the instructions that will be 
given to you later but I wish to give it 
to you now also. That statement is: 
Statements, arguments, and remarks 
of counsel are intended to help you in 
understanding the evidence and in 
applying the law, but they are not 
evidence. If any statements are made 
that are not supported by evidence, 
they should be disregarded." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Kahler argues the district judge's comments 
prior to the actual instruction showed bias—
particularly the comment that the judge did 
not normally give the instruction but wished 
to do so this time. Kahler argues that it 
amounted to a negative comment on defense 
counsel's credibility. 
The State focuses only on the instruction and 
ignores the judge's comments preceding the 
instruction. It argues the instruction itself was 
a fair and accurate statement of the law. It 
also points to K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-3414(3), 
which provides "the judge, in the judge's 
discretion, after the opening statements, may 
instruct the jury on such matters as in the 
judge's opinion will assist the jury in 
considering the evidence as it is presented." 
But the State fails to acknowledge that the 
district judge gave the jury a set of 
instructions prior to opening statements, 
which included an instruction on considering 
only testimony and exhibits admitted into 
evidence and an instruction that it is up to the 
jury to determine the weight and credit to be 
given the testimony of each witness. 
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Given the context of the prosecution's 
objections during the defense's opening 
statement, the judge's comment undoubtedly 
brought special attention to the instruction. 
Moreover, given the timing of the district 
court's comment, the jury's attention would 
undoubtedly have been directed to the 
defense's opening argument. The jury had 
just heard the district judge admonish defense 
counsel by saying, "Unless you intend to call 
witnesses to support what you're saying, 
they're not allowed." When the district judge 
commented immediately on the heels of the 
opening statements, he underscored his 
suspicion that the defense would not be able 
to introduce evidence that would allow the 
jury to attribute certain statements to Karen. 
This belief should not have been revealed to 
the jury. 
This court has previously warned district 
judges to "limit[] comments and rulings to 
what is reasonably required for the orderly 
progress of the trial, and refrain[] from 
unnecessary disparagement of persons or 
issues." Here, the comment added nothing to 
the orderly progress of the trial—the 
instruction could have been given without 
editorial comment or explanation. The 
district judge erred in making the comment. 
Error alone does not require reversal, 
however. "'The question is whether [the 
defendant]'s substantial rights to a fair trial 
were prejudiced by the court's 
statements.'" Here, the district judge's 
isolated comment did not show the type of 
judicial bias that denies a fair trial. On 
occasion, district judges reveal, usually 
unintentionally, a bias on an issue. 
Consequently, district judges routinely 
instruct the jury, as the judge did in this case, 
that "I have not meant to indicate any opinion 
as to what your verdict should be by any 
ruling that I have made or anything that I 
have said or done." Nothing suggests the 
judge's isolated comment here influenced the 
jury's consideration or misdirected the jury's 
focus. 
Indeed, the instruction given after the judge's 
ill-advised comment pointed the jury exactly 
where it needed to go: The instruction 
focused the jury on the evidence. That is the 
point of the instruction, which is often given 
repeatedly through a trial. Consequently, we 
hold the judge's comment to be harmless 
error under either the constitutional or 
nonconstitutional harmless error standard.  
 
D. Personally questioning a witness 
The prosecution's theory at trial was that 
Kahler shot the victims with a .223 caliber 
rifle or "long gun." Shell casings found at the 
scene and bullets found in a clip near where 
Kahler was arrested were .223 caliber. The 
gun used in the murders, however, was never 
found. During testimony, a Shawnee County 
deputy testified that she was asked to look for 
a "long gun" in Kahler's impounded vehicle 
as part of the investigation. She testified that 
she was unable to find a gun but did find an 
empty box for a Remington .223. She 
testified she left the box in the car. The 
district judge apparently did not think this 
testimony was clear, and at the end of the 
prosecutor's questioning, questioned the 
witness himself: 
"BY THE COURT: Q. And I will ask 
this just as a matter of clarification 
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before the break; you mentioned an 
empty box Remington .223 caliber, is 
that correct, caliber? 
"A. It was told to me that it was a 
Remington .223. 
"Q. All right. Now when you said 
that, are you talking about a gun itself, 
or the bullet, or caliber of gun? 
"A. It was the box for a gun. 
"Q. Okay. You don't know whether it 
was a Remington brand gun or some 
other brand? 
"A. I was told that it was a Remington 
.223. 
"THE COURT: Counsel, you want to 
try [***30]  to clarify that with her? 
"[Prosecutor]: Sure. 
. . . . 
"[Prosecutor]: Q. You didn't find a 
weapon in the vehicle, did you? 
"A. No. 
"Q. You found a box that appeared to 
be a gun box? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And it listed a caliber of the 
weapon at the end of it? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And what was the caliber of the 
gun? 
"A. It would have been .223. 
"Q. And REM, is that reference to the 
caliber or the brand of gun? 
"A. The brand of gun." 
Later testimony clarified that the box was for 
a long gun and the serial number of the gun 
that would have come in that box was 
registered to Kahler. Kahler maintains the 
district judge aided the State in proving its 
theory that a long gun was used in the crime 
and the assistance had the effect of bolstering 
the State's case and credibility. 
This court has allowed questioning of 
witnesses from the bench "based upon the 
premise that one of the functions of a trial 
judge is to accomplish the full development 
of the truth." But we have cautioned that the 
practice must not result in the slightest 
suggestion of partiality or bias. For decades, 
we have expressed our view that the better 
practice is for the district judge to discuss the 
matter with counsel outside the presence of 
the jury and ask counsel to pose the questions 
necessary to clarify the matter.  
Although the better practice would have been 
for the district judge to follow the procedure 
set out in Boyd, we see no misconduct here 
because there was no suggestion of partiality. 
Although Kahler contends that the judge's 
questioning aided and bolstered the State's 
case, it is just as probable that by stepping in 
to clarify and suggesting to the prosecutor 
that he follow up with additional questions, 
the district judge's comments reflected 
negatively on the State's presentation. Kahler 
does not argue that the questions asked were 
improper, and they drew no objection from 
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defense counsel at the time. We also note that 
the importance to the State's case regarding 
the type of gun used was nearly nonexistent 
given Kahler's defense was not based on 
denying the shootings. Ultimately, the judge 
did not assume the role of an advocate; he 
merely attempted to clarify a point he 
apparently felt was unclear—a point that 
was of virtually no importance to the trial. 
Consequently, we find no misconduct. 
E. Sustaining objection to closing comments 
about voice on tape 
We rejected Kahler's argument above that the 
prosecutor committed prosecutorial error by 
objecting to defense counsel's attempt to 
quote the male voice on the Life Alert 
recording. Here we address his argument that 
the district judge committed misconduct by 
sustaining the objection. 
The transcript reflects the following: 
"[By Defense Counsel]: . . . you're 
going to hear a male voice during this 
absolute chaos say . . . 
"[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I'm going 
to object. The tape's in evidence. And 
counsel's not allowed to testify and 
tell the jury what he thinks is on that 
tape. 
"[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I 
can say what I think's on that tape. 
They've got the tape and if it doesn't 
say it—counsel just said what all 
these witnesses said. I'm certainly 
allowed to say what the tape says. 
"THE COURT: I think it's improper. 
You cannot say what you think is on 
the tape. 
"[Defense Counsel]: Well, can I say 
what is on the tape, Your Honor? 
"THE COURT: They can listen for 
themselves. 
"[Defense Counsel]: All right." 
Kahler argues the district judge committed 
misconduct in two ways: first, by erroneously 
sustaining the objection and, second, by 
labeling defense counsel's conduct 
"improper." 
The State maintains that counsel for Kahler 
was about to misrepresent the evidence. It 
argues there was no testimony as to what the 
male voice on the tape specifically said. And 
noting that the voice itself is barely 
discernible, the State argues anything counsel 
would have said in regard to content would 
not have been based on the evidence. 
Accordingly, the State contends the district 
court was correct to sustain the objection. 
We disagree. The district court sustained the 
objection in error, if for no other reason than 
because it was premature. The record does 
not contain a proffer of the words that defense 
counsel thought were on the tape, so we 
cannot know for sure whether they 
comported with the admitted evidence. But 
we do know there was more evidence than the 
State acknowledges. In addition to 
the original recording itself, the record 
includes Dr. Peterson's report and the 
transcript contained on the enhanced CD, 
which indicate that the voice said, "I am 
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going to kill her." So, if defense counsel was 
going to state that the male voice on the tape 
said "I am going to kill her," it would have 
been entirely proper for defense counsel to 
discuss that statement and any reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from it. 
But an erroneous ruling by the district judge, 
standing alone, is not grounds for finding 
judicial misconduct. Something more is 
required. Here, Kahler argues that the words 
the district judge used in ruling on the 
objection denigrated the defense. But the 
words used to sustain the objection did not 
denigrate counsel personally. The phrase "it's 
improper" appears to be a reference to the 
form of the argument counsel was attempting 
to use. These are the words our opinions 
frequently use to characterize argument or 
conduct of counsel as impermissible.  
Granted, when we issue an opinion we are not 
speaking within earshot of the jury. But we 
believe juries can be expected to understand 
that objections will be made and ruled upon 
in terms of what is proper and what is or is 
not allowed without assuming nefarious 
purposes by counsel, at least not those 
beyond normal trial advocacy. We cannot 
fault the district judge for framing his 
ruling—although erroneous—in commonly 
used terms. 
Accordingly, we find no judicial misconduct. 
We do, however, find that the district court's 
sustaining of the State's objection was an 
unassigned trial error. Given the record and 
the arguments before us, we do not find this 
error requires reversal standing alone. 
 
F. Discouraging the jury from asking 
questions during deliberations 
For his final allegation of judicial 
misconduct, Kahler alleges that, before 
sending the jurors to deliberate at the end of 
the guilt phase, the district judge discouraged 
them from asking any questions they might 
have during deliberations. The particular 
remarks Kahler complains of concerned what 
the jurors should do in the event they had 
questions. The judge stated: 
"The bailiff will be outside the door 
here and if you have any questions 
you can knock on the door and 
communicate with her. 
"Now I have given you the 
instructions[,] that's the law of the 
case. Counsel has presented the 
evidence, the facts of the case. You 
should apply the law to the facts. You 
have everything you need to decide 
this case. You should review the 
instructions for the answers to any 
questions you might have. You should 
not have to ask any questions. 
However, if you have a question there 
is a process that we must go through 
and you should be aware of that 
process. You can't just ask the bailiff 
to tell me your question so that I can 
run back there and give you an 
answer. 
"The process that we must follow 
requires that any question that you 
might ask be in writing. And the 
presiding juror must prepare that 
question in writing, hand it to the 
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bailiff, and I must then assemble 
counsel and the defendant and we 
must discuss the question to decide 
whether we are able to give you an 
answer and, if so, what that answer 
should be. My experience as a Judge 
has been that although sometimes we 
are able to give jurors answers, for 
the most part the answer you're 
going to receive to most questions 
will be refer to your instructions for 
advice." (Emphasis added.) 
Kahler focuses on the italicized comments 
and argues they demonstrated impatience 
with the steps necessary to meet the due 
process and Eighth Amendment 
requirements of a capital case. He points 
to K.S.A. 22-3420(3) to argue the jury had a 
right to ask questions. At the time of 
trial, K.S.A. 22-3420(3) provided: 
"After the jury has retired for 
deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed as to any part of the law or 
evidence arising in the case, they may 
request the officer to conduct them to 
the court, where the information on 
the point of the law shall be given, or 
the evidence shall be read or 
exhibited to them in the presence of 
the defendant, unless he voluntarily 
absents himself, and his counsel and 
after notice to the prosecuting 
attorney." 
The remarks in this case were both legally 
and factually accurate; the jury was informed 
that questions could be asked; and the process 
that would be used to answer them was 
explained. The comment that the jury should 
not have to ask any questions, in context, 
appears to be a statement that the jury had the 
necessary information to reach a decision. 
The statement was an encouragement to the 
jurors to review the instructions before 
asking a question rather than a 
discouragement from asking any questions at 
all. The statement informed the jurors that 
most questions would likely be answered by 
referring the jury back to the instructions. 
Nothing in the comments demonstrated bias, 
prejudice, or partiality toward either party. 
We find no misconduct. 
G. No cumulative prejudicial effect 
As noted above, we have typically required 
the party asserting judicial misconduct to 
show that any misconduct found to exist 
actually prejudiced that party's substantial 
rights. Kahler urges us to apply the 
constitutional harmless error test set out 
in Ward. But having found only one instance 
of misconduct that was not reversible 
standing alone, the cumulative error rule is 
inapplicable here. 
In the process of reviewing the judicial 
misconduct claims, we noted some instances 
in which the district judge could have applied 
a better practice to the situation at hand. 
Nonetheless, we discern no pattern of 
conduct that manifested bias, prejudice, or 
partiality against the defendant, and Kahler's 
claim of judicial misconduct fails. 
III. EXPERT WITNESS INSTRUCTION 
Prior to trial, Kahler requested that the 
district court give the jury an instruction on 
how it may consider the opinion testimony of 
experts. The State objected and the district 
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court declined to give the proffered 
instruction because expert opinion 
instructions are not recommended by the 
criminal Pattern Instructions for Kansas 
(PIK). Kahler claims that the district court's 
ruling was erroneous. 
Standard of Review 
"For jury instruction issues, the progression 
of analysis and corresponding standards of 
review on appeal are: (1) First, the appellate 
court should consider the reviewability of the 
issue from both jurisdiction and preservation 
viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard 
of review; (2) next, the court should use an 
unlimited review to determinewhether the 
instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, 
the court should determine whether there was 
sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the defendant or the requesting 
party, that would have supported the 
instruction; and (4) finally, if the district 
court erred, the appellate court must 
determine whether the error was harmless, 
utilizing the test and degree of certainty set 
forth in State v. Ward."  
Analysis 
The requested instruction, based on the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals Pattern Criminal 
Jury Instruction 1.17, reads as follows: 
"During the trial you heard the 
testimony of     who expressed 
opinions concerning    . In some 
cases, such as this one, scientific, 
technical, or other specialized 
knowledge may assist the jury in 
understanding the evidence or in 
determining a fact in issue. A witness 
who has knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education, may testify and 
state an opinion concerning such 
matters. 
"You are not required to accept such 
an opinion. You should consider 
opinion testimony just as you 
consider other testimony in this trial. 
Give opinion testimony as much 
weight as you think it deserves, 
considering the education and 
experience of the witness, the 
soundness of the reasons given for the 
opinion, and other evidence in the 
trial." 
Although the State objected to the instruction 
at trial, it concedes on appeal that the 
instruction accurately states the law. The PIK 
Committee, however, continues to 
recommend that a separate instruction on 
expert opinion testimony not be given.  
The district judge did give the standard 
instruction on witness testimony, which 
states: "It is for you to determine the weight 
and credit to be given the testimony of each 
witness. You have a right to use common 
knowledge and experience in regard to the 
matter about which a witness has testified." 
Neither party objected to this instruction. The 
State contends that this instruction 
adequately covers the substance of the 
requested instruction. 
This court has frequently emphasized the 
wisdom of following the PIK Committee 
recommendations. On the other hand, we 
have also said that  the failure to use the exact 
language of a PIK instruction is not fatal. 
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Moreover, a district court should not hesitate 
to modify or add to pattern instructions where 
appropriate in a particular case.  
In State v. Willis, this court considered the 
giving of an expanded instruction on witness 
credibility. The Willis court concluded there 
was no clear error in the giving of the 
expanded instruction but noted "it would 
certainly have been the better practice to give 
an instruction along the lines of PIK Crim. 2d 
52.09." The expert witness instruction 
requested here, although contained in a 
separate instruction, was, in effect, an 
expanded version of the witness credibility 
instruction. 
Then, in State v. Hunt, this court stated that it 
"has continually disapproved the giving of an 
expanded version of the credibility 
instruction," although it had also continually 
held that to do so was not clearly erroneous. 
Later, in State v. Adams, the district judge 
provided a witness credibility instruction 
based on PIK Crim. 3d 52.09 that also 
included wording from a civil pattern jury 
instruction regarding expert witnesses. The 
added language, like the language in the 
federal instruction Kahler requested, 
instructed the jury that testimony of experts 
was to be considered like any other testimony 
and should receive the same weight and 
credit as the jury deemed it entitled to when 
viewed in connection with all the other facts 
and circumstances. The defendant alleged the 
instruction was erroneous because the district 
court did not follow the PIK Committee's 
recommendation not to give an expert 
witness instruction in criminal trials. 
The Adams court observed: 
"The instruction accurately stated the 
law as it stands in Kansas. The jury 
should weigh expert witness 
testimony in the same manner it 
weighs all testimony. . . . 
"In addition, Adams' jury would not 
reasonably have been misled by the 
instruction. Had the first paragraph of 
the hybrid stood alone, the jury still 
would have been instructed as to how 
to assess credibility of all witnesses, 
regardless of expertise."  
But this case highlights that there is a 
fundamental difference between an ordinary 
witness' testimony as to the facts of a case and 
an expert's opinion testimony as to what those 
facts mean. Indeed, opinion evidence from 
experts is admissible precisely because the 
jurors' common knowledge and experience 
would not permit them to properly 
understand the circumstances of the case. 
"Where the normal experience and 
qualifications of jurors permit them to 
draw proper conclusions from given facts 
and circumstances, expert conclusions or 
opinions are not necessary."  Yet, the general 
instruction in PIK Crim. 3d 52.09 recites, in 
part: "You have the right to use common 
knowledge and experience in regard to the 
matter about which a witness has testified." If 
a witness has been permitted to give an expert 
opinion because the subject matter is beyond 
the common knowledge and experience of 
the jurors, how does a juror use his or her 
nonexistent common knowledge and 
experience to assess the expert's testimony? 
Moreover, an expert witness is permitted to 
share his or her opinion with the jury only 
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after the trial judge has reached the legal 
conclusion that the witness is, indeed, an 
expert on the topic about which he or she is 
going to opine. The regular witness 
credibility instruction does not clarify for the 
jurors that they may reject the expert opinion 
even though it has been stamped with the 
judge's imprimatur. In short, there is nothing 
generic about opinion testimony from expert 
witnesses, and the jury's assessment of the 
credibility of that testimony should not be left 
to the insufficient direction contained in the 
generic PIK instruction. 
Consequently, the district court erred when it 
refused to give the defense's requested 
instruction on expert witness credibility 
because the instruction was legally 
appropriate and factually supported. But that 
does not end the discussion; the error is 
subject to a harmlessness analysis. In that 
regard, notwithstanding that the legal 
substance of the requested instruction was 
not adequately covered by the general 
instructions that were given, there is no 
reasonable possibility that the error affected 
the jury's guilty verdict. In other words, the 
error was harmless. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF K.S.A. 22-
3220 
For his fourth issue, Kahler contests the 
constitutionality of K.S.A. 22-3220. The 
statute provides: 
"It is a defense to a prosecution under 
any statute that the defendant, as a 
result of mental disease or defect, 
lacked the mental state required as an 
element of the offense charged. 
Mental disease or defect is not 
otherwise a defense." 
At trial, Kahler based his defense on mental 
disease or defect. He filed a motion alleging 
that the statute unconstitutionally deprived 
him of the ability to assert a defense based on 
insanity. The district court denied the motion, 
and the jury was instructed in accord with the 
statute. On appeal, Kahler continues to assert 
his constitutional challenge. 
Standard of Review 
Whether a statute is constitutional raises a 
question of law over which this court 
exercises unlimited review.  
 
Analysis 
Before the enactment of K.S.A. 22-3220, 
the M'Naghten rule was the proper test for the 
defense of insanity in Kansas. 
The M'Naghten rule provided that 
"the defendant is to be held not 
criminally responsible (1) where he 
does not know the nature and quality 
of his act, or, in the alternative, (2) 
where he does not know right from 
wrong with respect to that act. Under 
the 'right and wrong' test of criminal 
insanity, it must be proved that at the 
material time the accused did not 
know that what he was doing was 
contrary to law."  
But the Kansas legislature abandoned 
the M'Naghten rule through enactment 
of K.S.A. 22-3220, which became effective 
January 1, 1996. The statute adopted what is 
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known as the "mens rea approach."  The 
mens rea approach allows evidence of mental 
disease or defect as it bears on the mental 
element of a crime but abandons lack of 
ability to know right from wrong as a 
defense. Kahler argues that by doing so the 
statute violates the Due Process 
Clause because it offends a principle of 
justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.  
The same arguments made by Kahler were 
considered and rejected by this court in State 
v. Bethel. The Bethel court conducted a 
thorough review of the pertinent decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court and other 
states that had considered the issue. 
Ultimately, the Bethel court concluded 
that  "K.S.A. 22-3220 does not violate the 
defendant's right to due process under the 
United States or Kansas 
Constitutions." Kahler relies on Finger v. 
State, in which the Nevada Supreme Court 
held legal insanity is a fundamental principle 
of the criminal law of this country. But 
the Bethel court considered and rejected the 
reasoning of the Nevada Supreme Court 
in Finger, and we adhere to 
our Bethel decision. 
Although Kahler has added no new 
arguments to those this court considered and 
rejected in Bethel, he directs our attention to 
a written dissent from a denial of certiorari by 
three justices in Delling v. Idaho. The dissent 
was critical of the mens rea approach because 
it allows conviction of an individual who had 
no capacity to know that what he or she was 
doing was wrong. The dissent would have 
granted the petition for certiorari to consider 
whether Idaho's modification of the insanity 
defense is consistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. As part of 
its discussion, the dissent cited Bethel and 
noted that Kansas is one of only four states 
that have adopted the mens rea approach. 
While we are cognizant of the three justices' 
position, the Delling dissent has no effect on 
our Bethel decision. 
The parties have thoroughly set out the 
arguments and cases in their briefs. 
Nonetheless, Kahler has offered no new 
reason to reconsider the arguments 
previously and thoughtfully rejected by this 
court. Thus a review of those arguments or 
of Bethel is not warranted. 
 
V. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTION ON FELONY MURDER 
Kahler did not request an instruction that 
would have permitted the jury to convict him 
of felony murder, as a lesser included offense 
of capital murder. He claims on appeal that it 
was clearly erroneous for the district court to 
fail to give that lesser included offense 
instruction on its own. 
Standard of Review 
To determine whether the district court's 
failure to sua sponte give an unrequested jury 
instruction was clearly erroneous, the 
reviewing court must first determine whether 
there was any error at all. "To make that 
determination, the appellate court must 
consider whether the subject instruction was 
legally and factually appropriate, employing 
an unlimited review of the entire record."  
 164 
Analysis 
Kahler's brief was filed after this court's 
decision in State v. Cheever, held that felony 
murder was a lesser included offense of 
capital murder and, consequently, that an 
instruction to that effect should be given in a 
capital case where warranted by the evidence. 
Although no felony murder instruction was 
requested or given in Kahler's case, he argued 
in his opening brief, pursuant to Cheever, that 
one was warranted and that it was clear error 
not to give it. 
By the time the State filed its responsive 
brief, the legislature had amended K.S.A. 
2012 Supp. 21-5402, in response to Cheever, 
to specifically provide that felony murder 
was not a lesser included offense of capital 
murder. While the State raised a number of 
arguments, it primarily argued that K.S.A. 
2016 Supp. 21-5402(d) applied retroactively 
by its specific terms to overcome Kahler's 
argument. Anticipating Kahler's reply, the 
State also argued that K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-
5402(d) was neither unconstitutional under 
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution nor precluded by due process 
under Beck v. Alabama. 
As anticipated, Kahler's reply brief focused 
on arguments against the constitutionality 
of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5402(d) based 
on Beck and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Two 
months after the reply brief was filed, this 
court considered and decided the same 
arguments in State v. Gleason. 
Gleason concluded: 
"K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5402(d), by 
its express language, applies 
retroactively, foreclosing Gleason's 
claim that the district court erred in 
refusing Gleason's request for a 
felony-murder instruction. Further, 
the 2013 amendments do not violate 
Gleason's constitutional right to due 
process, as interpreted in Beck, nor 
does retroactive application violate 
the prohibition against ex post facto 
laws."  
In State v. Carr, this court held the ruling 
in Gleason eliminated any need to address 
the argument that a lesser included offense 
instruction for felony murder was supported 
by the evidence admitted at trial. And, 
subsequently in Cheever, again considering 
the same arguments, this court held "[t]he 
reasoning of the Gleason and Carr cases 
applies with equal force and effect to this case 
and requires us to conclude that Cheever was 
not entitled to a felony-murder lesser 
included offense instruction. The trial judge 
did not err when he did not give one." 
Gleason controls this case and dictates the 
conclusion that the district judge did not err 
by failing to give a felony-murder lesser 
included offense instruction because such an 
instruction was not legally appropriate. 
 
VI. LIMITATIONS ON DEFENSE VOIR DIRE 
Kahler alleges the district court denied him a 
fair trial by prohibiting his counsel from 
questioning prospective jurors during voir 
dire about their views on the death penalty. 
 
Standard of Review/Analytical Framework 
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The purpose of voir dire is to enable the 
parties to select jurors who are competent and 
without bias, prejudice, or partiality. The 
nature and scope of voir dire examination is 
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial 
court; however, appellate tribunals have the 
duty to make an independent evaluation of 
the circumstances of voir dire in determining 
whether the district court has taken sufficient 
measures to ensure the accused is tried by an 
impartial jury free from outside 
influences. An adequate voir dire is essential 
to protect a defendant's right to an impartial 
jury guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  
We will find an abuse of discretion if the trial 
court has unconstitutionally restricted a 
capital defendant's questioning during voir 
dire. Mindful that this is a capital case in 
which the jury has imposed the death penalty, 
we have carefully examined the record of the 
district court's conduct of voir dire. Simply 
put, we find no support for Kahler's argument 
in the record. 
The district judge consistently took the 
position that Kahler's counsel could not 
question prospective jurors about their views 
on the death penalty in the presence of other 
venire members. Clearly, the district judge 
was concerned that an individual panel 
member's comments could prejudice other 
members and wished to avoid a situation in 
which it might become necessary to 
disqualify an entire panel. But discussions 
between counsel and the district judge prior 
to commencement of trial, along with the 
written order covering the conduct of voir 
dire, made clear that counsel were entitled to 
question venire members individually when 
their in-court answers indicated a need to 
delve into matters outside the hearing of the 
rest of the panel. At oral argument, counsel 
for Kahler acknowledged that Kahler's trial 
counsel was not prevented from making an 
individual inquiry of each venire person's 
death penalty views. In fact, trial counsel 
never made a request to question any of the 
venire members individually. Consequently, 
while an absolute prohibition against inquiry 
in front of the rest of the venire panel might 
be an unnecessary precaution against the risk 
of tainting the entire panel, it was not error 
here. 
VII. CUMULATIVE ERROR DURING THE 
GUILT PHASE 
Kahler claims that his guilt phase convictions 
must be reversed because cumulative trial 
errors denied him a fair trial. 
 
Standard of Review/Analytical Framework 
 "'Cumulative trial errors, when considered 
collectively, may require reversal of the 
defendant's conviction when the totality of 
circumstances substantially prejudiced the 
defendant and denied the defendant a fair 
trial.'" No prejudicial error may be found 
under the cumulative error doctrine if the 
evidence against the defendant is 
overwhelming.  
"For errors to have a cumulative effect that 
transcends the effect of the individual errors, 
there must have been more than one 
individual error. [Citation omitted]." We 
have agreed with Kahler that the trial judge 
should not have told the jury, "I normally 
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don't do this," before giving PIK Crim. 4th 
50.070 after opening statements and that the 
trial judge erred in refusing to give the expert 
witness instruction requested by the 
defense. In the process of our review, we also 
noted an erroneous ruling by the district court 
on an objection the State lodged during 
defense counsel's closing argument. In short, 
there was more than one trial error. 
But the touchstone is whether the defendant 
received a fair trial, not whether he received 
a perfect trial. Moreover, we have declined to 
find reversible error under the cumulative 
error rule where "'the evidence is 
overwhelming against the defendant.'" On 
the record before us, we are firmly convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilty 
verdict would not have changed if the errors 
had not been committed. 
We also note that the errors identified during 
the guilt-phase proceeding are not the type 
that we would expect to impact 
the sentencing determination when the same 
jury decides both guilt and sentence. 
Accordingly, we do not revisit this error in 
our penalty-phase discussion. 
 
VIII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CATEGORICAL 
CHALLENGE TO DEATH PENALTY 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits the infliction of "cruel 
and unusual punishments." Kahler claims 
that a sentence of death violates that 
constitutional right when it is imposed upon 
a severely mentally ill person. 
Although Kahler relies on a motion he filed 
in the district court as having raised this issue 
below, that motion did not set out a 
categorical proportionality argument based 
on mental illness. Nevertheless, this court has 
held that a categorical proportionality 
challenge under the Eighth Amendment may 
be raised for the first time on appeal.  
 
Standard of Review/Types of Categorical 
Challenges 
"A categorical proportionality challenge 
under the Eighth Amendment implicates 
questions of law, and this court has unlimited 
review."  
"The United States Supreme Court 
identifies three subcategories of 
categorical proportionality 
challenges. The first considers the 
nature of the offense, such as a 
prohibition on capital punishment for 
nonhomicide crimes against 
individuals. The second considers the 
characteristics of the offender, such 
as a categorical rule prohibiting the 
death penalty for juveniles. The third, 
which was first recognized 
in [***57]  Graham, combines the 
two because it 'implicates a particular 
type of sentence as it applies to an 
entire class of offenders who have 
committed a range of crimes.' 560 
U.S. at 61."  
Analysis 
Kahler's claim fits within the second 
subcategory of offender characteristics. He 
proposes a categorical rule prohibiting 
the death penalty for offenders who were 
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severely mentally ill at the time of their 
crimes. 
In analyzing claims under this second 
category, the United States Supreme Court 
employs a two-part test: 
"The Court first considers 'objective 
indicia of society's standards, as 
expressed in legislative enactments 
and state practice' to determine 
whether there is a national consensus 
against the sentencing practice at 
issue. Next, guided by 'the standards 
elaborated by controlling precedents 
and by the Court's own understanding 
and interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment's text, history, meaning, 
and purpose,'  the Court must 
determine in the exercise of its own 
independent judgment whether the 
punishment in question violates the 
Constitution. 
We recently considered and rejected a nearly 
identical argument in Kleypas. In fact, 
Kahler's brief is, with the exception of those 
portions pertaining directly to Kahler 
himself, nearly word for word the same brief 
that was submitted on this issue in Kleypas. 
In Kleypas, we said that the defendant had 
not shown the kind of legislative consensus 
that the Supreme Court relies upon in the first 
part of its test. Then, in exercising our 
independent judgment under the second part 
of the test, we opined as follows: 
"As to the second-prong of the test, 
we explained in Williams that 
'community consensus is entitled to 
great weight but it is not 
determinative.' And in State v. 
Mossman, we observed: 
"'In accordance with the 
constitutional design, "the 
task of interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment remains [the 
Court's] responsibility." 
[Citation omitted.] The 
judicial exercise of 
independent judgment 
requires consideration of the 
culpability of the offenders at 
issue in light of their crimes 
and characteristics, along with 
the severity of the punishment 
in question. [Citations 
omitted.] In this inquiry the 
Court also considers whether 
the challenged sentencing 
practice serves legitimate 
penological goals.'  
"Atkins and Roper both identify 
retribution and deterrence as the 
'legitimate penological goals' served 
by the imposition of the death penalty 
on those who commit the worst 
crimes. Both conclude that the 
characteristics of juveniles and the 
mentally retarded,  respectively, 
make offenders in those categories 
less culpable than the 'average 
murderer.' And being less culpable 
and less amenable to deterrence, the 
death penalty is inappropriate for 
their crimes. 
"In support of his argument, Kleypas 
simply states '[t]he culpability of the 
severely mentally ill is diminished in 
 168 
the same manner as juveniles and the 
mentally retarded.' He cites language 
quoted from the ABA 
recommendation report to illustrate 
that some severe disorders result in 
hallucinations or delusions. But the 
ABA report itself recognizes that 
diagnosis alone is not a sensible basis 
for the exemption and, consequently, 
a case-by-case determination will be 
required. The report recognizes 
that Atkins left the definition of 
'mental retardation' to the states. The 
report continues: 
"'Atkins held the death penalty 
excessive for every person 
with mental retardation, and 
the Supreme Court therefore 
dispensed with a case-by-case 
assessment of responsibility. 
However, for the disorders 
covered by this . . . part of the 
Recommendation, preclusion 
of a death sentence based on 
diagnosis alone would not be 
sensible, because the 
symptoms of these disorders 
are much more variable than 
those associated with 
retardation or the other 
disabilities covered by the 
Recommendation's first 
paragraph.'  
"In contrast, in Roper, the United 
States Supreme Court noted that '[t]he 
differences between juvenile and 
adult offenders are too marked and 
well understood to risk allowing a 
youthful person to receive the death 
penalty despite insufficient 
culpability.’  And in Atkins, the Court 
noted that clinical definitions of 
mental retardation shared common 
features which ultimately bore on the 
determination of culpability.  
"Mental illnesses present less 
discernable common characteristics 
than age or mental retardation. 
Caselaw relating to the 
implementation of Ford v. 
Wainwright, and Panetti v. 
Quarterman, illustrates the difficulty 
in defining a discernable standard 
relating to mental illness.  As the 
ABA standard recognizes, case-by-
case evaluations would be necessary; 
it follows that the level of culpability 
will vary on a case-by-case 
basis. While we recognize that some 
mental illnesses may make a 
defendant less culpable and less likely 
to be deterred by the death penalty, 
often such illnesses can be treated and 
may not manifest in criminal 
behavior. 
"We also note the protections already 
in place, which protect the 
incompetent from trial and the 
'insane' from execution. In addition, a 
defendant may present a defense to 
the crimes based on a lack of 
capacity. Finally, as Kleypas did 
here, mental illness can be asserted as 
a mitigator. While we recognize a 
distinction between disqualification 
and mitigation, we also recognize that 
presenting mental illness as a 
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mitigator allows the jury to consider 
culpability. 
"Given these variables and 
considerations, in the exercise of our 
independent judgment, we reject a 
categorical prohibition based on the 
broad classification of mental illness, 
even as defined by the ABA standard, 
in favor of individualized 
assessments through the sentencing 
proceeding. We have confidence that 
Kansas juries can weigh a defendant's 
mental state at the time of the crime 
as a mitigating factor for 
consideration in the decision of 
whether to return a death penalty 
verdict. 
"We conclude that Kleypas fails to 
make the showing necessary under 
either prong of the two-part 
categorical proportionality analysis. 
We, therefore, deny his Eighth 
Amendment categorical 
proportionality challenge and 
conclude the Eighth Amendmentdoes 
not categorically prohibit the 
execution of offenders who are 
severely mentally ill at the time of 
their crimes."  
We find this issue controlled by our decision 
in Kleypas and see no reason to revisit that 
holding. 
IX. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
Kahler argues the two aggravating 
circumstances relied upon by the State to 
justify the death penalty failed to properly 
channel the jury's discretion as required by 
the federal and state constitutions. He argues 
that the "killing or creating a great risk of 
death to more than one person" factor is 
duplicative of the elements needed to prove 
capital murder. He argues that the "heinous, 
atrocious, and cruel" factor is vague and 
duplicative. 
 
Standard of Review 
The constitutionality of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance is a question of law 
subject to unlimited review.  
 
Analysis 
Kahler acknowledges in his brief that this 
court has decided the questions raised in this 
issue against him. Kahler has raised no new 
arguments nor pointed to any caselaw which 
would provide a basis for reconsideration of 
those decisions, and we decline to do so. 
 
X. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF AN 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE 
For his final issue, Kahler argues there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's 
finding of the second aggravating factor 
argued by the State, i.e., that the crime was 
committed in an especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel manner. 
 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support an aggravating 
circumstance was set out by this court 
in Kleypas, to-wit: 
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“The standard of review on appeal as 
to the sufficiency of evidence 
regarding an aggravating 
circumstance is whether, after review 
of all the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, the 
appellate court is convinced that a 
rational factfinder could have found 
the existence of the aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 
Analysis 
At the penalty hearing, the State relied in part 
on the evidence it had presented at the guilt 
phase trial. The State also put the coroner, Dr. 
Erik Mitchell, back on the stand to largely 
repeat his testimony from the guilt phase 
concerning the bullet wounds suffered by 
each of the victims. With respect to each 
victim, Mitchell described where each bullet 
entered the body, how the wound or wounds 
would have affected the victim's awareness 
and her ability to feel pain, and, ultimately, 
how they would have brought about her 
death. He testified that all of the women 
would have suffered the severe pain of being 
shot. He also concluded that all of them 
retained awareness long enough to know of 
the other shootings going on around them and 
to be cognizant of their own possible 
impending death. 
The jury was instructed in accord with PIK 
Crim..), on the heinous, 
atrocious, [***65]  or cruel aggravating 
circumstance: 
"That the defendant committed the 
crime of capital murder in an 
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel 
manner. As used in this instruction, 
the following definitions apply: 
• 'heinous' means extremely wicked 
or shockingly evil; 
• 'atrocious' means outrageously 
wicked and vile; and 
• 'cruel' means pitiless or designed to 
inflict a high degree of pain, utter 
indifference to, or enjoyment of the 
sufferings of others. 
"In order to find that the crime of 
capital murder is committed in an 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
manner, the jury must find that the 
perpetrator inflicted serious mental 
anguish or serious physical abuse 
before the victim['s] death. Mental 
anguish includes a victim's 
uncertainty as to her ultimate fate." 
We have often held that shooting deaths are 
not inherently heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
We compiled a number of those cases 
in State v. Baker. 
In Baker, we also reviewed a number of cases 
in which this court had found shooting deaths 
to be especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel. We concluded in Baker that the 
"common thread" running between those 
cases in which we held a shooting death had 
been especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
was evidence of the infliction of mental 
anguish upon the victim prior to death.  
A more recent case is factually similar to this 
case. In State v. Hayes, defendant Terry Ray 
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Hayes was married to Tiffani Hayes for a 
little over a year. In April 2010, Tiffani 
moved out, and shortly afterward, Hayes 
filed for a divorce. He experienced 
depression and suicidal ideations following 
the breakup. There was evidence that Hayes 
continually contacted Tiffani electronically, 
at work and elsewhere, that he accused her of 
infidelity, and that he had told others he 
would kill her. On the day of the murder, 
Hayes lured Tiffani to his home by telling her 
he had some of her property that she needed 
to pick up. Tiffani arrived with a friend and 
approached Hayes who was in the 
driveway. The friend witnessed Hayes 
confront Tiffani, heard Tiffani scream, and 
then saw Tiffani being chased down as she 
tried to escape from Hayes who had a gun. 
Hayes shot Tiffani in the back of the head 
when he caught up to her. In summing up the 
evidence supporting the aggravator, this 
court said there was "evidence that Hayes had 
threatened Tiffani in the past, that he lured 
her to his residence in order to kill her, and 
that he killed Tiffani as she tried to run away 
from him."  
Here, there was evidence that Kahler engaged 
in similar electronic stalking in which he sent 
emails to Karen, to Karen's lover, and to 
others. There was evidence Kahler was 
severely depressed and was obsessed with 
Karen's leaving. There was also evidence of 
a prior physical threat to Karen. Karen had 
previously had Kahler arrested for battering 
her, and she was aware of his obsessive 
behavior. In Hayes, the district court relied 
on similar evidence to establish that Tiffani 
had reason to fear Hayes and, as a result, 
suffered mental anguish at the time of her 
death. As in Hayes, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Kahler's prior behavior 
contributed to Karen's mental anguish when 
he walked into Wight's kitchen with a gun 
and shot her. 
In addition to the evidence above, there is 
clear evidence from the Life Alert recording 
that Kahler methodically went through the 
house shooting each of the women in turn. 
The coroner's testimony established that the 
bullet wounds to each of the victims were not 
immediately fatal and would have left each 
victim conscious long enough to suffer the 
physical pain of her injuries in addition to the 
mental anguish of her impending death. The 
evidence clearly established that Wight and 
Lauren were aware of others being shot 
before them and lived long enough to suffer 
seriously from their own wounds and to fear 
for their own lives. The Life Alert recording 
established beyond question that Lauren 
suffered severe mental anguish as her father 
went through the house shooting her family 
members as she lay mortally wounded 
fearing for her own life. Viewing this 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, we easily conclude that a 
rational factfinder could have found beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Kahler committed the 
murders in an especially heinous, atrocious, 
or cruel manner. 
We applied the same standard of review 
in Gleason, where we recognized our 
"independent duty to consider the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the jury's findings 
on aggravating circumstances."  
Kahler does not contest the jury's finding that 
Kahler killed or created a great risk of death 
to more than one person. But under our 
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independent duty to determine "whether 
the evidence supports the findings that an 
aggravating circumstance or circumstances 
existed," we have no problem determining 
that the evidence was sufficient to support 
this aggravating circumstance. With our 
determination above that sufficient evidence 
supported the heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
aggravating circumstance, we now must 
determine whether the evidence supports the 
finding that "mitigating circumstances were 
insufficient to outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances." Again, we have no difficulty 
in determining that the jury's weighing 
determination and sentencing verdict were 
supported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Kahler's conviction of capital murder 
under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) and his sentence 
of death are affirmed. 
 
BILES, Senior Judge, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part:  
I agree with the majority's decision to affirm 
James K. Kahler's convictions and sentences 
but disagree with one conclusion reached by 
the majority. I would not characterize as 
misconduct the trial judge's aside that "I 
normally don't do this" before giving the 
pattern jury instruction about remarks of 
counsel. I think the majority reaches the 
wrong conclusion and in the process does a 
disservice to the trial bench. It slaps a 
"judicial misconduct" label on what, at worst, 
should be an opportunity for a simple 
"teaching moment" to caution judges about 
their banter with juries. 
The comment in question came after defense 
counsel's opening statement. Recall there 
were three objections to defense counsel's 
opening statement with one admonition to 
defense counsel being overheard by the jury. 
And after counsel finished, the district judge 
gave an admittedly proper preliminary jury 
instruction, saying: 
"All right. Ladies and gentlemen of 
the jury, I'm going to read an 
instruction to you at this time. I 
normally don't do this, but I am going 
to ask that you listen carefully. This is 
one of the instructions that will be 
given to you later but I wish to give it 
to you now also. That statement is: 
Statements, arguments, and remarks 
of counsel are intended to help you in 
understanding the evidence and in 
applying the law, but they are not 
evidence. If any statements are made 
that are not supported by evidence, 
they should be disregarded." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Kahler argues this passing comment about 
what normally occurs in a typical trial, along 
with its proximity to his counsel's opening 
statement and the State's objections, shows 
judicial bias requiring reversal of Kahler's 
convictions. The majority does not go that 
far, but it tags the comment as judicial 
misconduct. I disagree. 
When addressing the merits of this alleged 
judicial misconduct—"I normally don't do 
this"—this court must consider the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the alleged 
misconduct to decide whether the remark 
manifested bias that impaired the trial's 
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fairness. In this case, the trial judge had a 
tough job. He was coping with a particularly 
heinous, high-profile death penalty case 
involving a quadruple homicide. Two 
victims were young girls. 
In what was obviously an effort to maintain 
focus and order, the trial judge sandwiched 
both counsel's opening statements between 
appropriate preliminary pattern jury 
instructions. Immediately before the State's 
opening remarks, the trial judge instructed 
jurors to consider only the testimony and 
exhibits admitted into evidence. Immediately 
after the defense's remarks, the trial judge 
cautioned the jury as recited above. 
It is impossible for me to understand how the 
defense can cry foul when what the trial judge 
advised the jury about included a comment 
that explained the State and defense counsel's 
purpose in giving their openings was to help 
jurors understand the evidence and 
application of the law. Surely, no one would 
take the State seriously if it objected that its 
opening statement was diminished because it 
was preceded by the judge telling the jury to 
consider only the testimony and exhibits—
effectively inviting the jury to disregard what 
it was about to hear. And the instruction that 
followed the opening statements here can 
objectively be seen as validating the purpose 
of opening statements, rather than degrading 
a particular speaker's integrity. 
What we are left with is the trial judge's aside 
that he "normally" did not give the later 
instruction, but wanted the jury to hear it 
then, and would give it again later. What 
would a reasonable person take from this? 
Indulging the majority's willingness to 
speculate, one obvious answer arises because 
these jurors knew they were hearing an 
abnormal, highly charged, multiple murder 
case in which an individual's life hung in the 
balance. And given that, they would have far 
more readily associated the judge's comment 
that he did not "normally" give a particular 
instruction with the serious business at hand 
and what was most assuredly on everyone's 
minds, i.e., the grisly case being heard. 
Instead, the majority steadfastly conjectures 
that jurors "would" see the remarks 
"undoubtedly" as targeting the defense in 
some critical way. That conclusion is too 
farfetched under the facts and circumstances 
presented. 
I disagree with the majority's characterization 
of this remark as judicial misconduct and 
error. But I agree if the comment was error, it 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
JOHNSON, Judge, dissenting:  
I dissent. To effect synergy with the majority, 
I will address each of its issues in turn, 
including those with which I agree, followed 
by the unassigned error of unconstitutionally 
inflicting the cruel and/or unusual 
punishment of death. 
 
ISSUE #1: PROSECUTORIAL ERROR 
I agree with the majority's holding that it is 
within the prosecutor's permissible latitude to 
object on the ground that the defense's 
closing argument is about to go beyond the 
admitted evidence, even where the objection 
is based on the prosecutor's erroneous 
understanding of the law. I disagree, 
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however, with the majority's suggestion that 
bad faith or ill will can never play any role in 
the error analysis. I would submit that a 
prosecutor does not have the wide latitude to 
intentionally seek to lure the trial court into 
erroneously excluding permissible defense 
arguments. Such bad faith conduct, 
manifesting ill will, does, indeed, constitute 
prosecutorial error. But I do not discern that 
the prosecutor in this case crossed that line.  
ISSUE #2: JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT 
I agree with the majority on its assessment of 
the judge's remarks to the third panel of 
venire persons warning against blurting out 
personal opinions. Although a more 
articulate admonition would have included 
the clarification that panel members could 
individually advise the court of their 
respective personal concerns about the death 
penalty outside the presence of the others that 
omission in this context did not rise to the 
level of misconduct. 
Likewise, I agree with the majority that it 
would have been better if the venire panel had 
not heard the trial judge ask the defense to 
pick up the pace. But I discern no judicial 
misconduct. 
Further, I agree with the majority's finding of 
error regarding the third alleged incident of 
judicial misconduct during which the district 
judge told the jury that he normally did not 
give the instruction on counsel's statements 
not being evidence after the opening 
statements. The majority correctly discerns 
that, in context, the judge's comment brought 
special attention to the instruction and the 
jury could have concluded that the extra 
instruction was specifically aimed at the 
credibility of the defense opening statement. 
With respect to the judge's questioning of the 
deputy, I would concur with the majority's 
determination that, although the better 
practice would have been for the district 
judge to ask the prosecutor to seek 
clarification of the testimony, there was no 
misconduct here. The judge's questions did 
not suggest partiality toward the State. 
Indeed, the questioning could be viewed as 
having cast some doubt on the deputy's 
thoroughness or expertise. 
The alleged judicial misconduct set forth in 
II.E. is a corollary to the alleged prosecutorial 
error in the first issue. To reiterate, after the 
prosecutor objected to defense counsel's 
stating what the male voice was saying on the 
Life Alert tape, the district judge ruled: "I 
think it's improper. You cannot say what you 
think is on the tape." Kahler contends that it 
was misconduct for the judge to sustain the 
objection and it was also misconduct for the 
judge to state in front of the jury that the 
defense argument was improper. 
I agree with the majority's assessment that the 
district court's ruling on the State's objection 
during the defense closing argument was 
legally infirm and constituted an unassigned 
trial error. But, as the majority correctly 
states, Kahler had to show more than an 
erroneous ruling on an objection to establish 
his assigned error of judicial misconduct. He 
did not do so here, even with the judge's use 
of the word "improper" to describe the legal 
status of the argument. 
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Kahler's complaint about the judge's remarks 
concerning jury questions during 
deliberations is similarly miscast as judicial 
misconduct. Even if the judge's comments 
were erroneous, Kahler does not explain how 
discouraging jury questions would inevitably 
result in bias, prejudice, or partiality that was 
adverse to the defense. One can imagine that 
a jury could have some questions which, if 
left unresolved, would prejudice the State. 
Consequently, although I view the judge's 
remarks to be ill-advised and erroneous, 
especially in a death penalty case, I cannot 
say they rise to the level of being misconduct. 
In sum, I concur with the majority that the 
record does not support the defendant's claim 
that the district judge engaged in a pattern of 
conduct that manifested bias, prejudice, or 
partiality against the defense. But defendant's 
arguments on this issue point out two 
unassigned errors, i.e., the district court 
erroneously sustained the State's objection 
during the defense closing argument, and the 
district court erroneously discouraged the 
jury from exercising its right, after retiring 
for deliberations, "to be informed as to any 
part of the law or evidence arising in the 
case."  
Individually, the judge's erroneous 
instruction following defense counsel's 
opening statement and the two unidentified 
errors would not have changed the jury's 
guilty verdict. I discuss their cumulative 
prejudicial effect in Issue #7. 
 
ISSUE #3: REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON 
EXPERT WITNESSES 
I agree with the majority that the district court 
erred in refusing to give the requested 
instruction on expert witness credibility, but 
that the error standing alone did not affect the 
jury's guilt-phase verdict. 
 
ISSUE #4: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF K.S.A. 
22-3220 
In rejecting Kahler's constitutional challenge 
to this state's elimination of the insanity 
defense, in favor of a mens rea approach, the 
majority leans heavily on its assessment that 
Kahler adds nothing new to the arguments 
that were rejected in State v. Bethel. While 
stare decisis is a valid tack, the majority 
conveniently overlooks a significant 
distinction between this case and Bethel. 
Although Bethel was convicted of capital 
murder, the death penalty was not 
involved. "Pursuant to an agreement of the 
parties, Bethel waived his right to a jury trial, 
the case was tried to the bench on stipulated 
facts, and the State did not pursue the death 
penalty."  
Recently, we acknowledged that this court is 
supposed to employ a higher degree of 
scrutiny in a death penalty case. We stated: 
"This court has, in several cases, 
noted that issues in a death penalty 
review are subject to a heightened 
reliability standard.” 
"A sentence of death is different from 
any other punishment, and 
accordingly there is an increased need 
for reliability in the determination 
that death is the appropriate sentence. 
“ 
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At the very least, this court has the obligation 
to independently analyze whether the 
procedure of replacing the insanity defense 
with the mens rea approach undermines the 
reliability of the jury's determination to 
impose the death penalty. One might question 
whether a juror would be as likely to vote to 
kill a defendant who did not know that his or 
her murderous act was wrong. 
ISSUE # 5: LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTION ON FELONY MURDER 
The majority follows recent precedent to 
opine that the legislature retroactively 
eliminated felony murder as a lesser included 
offense of capital murder. One can certainly 
make a logical argument for the proposition 
that eliminating felony murder as a lesser 
offense of capital murder effectively changes 
the definition of the crime of capital murder, 
and, although the legislature is entitled to 
change the definition of a crime, it cannot 
redefine the crime after it is committed. 
Nevertheless, that is the settled law in this 
state now. 
ISSUE #6: LIMITATIONS ON DEFENSE VOIR 
DIRE 
I have no quibble with the majority's holding 
that the district court did not impermissibly 
limit the defense's voir dire of the jury panels 
given the record before the court and defense 
counsel's failure to conduct individual voir 
dire of venire members. 
ISSUE #7: CUMULATIVE ERROR DURING 
THE GUILT PHASE 
I discern that the following judicial acts 
constitute multiple guilt-phase trial errors, to-
wit: (1) Giving the jury instruction after 
opening statements with accompanying 
remarks about it being unusual; (2) sustaining 
the State's objection during the defense 
closing argument, thereby precluding 
argument on the admitted Life Alert tape 
recording; (3) discouraging the jury from 
submitting questions during its deliberations; 
and (4) refusing to give the legally 
appropriate and factually supported expert 
witness instruction proffered by the defense. 
Notwithstanding the existence of more than 
one error, I would not hold that their 
collective effect requires reversal of the 
guilty verdict. But I strongly disagree with 
the majority's determination that the guilt-
phase errors can be ignored when considering 
the same jury's penalty-phase decision. Our 
heightened reliability obligation mandates 
that we not approve a sentence of death that 
is obtained through erroneous procedures. I 
would hold that the errors made in this case 
undermined the reliability of the jury's death 
sentence, and I would require that it be 
vacated and remanded for a new sentencing 
trial. A death sentence that fails the unreliable 
procedures test cannot pass constitutional 
muster, even if the majority believes that a 
subsequent trial would yield the same result. 
 
ISSUE #8: EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
CATEGORICAL CHALLENGE TO DEATH 
PENALTY 
The majority relies exclusively on Kleypas, 
to reject Kahler's argument that it is cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States 
Constitution for the State to kill a person who 
was severely mentally ill at the time of the 
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capital murder. I did not specifically address 
this issue in my Kleypas dissent, but I do so 
now. 
Fifteen years ago, in Atkins v. Virginia, the 
United States Supreme Court construed and 
applied the Eighth Amendment "in the light 
of our 'evolving standards of decency,'" and 
concluded that imposing the death penalty on 
a mentally retarded offender was excessive 
and "that the Constitution 'places a 
substantive restriction on the State's power to 
take the life' of a mentally retarded offender." 
While recognizing that a preferred label is 
intellectual disability, see Hall v. Florida, for 
clarity I will use the terms employed 
in Atkins and Kleypas, i.e., mental 
retardation and mentally retarded. 
Part of the rationale for Atkins' holding was 
that the Court seriously doubted that either of 
the two justifications for the death penalty 
that it had recognized—retribution and 
deterrence—could be applied to mentally 
retarded offenders. The Court opined that 
"[u]nless the imposition of the death penalty 
on a mentally retarded person 'measurably 
contributes to one or both of these goals, it "is 
nothing more than the purposeless and 
needless imposition of pain and suffering," 
and hence an unconstitutional punishment.'"  
In reaching its conclusion that it was "not 
persuaded that the execution of mentally 
retarded criminals will measurably advance 
the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the 
death penalty," Atkins, the Court engaged in 
the following analysis: 
"With respect to retribution—the 
interest in seeing that the offender 
gets his 'just deserts'—the severity of 
the appropriate punishment 
necessarily depends on the culpability 
of the offender. Since Gregg, our 
jurisprudence has consistently 
confined the imposition of the death 
penalty to a narrow category of the 
most serious crimes. For example, 
in Godfrey v. Georgia, we set aside a 
death sentence because the 
petitioner's crimes did not reflect 'a 
consciousness materially more 
"depraved" than that of any person 
guilty of murder.'  If the culpability of 
the average murderer is insufficient to 
justify the most extreme sanction 
available to the State, the lesser 
culpability of the mentally retarded 
offender surely does not merit that 
form of retribution. Thus, pursuant to 
our narrowing jurisprudence, which 
seeks to ensure that only the most 
deserving of execution are put to 
death, an exclusion for the mentally 
retarded is appropriate. 
"With respect to deterrence—the 
interest in preventing capital crimes 
by prospective offenders—'it seems 
likely that "capital punishment can 
serve as a deterrent only when murder 
is the result of premeditation and 
deliberation,"' Exempting the 
mentally retarded from that 
punishment will not affect the 'cold 
calculus that precedes the decision' of 
other potential murderers.  Indeed, 
that sort of calculus is at the opposite 
end of the spectrum from behavior of 
mentally retarded offenders. The 
theory of deterrence in capital 
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sentencing is predicated upon the 
notion that the increased severity of 
the punishment will inhibit criminal 
actors from carrying out murderous 
conduct. Yet it is the same cognitive 
and behavioral impairments that 
make these defendants less morally 
culpable—for example, the 
diminished ability to understand and 
process information, to learn from 
experience, to engage in logical 
reasoning, or to control impulses—
that also make it less likely that they 
can process the information of the 
possibility of execution as a penalty 
and, as a result, control their conduct 
based upon that information. Nor will 
exempting the mentally retarded from 
execution lessen the deterrent effect 
of the death penalty with respect to 
offenders who are not mentally 
retarded. Such individuals are 
unprotected by the exemption and 
will continue to face the threat of 
execution. Thus, executing the 
mentally retarded will not measurably 
further the goal of deterrence."  
The Kleypas majority "recognize[d] that 
some mental illnesses may make a defendant 
less culpable and less likely to be deterred by 
the death penalty." Notwithstanding the self-
serving equivocation in that recognition, it 
nevertheless points out the logical fallacy in 
categorically protecting the mentally retarded 
but not the severely 
mentally ill. Atkins spoke about mentally 
retarded offenders being less morally 
culpable because of their "diminished ability 
to understand and process information, to 
learn from experience, to engage in logical 
reasoning, or to control impulses," as well as 
not being amenable to deterrence. I fail to 
grasp how a severely mentally ill person 
possessing those same characteristics is not 
in the same less-morally-culpable category as 
the mentally retarded offender. If a person is 
incapable of understanding the nature and 
quality of their murderous act and/or did not 
know that the act was wrong, does it matter 
whether the cause of the cognitive deficiency 
is labeled mental retardation or chronic 
mental illness? The point is that, when 
executing a severely mentally ill person will 
not "measurably advance the deterrent or the 
retributive purpose of the death penalty," it 
becomes "nothing more than the purposeless 
and needless imposition of pain and 
suffering."  
Kleypas strained to distinguish severe mental 
illness by declaring that the condition 
presents "less discernable common 
characteristics than age or mental 
retardation." The apparent suggestion was 
that the courts might have to work more 
diligently to identify which mentally ill 
persons are less culpable. That argument is 
unpersuasive, if for no other reason than the 
notion that a person's life—even a murderer's 
life—should not be taken away without this 
court's heightened scrutiny, even if that takes 
more effort. 
But, more importantly, I do not accept the 
premise. This state has decades of 
jurisprudence applying the M'Naghten rule. 
Determining whether a person was so 
severely mentally ill at the time of the crime 
as to render him or her less culpable is not 
much of a leap from that former knowing-
right-from-wrong jurisprudence. Likewise, 
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the argument falters when one considers that 
intellectual disability in this state is not 
determined through a mathematical 
calculation, but rather the condition requires 
a case-by-case determination as well.  
Moreover, I must confess to being baffled by 
the point Kleypas attempted to make by 
stating that "often such [mental] illnesses can 
be treated and may not manifest in criminal 
behavior." If the suggestion is that mental 
retardation and being 
underage always manifests in criminal 
behavior, that would, of course, be ludicrous. 
The fact that not all mentally ill persons 
engage in criminal activity is no more 
compelling than the fact that not all mentally 
retarded persons are criminals. Moreover, if 
the statement means to suggest that mentally 
retarded persons can never receive training 
that will permit them to peacefully exist in 
society, that, too, would be wrong-headed. 
Finally, Kleypas' rationale that the problem 
of executing severely mentally ill persons is 
ameliorated because mental illness can be 
presented to the jury as a mitigator does not 
pass cursory consideration. Would telling a 
juror that the defendant suffers from a 
severe mental illness that resulted in him or 
her killing people without knowing it was 
wrong, suggesting that the defendant will 
always be a danger to society, make the juror 
more, or less, likely to vote for death? If it is 
morally and legally wrong to execute a 
person who is no more culpable than Atkins' 
"average murderer," the decision to do so 
should not be left in the emotionally charged 
hands of the jury. 
ISSUE #9: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TWO 
AGGRAVATING FACTORS 
I concur with the majority's determination 
that the issues raised here were previously 
decided adversely to Kahler, and I see no 
reason to attempt to avoid the doctrine of 
stare decisis today. 
 
ISSUE #10: SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE 
I would agree with the majority's assessment 
that this case presents an exception to the 
general proposition that shooting deaths are 
not inherently heinous, atrocious, or cruel. A 
person who stalks and systematically shoots 
his wife and daughters, one after the other, 
whereupon each remains aware of her own 
impending death and the deaths of her 
relatives has committed capital murder in a 
heinous, atrocious, and cruel manner. 
 
OTHER UNASSIGNED ERRORS 
Kahler does not challenge the 
constitutionality of Kansas' death penalty law 
under our State Constitution. But as noted 
above, we can—and should—consider 
unassigned errors that impact on fairness and 
justice. In Robinson, I expressed my view 
that the death penalty violates the prohibition 
against cruel or unusual punishment in our 
State Constitution. I relied heavily on Justice 
Breyer's dissent in Glossip, which I 
summarized as follows: 
"The Glossip dissent opined that in 
1976, when the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the death 
penalty, 'the Court thought that the 
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constitutional infirmities in the death 
penalty could be healed,' and it 
'delegated significant responsibility 
to the States to develop procedures 
that would protect against those 
constitutional problems.'  But 
'[a]lmost 40 years of studies, surveys, 
and experience strongly indicate . . . 
that this effort has failed.'  The dissent 
related that the current administration 
of the death penalty 'involves three 
fundamental constitutional defects: 
(1) serious unreliability, (2) 
arbitrariness in application, and (3) 
unconscionably long delays that 
undermine the death penalty's 
penological purpose.' Moreover, the 
dissent noted that, perhaps as a result 
of these constitutional defects in the 
death penalty, 'most places within the 
United States have abandoned its use,' 
which makes the penalty 'unusual.'” 
The only thing I would add here is the 
obvious observation that a part of what makes 
the death penalty unfair and unjust is that the 
degree of certainty that a jury must possess to 
vote for the death penalty does not match the 
finality of the punishment, once executed. A 
jury can convict a person of capital murder 
without being certain that the person is guilty. 
Indeed, prosecutors frequently argue to juries 
that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
of proof does not mean beyond all doubt. 
Then, in the sentencing phase, the same less-
than-certain standard is applied to the 
existence of aggravating factors, which must 
then be outweighed by mitigating 
circumstances.  
But there is nothing uncertain about the 
punishment of death. There is no taking back 
a completed execution, even if we learn that 
the jury was hoodwinked by unscrupulous 
forensics, sandbagged by unethical 
prosecutions, or left less than fully informed 
by inconceivably incompetent defense 
counsel. In recent years, death row inmates 
have been found to have been wrongfully 
convicted for a plethora of 
reasons. Moreover, after a death sentence is 
executed, it matters not one whit whether the 
sentence was unconstitutionally imposed. For 
instance, there was no relief for all of the 
mentally retarded offenders put to death 
before the Atkins court announced that it was 
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual 
punishment to do so. Likewise, the 22 
juvenile offenders put to death between 1985 
and 2003 were not brought back to life 
by Roper's epiphany that a state executing its 
children is categorically unconstitutional.  
In short, when it comes to our death penalty, 










“Supreme Court to Examine Insanity Defense, Need for Jury Unanimity”  
 
 
The Wall Street Journal  
 
Jess Bravin  
 
March 18, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court said Monday it would 
consider whether two pillars of criminal 
law—the insanity defense and the rule that 
only unanimous juries may convict—are 
required by the Constitution. 
The court also agreed to decide cases 
involving two other questions of criminal 
law. One is how recent decisions limiting 
punishment of juvenile offenders apply 
retroactively, an issue raised by Beltway 
sniper Lee Boyd Malvo in challenging his 
sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole. It said it would also 
decide whether states can prosecute crimes 
based on false information entered on federal 
immigration forms. 
All four cases will be heard in the court’s next 
term, which begins Oct. 7. 
The insanity case comes from Kansas, which 
in 1996 eliminated the right of a defendant to 
claim he or she couldn’t distinguish between 
right and wrong. James Kahler, sentenced to 
death for the 2009 murders of four family 
members, contends he was denied the chance 
to argue he was criminally insane based on 
severe depression that may have made him, 
as a defense expert testified, “psychotic and 
impaired to the point” of losing the required 
degree of moral consciousness. 
The Kansas law, he argues, violates the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment and the 14th 
Amendment guarantee of due process of law. 
The insanity defense dates from an 1843 
British case of Daniel M’Naghten, a Scottish 
wood-turner who fatally shot a government 
secretary he mistook for the prime minister. 
Under the resulting M’Naghten rule followed 
by British and American courts, defendants 
can be acquitted if they don’t comprehend 
what they are doing or don’t understand that 
it is wrong. 
In the mid-20th century, courts expanded the 
grounds for insanity or mental-defect 
defenses. A tiny number of defendants plead 
insanity, but after several notorious cases, 
including John Hinckley’s acquittal for 
attempting to assassinate President Reagan 
and for severely wounding his spokesman 
James Brady, lawmakers and voters began to 
rein in mental-capacity defenses. 
States like California, where voters were 
shocked by the so-called Twinkie defense 
invoked to claim that the accused’s poor diet 
partly led him to kill San Francisco Mayor 
George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey 
Milk, dialed back the scope of the insanity 
defense. But according to Mr. Kahler’s 
petition, Kansas, Alaska, Idaho, Montana and 
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Utah go further, prohibiting defendants from 
arguing that they lack the capacity to 
distinguish right from wrong. 
In a separate case, the court will examine 
whether defendants can be convicted of 
crimes without a unanimous jury vote. 
Oregon is the last state permitting 10-2 votes 
for conviction, after Louisiana voters 
amended the state constitution to require 
unanimous verdicts after Jan. 1, 2019. 
Evangelisto Ramos, however, who was 
convicted of a New Orleans murder in 2016 
by a 10-2 vote and sentenced to life without 
the possibility of parole, argues that the 
unanimity requirement, long recognized as 
applying to federal courts under the Sixth 
Amendment, is constitutionally demanded of 
state courts as well. 
The Supreme Court has found that nearly 
every provision of the Bill of Rights also 
applies to state governments, but the Sixth 
Amendment has been an anomaly since 1972, 
when the justices splintered 5-4 against 
applying it to the states. 
The Malvo case revisits a series of random 
shootings that terrorized the Washington, 
D.C. area in 2002 and left 10 victims dead. 
The crime spree’s mastermind, John 
Muhammad, was executed by Virginia in 
2009. Mr. Malvo, who was aged 17 when he 
committed most of the crimes, was sentenced 
to life without parole. 
Starting in 2005, however, the Supreme 
Court delivered a series of opinions that 
prohibited the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders and, in 2012, required additional 
consideration of their incomplete 
development and capacity for rehabilitation 
before imposing life without parole. 
A federal appeals court in Richmond, Va., 
found the 2012 decision applied retroactively 
to Mr. Malvo’s case. The Virginia attorney 
general appealed. 
The fourth case granted Monday involves a 
state prosecution for identity theft of three 
illegal immigrants who used other people’s 
Social Security numbers to fill out 
employment forms in Kansas. The state 
supreme court ruled that federal law doesn’t 
permit states to base such charges on false 
information entered on federal immigration 
forms. Kansas, backed by the Trump 
administration, argues that reading is 
mistaken. 
After accepting those cases, the Supreme 
Court heard argument over 11 districts in the 
Virginia House of Delegates that a lower 
court found had impermissibly been drawn to 
discriminate against African-American 
voters. The argument focused primarily not 
on the lower court’s reasoning, however, but 
on whether the Republican-controlled House, 
which intervened in the case, had legal 
standing to defend the map over opposition 
from the state’s Democratic attorney general. 
Virginia holds off-year state elections, and all 
140 legislative seats are at issue. Republicans 
hold a 51-49 advantage in the state House. 
A decision in the case, Virginia House of 
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Nick Viviani  
 
March 19, 2019 
 
A U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the case of a 
Kansas man convicted of killing four family 
members ten years ago in Osage County 
could change the way insanity defenses work 
across the country. 
On Monday, Kansas Attorney General Derek 
Schmidt announced the nation’s highest 
court would hear the appeal of James Kraig 
Kahler, who was sentenced to death for the 
November 2009 killings of his estranged 
wife, two daughters, and wife's grandmother 
a day after Thanksgiving. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the Writ of 
Certiorari filed on behalf of Kahler by the 
state’s Capital Appellate Defender’s office, 
Sidley Austin LLP, and the Northwestern 
Supreme Court Practicum. The case is 
scheduled to be heard in the October 2019 
session. 
The Justices called Kahler’s case an “ideal 
vehicle” to determine whether the state’s 
restrictions on insanity pleas violate his 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
According to Kansas statute, mental disease 
or defect is not a defense if the defendant had 
the intention of committing the offense 
“regardless of why he thought he was doing 
it or whether he knew it was right or wrong.” 
The state Supreme Court upheld the measure 
in 2003 following the Michael Bethel’s 
appeal of his murder conviction. 
“Kansas still allows that information to be put 
on, but through a different statute regarding 
information about mental disease or defect,” 
said Schmidt. 
In its decision to hear Kahler’s appeal, federal 
Justices pointed out seven states’ high courts 
have recognized a Constitutional right to an 
insanity defense, defying their respective 
state legislatures’ efforts to place restrictions 
on it or get rid of it altogether. They 
specifically pointed to the Nevada Supreme 
Court’s determination the “legal insanity is a 
well-established and fundamental principle 
of the law of the United States… (and) 
…therefore protected by the Due Process 
Clauses of both the United States and Nevada 
Constitutions.” 
The writ issued by the Court also pointed to 
precedent by the Washington Supreme Court 
citing the long history of insanity defenses 
“from the earliest period of the common 
law.” In Washington v. Strasburg the court 
ruled it was “too plain for argument” that 
“prior to and at the time of the adoption of our 
Constitution” a defendant was entitled to 
such a defense. 
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“We have a very limited use of evidence 
regarding a mental disease or defect that can 
be used in criminal cases in Kansas,” said 
John Francis, a law professor at Washburn 
University. 
The High Court said its counterparts in the 
Kansas Supreme Court were wrong when 
they decided an insanity defense was not a 
fundamental tenet of American 
jurisprudence, reaching back to scholarly 
thought from Hebrew and Greek thinkers 
from the 6th and 5th centuries B.C., 
respectively. They noted by the 12th century 
such a defense “had taken root within the 
English common law tradition, and by the 
sixteenth century, insanity was a “well 
recognized defense.” 
According to the Court’s writ, the Bethel 
decision found the Kansas state legislature 
did not eliminate the insanity defense 
altogether, however it did “redefine” it. 
Kansas law as it stands allows defendants 
claiming insanity to be convicted “if the 
defendant was able to form the intent 
required to commit the offense” – even if they 
did not know whether doing it was right or 
wrong. The statement called irrelevant the 
fact malice is not an essential part of a murder 
decision in Kansas, only the intent to kill a 
human being. 
AN IDEAL VEHICLE 
In contrast, four states besides Kansas – 
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Utah – have all 
placed restrictions on the M’Naghten (or 
similar) rule that typically is used in insanity 
defenses. This discrepancy has prompted the 
U.S. Supreme Court to call Kahler’s appeal 
“an ideal vehicle to decide the issue.”  
It added that the Kahler case “cleanly" offers 
the Justices a chance to settle the issue. 
“(I)n forty-six other states, Mr. Kahler could 
have been found not responsible as result of 
his mental state,” the Justices said. “Not in 
Kansas.” 
In Idaho, one of the state’s that has restricted 
its insanity defense, a three-Justice majority 
ruled Due Process does not mandate an 
insanity defense either at the state or federal 
level. The Justices found the “wide disparity” 
in decisions by state legislatures and courts 
“suggests” it is not Constitutionally-required. 
The U.S. Supreme Court noted other state 
high courts have issued similar decisions. 
Additionally, both sides of the 
constitutionality split are filled with 
precedents affirming their positions. 
“We think that the Kansas law has a solid 
constitutional basis,” said Schmidt. 
VITALLY IMPORTANT 
“Whether the Constitution permits states to 
criminally punish (and potentially execute) 
individuals who could not control their 
actions or understand they were wrong has 
profound legal, moral, and practical 
implications for our criminal justice system.” 
 
- U.S. Supreme Court Review of Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari for Kahler v. Kansas 
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In declaring the questions posed by the 
Kahler case “a vitally important and 
recurring issue,” the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that the legitimacy of our criminal law 
rests in part on whether it “reflects the moral 
judgment of the community.” 
They cite precedent from Tison v 
Arizona that argues the “heart of the 
retribution rationale” relates directly to 
personal culpability of the offender. They 
declare this “crucial link” is broken in cases 
involving the severely mentally ill who 
cannot control or comprehend the nature of 
their actions. 
Beyond that, a guilty verdict, as opposed to 
an insanity verdict, could in turn prevent a 
defendant from receiving necessary medical 
treatment because “prisons are notoriously 
ill-suited to provide adequate mental health 
treatment.” 
SENTENCED TO DEATH 
Kahler was sentenced to death for the 
November 2009 killings of his estranged 
wife, two daughters, and wife's grandmother 
a day after Thanksgiving. 
In February of last year, the Kansas Supreme 
Court upheld Kahler's conviction. The state 
Justices ruled that, while prosecutors did 
make errors in the course of the trial, those 
mistakes would not have affected the verdicts 
nor his sentence. In addition, they concluded 
his crimes met the standard of "heinous, 

































The Claremont Journal of Law and Public Policy  
 
Rafael Santa Maria  
 
February 11, 2019 
 
A grisly capital murder case might determine 
the constitutionality of the insanity defense. 
In 2009, James Kraig Kahler shot and 
killed his wife, his mother-in-law, and his 
own two daughters in Burlingame, Kansas. 
After being found guilty and facing a capital 
murder conviction, Kahler appealed to the 
Kansas Supreme Court in an attempt to 
overturn his death sentence. In doing so, the 
defense claimed that Kahler’s severe 
depression, seemingly caused by his wife’s 
extramarital affair and estrangement from his 
family, impaired Kahler’s judgment and 
caused him to lose control of his actions. 
Nevertheless, the Kansas Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s capital conviction. 
Kahler then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, 
bringing the future of the insanity defense to 
the national stage. 
 
Although the insanity plea is very seldom 
used in US criminal cases, the 
pending Kahler v. Kansas case nonetheless 
presents interesting constitutional questions. 
In pleading for Kahler’s innocence, the 
Kahler defense argued that the Kansas courts 
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process and his Eighth Amendment right 
to freedom from cruel and unusual 
punishment. They argued that, since 
Kansas does not recognize severe mental 
illness as a defense to criminal action, Kahler 
was not allowed to provide evidence that his 
mental illness caused him to lose control and 
thus was not given proper due process. 
Furthermore, the defense claimed that 
punishing Kahler would be cruel and unusual 
since his mental illness, as opposed to Kahler 
himself, bore the moral culpability of the 
crime. 
 
By framing the issue of the insanity defense 
in these terms, Kahler v. Kansas may provide 
a definitive answer to whether “the 
Constitution mandates an insanity defense,” 
a question that the Supreme Court avoided 
in Clark v. Arizona, a previous case involving 
a similar issue. In said case, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Arizona Court of Appeals 
decision to convict Eric Michael Clark, a man 
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, since 
Clark could reasonably distinguish between 
morally right or wrong actions. Still, the 
Supreme Court remained ambiguous 
regarding the constitutionality of the insanity 
defense and instead left the issue largely up 
to the state courts. Justice Souter’s 
decision reflected this equivocality, stating: 
“We have never held that the Constitution 
mandates an insanity defense, nor have we 
held that the Constitution does not so 
require.”  
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Without a definitive stance on the insanity 
defense from the Supreme Court, state high 
courts differ significantly on whether or not 
the insanity defense is constitutionally 
required. In Kahler’s petition to the Supreme 
Court, the petitioners highlight these wide 
disagreements and use them to argue for 
a writ of certiorari. Notably, the 
petition points out that while Nevada, 
California, Louisiana, Washington, 
Mississippi, Colorado and Minnesota 
condemn criminal convictions of defendants 
who are mentally unable to understand or 
control their actions, Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, 
Montana and Utah explicitly deny that due 
process requires states to recognize an 
insanity defense. Moreover, the petitioners 
stress that these states overwhelmingly tend 
to reaffirm their previous rulings, further 
entrenching insanity defense 
inconsistencies.  
 
Of course, the Kahler petition unabashedly 
advocates for the Supreme Court to rule that 
the insanity defense is a constitutionally 
mandated aspect of the criminal legal system. 
Throughout the petition brief, the petitioners 
decry the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision 
and Kansas policy on the insanity defense in 
general, presenting the need for a 
constitutionally-mandated insanity defense 
as the culmination of hundreds of years of 
English common law principles and 
precedents.  
 
Regardless of the petitioners’ bias, the brief 
draws attention to how the constant 
prevalence of mental illness ensures that 
there will always be at least some cases in 
which the culpability of the defendant cannot 
easily be determined. Since this issue will 
inevitably persist, the issue of consensus on 
the insanity defense will continue to boil to 
the surface. Therefore, even if it is not 
addressed and resolved in Kahler v. Kansas, 






















The Topeka Capital Journal 
 
Morgan Chilson  
 
February 9, 2018 
 
An appeal by James Kraig Kahler to overturn 
a capital murder conviction after he was 
found guilty of killing four family members 
in 2009 was quashed Friday by the Kansas 
Supreme Court, which also upheld a state 
statute that allows the execution of people 
with severe mental illnesses. 
Kahler, who killed his wife, two daughters 
and his wife’s grandmother in a Burlingame 
shooting, raised 10 issues in his appeal, 
challenging the conduct of the prosecutor and 
trial judge and arguing the death penalty is 
unconstitutional when applied to a person 
who has a severe mental illness when 
committing a crime. 
While the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
trial judge committed errors, the majority 
agreed those errors didn’t affect the trial’s 
outcome and didn’t justify reversing the 
guilty verdict or death sentence. 
The court asserted arguments by Kahler’s 
attorney regarding the constitutionality of a 
Kansas statute that abandoned the insanity 
defense didn’t make a case for 
reconsideration. Kahler’s defense attorney 
had argued Kahler was severely mentally 
impaired when he committed murder because 
of depression. 
“Kahler has offered no new reason to 
reconsider the arguments previously and 
thoughtfully rejected by this court,” the 
majority court opinion said. 
Kahler murdered his estranged wife, Karen 
Kahler, 44; daughters Lauren Kahler, 16, and 
Emily Kahler, 18; and Karen Kahler’s 
grandmother, Dorothy Wight, 89. He left his 
then 10-year-old son alive. 
Kansas Attorney General Derek Schmidt 
applauded the court’s decision to uphold a 
death sentence for the fifth time. 
“The decision today affirms the conviction 
and death sentence based on an Osage 
County jury’s findings and moves this case 
forward one more step,” Schmidt said. 
Others with a death penalty upheld by the 
court are Scott Cheever, John Robinson, 






Kelly v. United States 
 
Ruling Below: United States v. William E. Baroni, Jr., 909 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 
Overview: Kelly was convicted of fraud from federally funded programs, wire fraud, conspiracy 
to commit fraud, and conspiracy against civil rights. She appealed her conviction. The issue is 
whether a public official “defraud” the government of its property by advancing a “public policy 
reason” for an official decision that is not her subjective “real reason” for making the decision.   
Issue: Whether a public official “defraud[s]” the government of its property by advancing a “public 
policy reason” for an official decision that is not her subjective “real reason” for making the 
decision. 




William E. BARONI, Jr. and Bridget Anne KELLY, Defendants-Appellants 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit 
 
Decided on November 27, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and 
Bridget Anne Kelly engaged in a scheme to 
impose crippling gridlock on the Borough of 
Fort Lee, New Jersey, after Fort Lee's mayor 
refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of 
then-Governor Chris Christie. To this end, 
under the guise of conducting a "traffic 
study," Baroni and Kelly, among others, 
conspired to limit Fort Lee motorists' access 
to the George Washington Bridge—the 
world's busiest bridge—over four days in 
early September 2013: the first week of Fort 
Lee's school year. This scheme caused 
vehicles to back up into the Borough, 
creating intense traffic jams. Extensive media 
coverage ensued, and the scandal became 
known as "Bridgegate." 
In 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and 
Kelly for their role in the scheme. Each 
Defendant was charged with seven counts: 
conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly 
convert, or intentionally misapply property of 
an organization receiving federal benefits, 18 
U.S.C. § 371, and the substantive offense; 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and two 
counts of the substantive offense; and 
conspiracy against civil rights,  and the 
substantive offense. A jury convicted 
Defendants on all counts. They appeal only 
their judgments of conviction. 
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For reasons that follow, we will affirm 
Defendants' judgments of convictions on the 
wire fraud and Section 666 counts but will 
reverse and vacate their civil rights 
convictions. 
I.  
In 2010, then-New Jersey Governor Chris 
Christie appointed Baroni to serve as Deputy 
Executive Director of the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey. That same year, 
David Wildstein—a cooperating witness in 
this case—was hired to serve as the Port 
Authority's Director of Interstate Capital 
Projects, in which capacity he functioned as 
Baroni's chief of staff. 
Among its many functions, the Port 
Authority operates the George Washington 
Bridge, a double-decked suspension bridge 
connecting the Borough of Fort Lee, New 
Jersey, and New York City across the 
Hudson River. On the bridge's upper deck, 
twelve toll lanes carry traffic from New 
Jersey into New York. During the morning 
rush hour, Port Authority police place traffic 
cones to reserve the three right-most lanes—
the "Special Access Lanes"—for local traffic 
from Fort Lee. This leaves the other nine 
lanes for drivers on the "Main Line," which 
includes traffic from I-80 and I-95. This 
practice of reserving Special Access Lanes 
was a decades-long custom dating back to a 
political deal between a former New Jersey 
governor and Fort Lee mayor. 
Wildstein testified he first became aware of 
the Special Access Lanes in March 2011. He 
learned the three lanes were given to Fort Lee 
by a former New Jersey governor to reduce 
local traffic and "immediately thought that 
this would be . . . a potential leverage point 
with [Fort Lee] Mayor [Mark] Sokolich 
down the road." Wildstein shared this 
observation with Baroni, Governor Christie's 
then-Chief of Staff Bill Stepien, and Kelly, 
then the Deputy Chief of Staff for New 
Jersey's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs 
(IGA). Wildstein did not, however, use the 
Special Access Lanes as leverage at that time. 
Around the same time that Wildstein realized 
the Special Access Lanes could be used as 
leverage, IGA officials—including Kelly—
were discussing a plan to solicit 
endorsements from Democratic elected 
officials to generate bipartisan support for 
Governor Christie's 2013 re-election bid. 
IGA officials rewarded potential endorsers 
with, among other things, "Mayor's Days" 
(meetings with top departmental and 
agency staff) and invitations to sporting 
events, breakfasts and parties at 
Drumthwacket (the Governor's Princeton 
residence), and the Governor's State of the 
State address. 
The Governor's Office and IGA used the Port 
Authority similarly to bestow political favors 
on potential endorsers. As Wildstein 
explained at trial, the Port Authority "was 
viewed as the economic engine of the region" 
and "had an ability to do things for 
Democratic officials that would potentially 
put the Governor in a more favorable 
position." Baroni and Wildstein were thus 
asked "to assist the Governor's Office in 
identifying opportunities that would be 
helpful." The Port Authority gave benefits 
ranging from gifts (e.g., steel from the 
original World Trade Center towers, flags 
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that had flown over Ground Zero, framed 
prints) and tours, to jobs, to large economic 
investments (e.g., the $250 million purchase 
of the Military Ocean Terminal at Bayonne). 
One Democratic endorsement sought by the 
Governor's Office was that of Mayor 
Sokolich. IGA invited Sokolich to a New 
York Giants game, several holiday parties, 
and one of Governor Christie's budget 
addresses. And, as early as 2010, the 
Governor's Office and IGA directed 
Wildstein to leverage the Port Authority's 
resources to obtain Sokolich's endorsement. 
Sokolich received benefits ranging from the 
sort of gifts described above to substantial 
Port Authority assistance for Fort Lee (e.g., 
Port Authority Police assistance directing 
traffic in Fort Lee, a $5,000 contribution to 
the Fort Lee fire department for an equipment 
purchase, and over $300,000 in funding for 
four shuttle buses providing Fort Lee 
residents with free transport between ferry 
and bus terminals). Despite that, Sokolich 
informed IGA in 2013 that local political 
considerations precluded him from endorsing 
the Governor's reelection bid. 
In June 2013, Kelly told Wildstein that she 
was disappointed Sokolich would not be 
endorsing Governor Christie, and Wildstein 
reminded her "if she want[ed] the Port 
Authority to close down those Fort Lee lanes 
to put some pressure on Mayor Sokolich, that 
that c[ould] be done." On August 13, 2013, 
Kelly sent an email to Wildstein that read: 
"Time for some traffic problems in Fort Lee." 
Wildstein "understood that to mean it was 
time to change the lane configurations, the 
upper level of the George Washington Bridge 
in order to create traffic in the Borough of 
Fort Lee." Wildstein testified that, on a 
follow up telephone call, Kelly told him that 
"Mayor Sokolich needed to fully understand 
that life would be more difficult for him in the 
second Christie term than it had been [i]n the 
first." Wildstein admitted at trial that he 
agreed to change the lane configuration "[f]or 
the purpose of causing—of punishing Mark 
Sokolich, of creating a traffic jam that would 
punish him, send him a message," and that 
there was no other reason for the change.  
Wildstein testified he told Baroni he 
"received an email from Miss Kelly that [he] 
viewed as instructing [him] to begin to put 
leverage on Mayor Sokolich by doing a lane 
closure." He also testified he told Baroni "that 
Miss Kelly wanted the Fort Lee lanes closed 
. . . [f]or the purpose of punishing Mayor 
Sokolich . . . [b]ecause he had not endorsed 
Governor Christie" and that "Mr. Baroni was 
fine with that."  
According to Wildstein, he decided "to create 
the cover of a traffic study" and shared his 
plan with both Baroni and Kelly. Wildstein 
believed "calling it a traffic study would 
provide a cover story for the true purpose of 
changing and realigning that traffic pattern at 
the bridge" and "to have a public policy 
reason for doing so as opposed to saying it 
was political and it was punitive and 
revealing the true purpose." In furtherance of 
Defendants' traffic study cover story, 
Wildstein contacted Peter Zipf, the Port 
Authority's chief traffic engineer, and told 
him he wanted to take away the cones that 
created the Special Access Lanes "so that 
New Jersey could determine whether those 
three lanes given to Fort Lee would continue 
on a permanent basis." Zipf responded later 
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that day with various proposals but 
recommended that at least one segregated 
lane be left in place to prevent sideswipe 
crashes. 
According to Wildstein, he and Baroni 
discussed when to implement the lane closure 
at the end of August 2013, and they selected 
Monday, September 9, 2013—the first day of 
school in Fort Lee. But Wildstein waited to 
give the instruction until Friday, September 
6. He testified "[i]t was a deliberate effort on 
[his] part to wait until the last minute to give 
a final instruction so that nobody at the Port 
Authority would let Fort Lee know, would 
communicate that to Fort Lee or anyone else 
within the Port Authority," including 
Executive Director Patrick Foye. According 
to Wildstein, he discussed waiting to give the 
instruction with both Baroni and Kelly, who 
agreed. This directly contravened normal 
Port Authority protocol, with any lane 
closures announced to the public weeks, and 
even months, in advance. 
Wildstein gave the instruction to Zipf and 
two other Port Authority managers, Bob 
Durando (the general manager of the George 
Washington Bridge) and Cedric Fulton (the 
director of Tunnels, Bridges & Terminals), 
again claiming that New Jersey wanted to see 
whether the Special Access Lanes would 
remain permanent. When Fulton asked if 
Foye knew, Wildstein lied and said he did. 
Wildstein later told the same lie to Durando. 
Durando explained that because only one 
Special Access Lane would remain open, the 
Port Authority needed to pay an extra toll 
collector to be on relief duty for that sole toll 
collector. Wildstein discussed this with 
Baroni and Kelly, and none of the three saw 
a problem with this extra cost. Wildstein and 
Zipf also discussed collecting data on the 
ensuing traffic, and Wildstein testified he 
understood it would require "some staff 
time."  
On the morning of Monday, September 9, 
Port Authority police placed traffic cones 
two toll booths to the right of where they 
were customarily placed on the upper deck, 
thereby reducing the number of Special 
Access Lanes from three to one, and 
increasing the number of Main Line lanes 
from nine to eleven. This realignment meant 
that Fort Lee's sole remaining Special Access 
Lane had to accept both cash and E-ZPass, 
further delaying traffic. As discussed, Fort 
Lee received no advance warning of the 
change—contrary to the Port Authority's 
standard procedures. 
As a result of this change, cars attempting to 
cross the George Washington Bridge during 
the morning commute backed up into Fort 
Lee and gridlocked the entire town. Mayor 
Sokolich repeatedly attempted to contact 
Baroni and IGA to have the two other Special 
Access Lanes reinstated, but Baroni 
deliberately did not respond. Wildstein 
testified "that was the plan that [he] had come 
up with along with Mr. Baroni and Miss 
Kelly, which is that all calls would be 
directed to Mr. Baroni. And that Mr. Baroni 
would be radio silent. Meaning any—all the 
calls would come to him, and he wasn't 
planning on returning any of them."  
On the morning of September 9, Mayor 
Sokolich called Baroni's office about an 
"urgent matter of public safety in Fort Lee," 
 193 
but received no response. The Fort Lee 
borough administrator also called to say Fort 
Lee police and paramedics had difficulty 
responding to a missing child and a cardiac 
arrest. The next day, the mayor called again, 
saying the traffic was a "life/safety" issue and 
that paramedics had to leave their vehicle and 
respond to a call on foot. Receiving no 
response to his calls, he then sent Baroni a 
letter on September 12 detailing the negative 
impact on public safety in Fort Lee. Kelly 
was similarly unmoved by the traffic and the 
anger it generated, reportedly smiling when a 
colleague at IGA informed her of the 
situation. 
Executive Director Foye first learned of the 
realignment on the evening of Thursday, 
September 12. The following morning, he 
sent an email to Baroni and others, criticizing 
the "hasty and ill-advised" realignment and 
ordering the restoration of the prior 
alignment with three Special Access Lanes. 
Baroni went to Foye's office and asked that 
the realignment be put back into effect, with 
only one Special Access Lane for Fort Lee. 
Foye testified Baroni said the issue was 
"important to Trenton," which Foye 
understood to reference the Governor's 
Office. Foye refused to do so. Baroni 
returned to Foye's office later that day, again 
asked that two of Special Access Lanes be 
taken away from Fort Lee, and said the issue 
was "important to Trenton" and "Trenton 
may call." Foye held firm and continued to 
refuse. Wildstein testified Baroni reached out 
to David Samson, the New Jersey-appointed 
Chairman of the Port Authority, to "overrule 
Mr. Foye and talk to others on the New York 
side," but Samson ultimately declined to do 
so, instead recommending Baroni "let it go." 
In response to significant public backlash, 
Baroni and Wildstein began preparing a 
report that would describe what happened as 
"a traffic study to determine whether it was 
fairer to give three lanes to Fort Lee." The 
report would also have admitted that the Port 
Authority had failed to give Fort Lee 
appropriate notice due to an alleged 
"communications breakdown." But the report 
was never released because Port Authority 
staff were asked to testify before the New 
Jersey State Assembly. Wildstein helped 
Baroni prepare his testimony, which was 
based on the draft report and the traffic study 
and "fairness" rationale. 
Then-Governor Christie fired Wildstein on 
December 6 and Baroni on December 12. 
Kelly was fired on January 9, 2014. A federal 
criminal investigation followed and resulted 
in the underlying prosecution. 
 
II. 
On April 23, 2015, a federal grand jury 
returned a nine-count indictment, charging 
Defendants with seven counts each. 
In Count 1, the grand jury charged 
Defendants with conspiracy to obtain by 
fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally 
misapply property of an organization 
receiving federal benefits. As charged, "[t]he 
object of the conspiracy was to misuse Port 
Authority property to facilitate and conceal 
the causing of traffic problems in Fort Lee as 
punishment of Mayor Sokolich." In Count 2, 
Defendants were charged with the 
substantive offense of that conspiracy. The 
grand jury alleged Defendants, through Port 
Authority agents Baroni and Wildstein, 
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"obtained by fraud, otherwise without 
authority knowingly converted to their use 
and the use of others, and intentionally 
misapplied property owned by and under the 
care, custody, and control of the Port 
Authority, with a value of at least $5,000."  
In Count 3, Defendants were charged with 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The 
charged "object of the conspiracy was to 
obtain money and property from the Port 
Authority and to deprive the Port Authority 
of its right to control its own assets by falsely 
representing and causing false 
representations to be made that the lane and 
toll booth reductions were for the purpose of 
a traffic study." In Counts 4 through 7, the 
grand jury charged each Defendant with two 
substantive wire fraud violations. Count 4 
pertained to Kelly's August 13, 2013 email 
informing Wildstein it was "[t]ime for some 
traffic problems in Fort Lee," and Count 6 to 
her September 9, 2013 email thanking 
Wildstein for confirming there would be 
"[r]adio silence" from Baroni in response to 
Mayor Sokolich's inquiries. Counts 5 and 7 
related to Baroni's September 9 and 12, 2013 
emails to Wildstein concerning complaints 
from Mayor Sokolich. 
In Count 8, the grand jury charged 
Defendants with conspiracy against civil 
rights. The charged "object of the conspiracy 
was to interfere with the localized travel 
rights of the residents of Fort Lee for the 
illegitimate purpose of causing significant 
traffic problems in Fort Lee to punish Mayor 
Sokolich." In Count 9, Defendants were 
charged with the substantive violation.  
At the outset, Defendants moved to dismiss 
all the charges. The District Judge held oral 
argument and denied the motions. After a six-
week trial, the jury found Defendants guilty 
on all counts. Defendants moved for 
judgments of acquittal, and for a new trial. 
Again, the trial judge denied the motions. She 
then sentenced Baroni to 24 months' 
imprisonment and Kelly to 18 months' 
imprisonment. Defendants, who are free on 
bail pending this appeal, challenge only their 
judgments of conviction.  
 
III. 
Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting their wire fraud 
and Section 666 convictions. 
"We exercise plenary review over a district 
court's grant or denial of a motion for 
judgment of acquittal based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence,"  and we apply 
the same standard as the district court. "A 
judgment of acquittal is appropriate 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
29 if, after reviewing the record in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution, we 
determine that no rational jury could have 
found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Where sufficiency arguments give 
rise to questions of statutory interpretation, 
our review is also plenary.  
 
A. 
Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence underlying their wire fraud 
convictions. "A person violates the federal 
wire fraud statute by using interstate wires to 
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execute 'any scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
for obtaining money or property by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
or promises.'" Conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud is a separate crime subject to the same 
penalties as the substantive offense. 
The Government's theory at trial was that 
Defendants sent emails in furtherance of, and 
to execute, a scheme to defraud the Port 
Authority of physical property (i.e., the 
Special Access Lanes and toll booths) and 
money (i.e., public employee labor) in order 
to carry out the lane reductions. In 
summation, the Government explained this 
was the "same money, the salaries, the same 
property, the lanes, the toll booths," that it 
alleged Defendants fraudulently obtained, 
knowingly converted, or intentionally 
misapplied in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666. 
The Government explained: 
The physical property that was 
misused were the local access lanes, 
themselves, and the toll booths. . . . 
The defendants agreed to use these 
Port Authority assets, that property, to 
purposely create a traffic jam in Fort 
Lee. That agreement was not a 
legitimate use of the George 
Washington Bridge, the Port 
Authority's property. 
The Government identified the "money" as 
"the salaries of each of the employees who 
wasted their time in furtherance of the 
defendants' scheme," including "the salary 
paid to the overtime toll booth collectors for 
the one remaining toll booth that was 
accessible to Fort Lee," "the money paid to 
Baroni and Wildstein themselves while they 
. . . [were] wasting their time in furtherance 
of this conspiracy," and "money paid to the 
engineers who wasted time—and Port 
Authority professional staff, who wasted 
time collecting data that no one ever wanted." 
The Government also invoked the costs the 
Port Authority incurred in redoing a 
legitimate traffic study—at Center and 
Lemoine Avenues in Fort Lee—that was 
spoiled by the gridlock and "would not have 
been ruined without these lane reductions."  
According to the Government, Defendants' 
untruthful claim they were conducting a 
traffic study was what allowed them to carry 
out the lane reductions and to obtain the Port 
Authority property and money necessary to 
do so. The Government also contended 
Defendants conspired with each other and 
Wildstein in furtherance of this fraudulent 
scheme. 
Defendants argue the evidence was 
insufficient to prove a scheme to 
defraud because (1) Baroni possessed 
unilateral authority over Port Authority 
traffic patterns and any resources necessary 
to implement his decisions, and (2) the Port 
Authority was not deprived of any property 
right. In addition to these challenges, 
Defendants contend the Government has 
disguised an impermissible honest services 
fraud case as a wire fraud case in an attempt 
to circumvent the Supreme Court's decision 
in Skilling v. United States. 
For reasons that follow, we hold the 
Government presented evidence sufficient to 
prove Defendants violated the wire fraud 
statute by depriving the Port Authority of, at 
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a minimum, its money in the form of public 
employee labor. 
1. 
Defendants principally argue they could not 
have committed fraud because Baroni 
possessed the unilateral authority to control 
traffic patterns at Port Authority facilities and 
to marshal the resources necessary to 
implement his decisions. 
They previously raised this argument in 
moving both to dismiss the indictment and 
for judgments of acquittal or a new trial. 
Before trial, the District Judge declined to 
dismiss the wire fraud counts on this basis, 
holding the existence and scope of Baroni's 
authority was a question of fact for the jury. 
After trial, the judge denied Defendants' 
motions because that question was "one that 
the jurors resolved in favor of the 
prosecution." Carefully reviewing the 
relevant witness testimony, the judge held 
"the Government presented evidence at trial 
from which the jury could reasonably have 
found that Baroni did not have the authority 
to change the lane configurations, and in fact, 
did defraud the Port Authority." We agree. 
Defendants rely on our opinion in United 
States v. Zauber. There, the defendants were 
pension fund trustees who received 
kickbacks for investing in a mortgage 
company.  We held the indictment failed to 
charge violations of the mail and wire fraud 
statutes because it did not allege "an actual 
money or property loss to the pension 
fund." In so holding, we observed, among 
other things, that the defendants, "as trustees 
of the pension fund, had the power and the 
authority to invest the fund's monies with 
others." Likening Baroni to the pension fund 
trustees in Zauber, Defendants argue "the 
undisputed evidence showed that Baroni's 
position as co-head of the Port Authority 
gave him authority to make unilateral 
decisions about the alignment of traffic 
patterns at Port Authority facilities, and to 
command the resources needed to carry those 
decisions out." We disagree. 
As a preliminary matter, Zauber is inapposite 
because here the grand jury alleged, and the 
Government proved at trial, that the Port 
Authority was actually deprived of its money 
and property. In any event, the evidence 
refutes the notion Baroni possessed 
"unilateral" authority to realign the bridge's 
lanes. To the contrary, it reveals Defendants 
would not have been able to realign the lanes 
had Baroni and Wildstein provided the actual 
reason or no reason at all. They had to create 
the traffic study cover story in order to get 
Port Authority employees to implement the 
realignment. And, as we described above, 
Wildstein lied to Port Authority officials 
Durando and Fulton about whether Executive 
Director Foye knew of the realignment. This 
lie was necessary to keep Foye in the dark 
and prevent him from putting an immediate 
end to the scheme. In fact, that is exactly what 
happened when he finally learned of the 
realignment. Foye ordered the three Special 
Access Lanes be restored to the use of Fort 
Lee motorists and refused Baroni's repeated 
entreaties to reinstate the realignment. Baroni 
then appealed to Chairman Samson, who 
declined to intervene and overrule Foye's 
decision. This evidence belies Defendants' 
assertion Baroni had anything approaching 
"authority to make unilateral decisions about 
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the alignment of traffic patterns at Port 
Authority facilities." If that were so, Baroni 
could have reinstated the realignment on his 
own without needing to appeal to Foye and 
then Samson. That Baroni was 
countermanded shows he lacked the 
unencumbered authority he claims he 
possessed, and that he needed to lie to realign 
the traffic patterns. The record contains 
overwhelming evidence from which a 
rational juror could have reached these 
conclusions. Indeed, it is difficult to see how 
any rational juror could have concluded 
otherwise. The jury's verdict necessarily 
reflects its rejection of Defendants' argument 
that Baroni possessed unilateral authority to 
control the bridge. 
Defendants contend we cannot draw this 
inference because the trial judge declined to 
give a jury instruction based on Zauber. We 
disagree. The judge instructed the jury that 
[i]n order to establish a scheme to 
defraud, the Government must also 
prove that the alleged scheme 
contemplated depriving the Port 
Authority of money and property. 
An [**22]  organization is deprived 
of money or property when the 
organization is deprived of the right 
to control that money or property. 
And one way the organization is 
deprived of the right to control that 
money and property is when the 
organization receives false or 
fraudulent statements that affect its 
ability to make discretionary 
economic decisions about what to do 
with that money or property. 
This instruction forecloses the possibility the 
jury convicted Defendants of fraud without 
finding Baroni lacked authority to realign the 
lanes. For Baroni could not deprive the Port 
Authority of money and property he was 
authorized to use for any purpose. Nor could 
he deprive the Port Authority of its right to 
control its money or property if that right to 
control were committed to his unilateral 
discretion. In finding the existence of a 
scheme to defraud, the jury necessarily 
concluded Baroni lacked authority to order 
the realignment. 
2. 
Defendants also argue the Port Authority was 
not deprived of any tangible property and 
challenge the Government's and District 
Court's invocation of the "right to control" 
theory of property. 
Before trial, the trial judge rejected 
Defendants' related argument the charges 
should be dismissed because they did not 
"obtain" money or property. Relying on our 
decision in United States v. Al Hedaithy, the 
judge ruled "it [wa]s enough that they 
prevented the Port Authority from exercising 
'its right to exclusive use of' its property, 
which here allegedly includes toll booths and 
roadways, in addition to money in the form 
of employee compensation and the costs of 
redoing a traffic study."  
In their post-trial motions, however, 
Defendants raised no sufficiency arguments 
respecting the property at issue. Rather, they 
contended only that Baroni possessed the 
authority to realign the lanes. We note 
Defendants arguably forfeited their right to 
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raise these issues on appeal by not presenting 
them to the District Court. But we need not 
decide that question because Defendants' 
arguments are unpersuasive under any 
standard of review. 
The wire fraud statute proscribes "scheme[s] 
or artifice[s] to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses." As Defendants note, 
the federal fraud statutes require the 
defendants to scheme to defraud a victim of 
"property rights."  
Defendants argue they "did not deprive the 
Port Authority of any tangible property." 
"After all," they say, "the Port Authority still 
owns all of the lanes and tollbooths (and 
always has)." But even 
assuming arguendo Defendants are correct, 
the federal fraud statutes are not limited to 
protecting tangible property rights.  "[T]o 
determine whether a particular interest is 
property for purposes of the fraud statutes, 
we look to whether the law traditionally has 
recognized and enforced it as a property 
right."  
The Government introduced ample evidence 
Defendants obtained by false or fraudulent 
pretenses, at a minimum, public employees' 
labor. Their time and wages, in which the 
Port Authority maintains a financial interest, 
is a form of intangible property.   
Wildstein testified that, on the Friday before 
the lane reductions, he called Durando, the 
general manager of the George Washington 
Bridge, and said he wanted to study traffic 
patterns and see the effect of taking two lanes 
away from Fort Lee. Wildstein told Durando 
the New Jersey side of the Port Authority 
wanted to be able to "make a determination 
down the road as to whether those [Fort Lee] 
lanes would stay on a permanent basis." Of 
course, as Wildstein admitted at trial, the 
traffic study rationale offered to Durando was 
not the real reason for the realignment. 
Among other things, Durando told Wildstein 
he would need to have a relief toll worker on 
duty because all of Fort Lee's traffic would be 
going through one lane. Wildstein testified he 
"understood that the Port Authority would 
have to pay for an extra toll collector to be on 
relief duty for that first toll collector," and 
discussed this cost with both Defendants. 
According to Wildstein, both Baroni and 
Kelly found it humorous that the Port 
Authority would have to "pay a second toll 
collector to sit and wait in case the first toll 
collector had to go to the bathroom," and they 
had no problem with the extra cost. On 
Sunday, September 8, 2013, Wildstein 
emailed Durando to say he would "be at [the] 
bridge early Monday [morning] to view [the] 
new lane test." S.A. 49. Durando replied that 
he would also be present, and that he had 
"also brought a toll collector in on overtime 
to keep toll lane 24 (the extreme right hand 
toll lane Upper level) in the event the 
collector assigned to TL 24 needs a 
personal." Wildstein forwarded the email to 
Baroni. On cross-examination, Baroni 
admitted he had received the email and did 
not object to bringing in overtime toll booth 
workers. 
The Government also called Theresa Riva, a 
Port Authority employee who served as an 
Operations Planning Analyst for the George 
Washington Bridge during the relevant time 
 199 
period. In that capacity, Riva supervised time 
keeping for operations staff and managed 
scheduling and coverage for toll collectors. 
Riva testified she learned of the lane 
reductions the Friday before, and Bob 
Durando "asked [her] to staff one additional 
toll collector" on the upper level toll plaza 
twenty-four hours a day. Because toll 
collectors work eight-hour shifts, this meant 
"three toll collectors a day to be an excess toll 
collector in the toll house." Riva testified all 
these additional toll collectors were paid an 
overtime rate "[b]ecause they either worked 
on their regular day off or in excess of eight 
hours, a double [shift]." Riva testified these 
employees would not have been paid absent 
the lane realignment. 
In addition to the overtime toll workers, 
Wildstein discussed with Zipf using Port 
Authority professional staff to track data, 
which would include "numbers on how—
how many cars were involved and how far 
back the traffic was delayed." Wildstein 
understood Zipf "would have to use some 
staff time." At trial, the staff members 
testified to the significant amount of time 
they spent performing unnecessary work 
related to the realignment. 
Amy Hwang, Senior Operations Planning 
Analyst for the Port Authority, testified she 
collected data on traffic at the bridge and 
compared it to traffic on the same date the 
year before. Hwang testified she spent two 
hours working on the traffic study per day 
from Monday, September 9, through Friday, 
September 13, for a total of 10 hours. 
Victor Chung, Senior Transportation Planner 
for the Port Authority, was asked to forecast 
the impact of reducing Fort Lee's Special 
Access Lanes from three to one. Chung 
testified he spent a little over eight hours 
doing this analysis on the Friday before the 
reductions went into effect. During the week 
of the reductions, Chung was asked to 
compare travel times approaching the 
bridge's upper-level toll plaza during peak 
hours and to compare it to historical travel 
times. Chung testified he spent about six 
hours on this analysis, for a total of 14 hours 
spent on unnecessary work. 
And Umang Patel, Staff Service Engineer in 
the Port Authority's Traffic Engineering 
department, downloaded and analyzed data 
relating to travel time on the Main Line 
during the lane reductions. Patel testified he 
spent two hours discussing the lane 
reductions on Monday, September 9, and 
four hours per day analyzing data on 
Tuesday, September 10, through Thursday, 
September 12, for a total of fourteen hours. 
Moreover, Wildstein estimated he spent 
twenty-five to thirty hours working on the 
lane reductions, and that Baroni spent fifteen 
to twenty hours, for a total of forty to fifty 
hours. Their compensation is plainly 
"money" for the purposes of the wire fraud 
statute.  
The Government's evidence that Defendants 
fraudulently conscripted fourteen Port 
Authority employees into their service, and 
that Baroni and Wildstein accepted 
compensation for time spent conspiring to 
defraud the Port Authority, is alone sufficient 
for a rational juror to have concluded 
Defendants deprived the Port Authority of its 
money or property. 
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Although we need not reach or decide 
Defendant's arguments on the "right to 
control" theory in light of our  holding, we 
recognize this traditional concept of property 
provides an alternative basis upon which to 
conclude Defendants defrauded the Port 
Authority. As Baroni notes, "[i]ncluded 
within the meaning of money or property is 
the victim's 'right to control' that money or 
property."  
The George Washington Bridge is the world's 
busiest motor vehicle bridge leading to our 
nation's most populous city. The Port 
Authority's physical property—the bridge's 
lanes and toll booths—are revenue-
generating assets. The Port Authority has an 
unquestionable property interest in the 
bridge's exclusive operation, including the 
allocation of traffic through its lanes and of 
the public employee resources necessary to 
keep vehicles moving. Defendants invented a 
sham traffic study to usurp that exclusive 
interest, reallocating the flow of traffic and 
commandeering public employee time in a 
manner that made no economic or practical 
sense. Indeed, the realignment—intended to 
limit access to the bridge and gridlock an 
entire town—was impractical by design. 
In sum, Defendants' arguments concerning 
the property interest at issue fall far short. 
 
3. 
Finally, Defendants argue we "should reject 
the government's attempt to shoehorn a 
repudiated theory of honest services fraud 
into an ill-fitting theory of money or property 
fraud."  
In denying Defendants' post-trial motions, 
the District Court summarily rejected this 
argument, holding "[t]here is a difference . . . 
between intangible rights to honest services 
not covered by the wire fraud statute, and 
intangible property rights which are." We 
agree. 
Defendants primarily rely on the Supreme 
Court's decision in Skilling v. United States, 
which narrowed the scope of the honest 
services statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346. After the 
Supreme Court ruled in McNally that the 
mail fraud statute was "limited in scope to the 
protection of property rights," Congress 
enacted Section 1346 "specifically to cover 
one of the 'intangible rights' that lower courts 
had protected . . . prior to McNally: 'the 
intangible right of honest services.'"  That 
statute provides, for the purposes of the mail 
and wire fraud statutes, that "the term 
'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a 
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the 
intangible right of honest 
services." In Skilling, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged "Congress intended § 1346 to 
refer to and incorporate the honest-services 
doctrine recognized in Courts of Appeals' 
decisions before McNally derailed the 
intangible-rights theory of fraud." But it also 
recognized a broad reading of the statute 
"would raise the due process concerns 
underlying the vagueness doctrine." In order 
to preserve the statute, the Court surveyed 
pre-McNally honest services case law, and 
concluded "there is no doubt that Congress 
intended § 1346 to reach at least bribes and 
kickbacks.” Accordingly, the Court limited 
the application of Section 1346 to "the bribe-
and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case 
law."  
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Defendants argue it cannot be a crime "for a 
public official to take official action based on 
concealed 'political interests.'" And they 
warn that "[t]he government's theory—that 
acting with a concealed political interest 
nonetheless becomes mail or wire fraud so 
long as the public official uses any 
government resources to make or effectuate 
the decision—would render the Supreme 
Court's carefully considered limitation [on 
honest services fraud] a nullity." According 
to Defendants, "[i]t cannot be the case that the 
Supreme Court has pointedly and repeatedly 
rebuffed the government's attempts to 
prosecute public officials for the deprivation 
of the public's intangible right to honest 
services or honest government if, all along, 
the inevitable use of at least a peppercorn of 
public money or property made every 
instance of such conduct prosecutable as 
money or property fraud." 
We are mindful of the Supreme Court's 
honest services case law but do not believe it 
counsels a different result in this case. 
Defendants were charged with simple money 
and property fraud under Section 1343—not 
honest services fraud—and the grand jury 
alleged an actual money and property loss to 
the Port Authority. In any event, their 
conduct in this case can hardly be 
characterized as "official action" that was 
merely influenced by political 
considerations. Defendants invented a cover 
story about a traffic study for the sole 
purpose of reducing Fort Lee's access to the 
George Washington Bridge and creating 
gridlock in the Borough. Trial testimony 
established that everything about the way this 
"study" was executed contravened 
established Port Authority protocol and 
procedures. Indeed, witnesses testified that 
traffic studies are usually conducted by 
computer modeling, without the need to 
realign traffic patterns or disrupt actual 
traffic. When traffic disruptions are 
anticipated, the Port Authority gives advance 
public notice. And, as we have discussed, the 
evidence conclusively demonstrates Baroni 
lacked the authority to realign the bridge's 
traffic patterns unilaterally. 
It is hard to see, under Defendants' theory, 
how a public official could ever be charged 
with simple mail or wire fraud. They appear 
to suggest that, as public officials, any fraud 
case against them necessarily entails 
intangible right to honest services. That is not 
so. As we have explained, Defendants were 
charged with defrauding the Port Authority 
of its money and property—not the intangible 
right to their honest services. Prosecutions of 
public officials for defrauding the 
government of money and property are 
unfortunately quite common. 
Defendants also argue their convictions pose 
federalism concerns and would "involve[] the 
Federal Government in setting standards of 
good government for local and state 
officials." Again, we disagree. This case 
lacks the federalism concerns present 
in McNally, where the federal government 
prosecuted a Kentucky state official and a 
private citizen for their role in a "self-dealing 
patronage scheme" involving the state's 
purchase of insurance policies. But unlike a 
typical state or local governmental body, the 
Port Authority is an interstate agency created 
by Congressional consent, and Defendants 
acknowledge it receives substantial federal 
funding. The federal government thus has an 
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especially significant interest in protecting 
the Port Authority's financial and operational 
integrity. 
* * * 
In sum, the Government presented sufficient 
evidence for the jury to convict Defendants 
of wire fraud. 
B. 
Defendants' other sufficiency challenge 
contests thei Section 666 convictions.  In 
relevant part, Section 666 provides: 
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance 
described in subsection (b) of this section 
exists— 
(1) being an agent of an 
organization, or of a State, 
local, or Indian tribal 
government, or any agency 
thereof— 
(A) embezzles, steals, 
obtains by fraud, or 
otherwise without 
authority knowingly 
converts to the use of 
any person other than 




(i) is valued at $5,000 
or more, and 
(ii) is owned by, or is 
under the care, 
custody, or control of 
such organization, 
government, or 
agency; . . . 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not 
more than 10 years, or both. 
(b) The circumstance referred to 
in subsection (a) of this section is that 
the organization, government, or 
agency receives, in any one year 
period, benefits in excess of $10,000 
under a Federal program involving a 
grant, contract, subsidy, loan, 
guarantee, insurance, or other form of 
Federal assistance. 
Accordingly, a violation of Section 
666(a)(1)(A) requires proof of five elements. 
The government must prove that: (1) a 
defendant was an agent of an organization, 
government, or agency; (2) in a one-year 
period that organization, government, or 
agency received federal benefits in excess of 
$10,000; (3) a defendant stole, embezzled, 
obtained by fraud, knowingly converted, or 
intentionally misapplied property; (4) that 
property was owned by, or in the care, 
custody, or control of, the organization, 
government, or entity; and (5) the value of 
that property was at least $5,000. 
Defendants' appeal involves only the third 
and fifth elements—whether they obtained 
by fraud, knowingly converted, or 
intentionally misapplied Port Authority 
property (the actus reus), and whether that 
property was worth at least $5,000. 
As with the wire fraud counts, the 
Government's theory at trial was that the 
property at issue fell into two categories: 
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physical property (i.e., the Special Access 
Lanes and toll booths) and money (i.e., 
employee labor). 
Defendants argue the evidence was 
insufficient to prove a violation of Section 
666  because (1) that provision criminalizes 
theft, not the allocation of a public resource 
based on political considerations, and (2) the 
value of the property at issue was under 
$5,000. 
For reasons that follow, we hold the 
Government presented evidence sufficient to 
prove Defendants violated Section 666 by 
fraudulently obtaining, at a minimum, the 
labor of Port Authority employees in 
furtherance of their scheme, and that the 
value of that labor exceeded the statute's 
$5,000 threshold. 
1. 
Defendants broadly argue they merely 
allocated a public resource based on political 
considerations, which cannot be criminal. 
Offering an analogy, Kelly contends 
Defendants' conduct is "materially 
indistinguishable" from that of a mayor who, 
after a heavy snowfall, directs city employees 
to plow the streets of a ward that supported 
her before getting to a ward that supported 
her opponent. Baroni makes similar 
arguments.  
While such analogies have some superficial 
appeal, we find them unpersuasive. We agree 
with the District Court that this argument 
"conflates motive . . . with mens reas and 
conduct." Defendants altered the bridge's 
decades-old lane alignment—without 
authorization and in direct contravention of 
Port Authority protocol—for the sole purpose 
of creating gridlock in Fort Lee. To execute 
their scheme, they conscripted fourteen Port 
Authority employees to do sham work in 
pursuit of no legitimate Port Authority aim. 
That Defendants were politically motivated 
does not remove their intentional conduct 
from the ambit of the federal criminal law. 
What Defendants did here is hardly 
analogous to a situation where a mayor 
allows political considerations to influence 
her discretionary allocation of limited 
government resources in the normal course of 
municipal operations. There is no facially 
legitimate justification for Defendants' 
conduct here. 
Nor are we persuaded by Defendants' 
arguments that the Government has sought to 
expand the reach of Section 666 beyond 
conduct involving bribery and theft. Relying 
upon our decision in United States v. Cicco, 
Defendants contend the Government is 
attempting to use Section 666 "to criminalize 
a public official's efforts to allocate or 
reallocate public resources based on politics." 
In that case, Cicco, a mayor, declined to 
rehire two auxiliary police officers because 
they failed to support the Democratic Party in 
a local election. The Government filed a 
multi-count indictment charging Cicco and a 
member of the town council with, among 
other things, violations of Section 666's anti-
bribery provision, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). 
After the jury found the defendants guilty, the 
trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on 
the Section 666 counts, reasoning Congress 
did not intend for the statute to apply to their 
conduct and that it was unconstitutionally 
vague.  
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On appeal, we recognized Section 666, read 
literally, might cover the defendants' use of 
municipal employment to solicit election day 
services as a form of quid pro quo, but that 
the statute's language was "also consistent 
with an intention of focusing solely on 
offenses involving theft or bribery, the crimes 
identified in the title of that section." Because 
we found the statute ambiguous, we turned to 
the legislative history. Concluding "the 
crimes Congress targeted when it created § 
666 are simply different in kind than those 
alleged" against the defendants, we held they 
did not violate the statute. We also observed 
that the conduct in question—deprivation of 
public employment to solicit political 
contributions—was within the ambit of a 
different criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 601.  
The Government responds that Cicco is 
inapposite because the conduct at issue in that 
case "potentially implicated the bribery 
provisions of § 666(a)(1)(B), but has nothing 
to do with property obtained by fraud, 
converted or otherwise intentionally 
misapplied." We agree that this case is not 
like Cicco. 
But Cicco is instructive here. Our exposition 
of Section 666's legislative history—which 
was not limited to Section 666's bribery 
provisions—confirms that Defendants' 
conduct in this case falls squarely within the 
statute's purpose. As we explained in Cicco, 
Congress enacted Section 666 as part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Bill of 1984. We 
noted "[t]he provision was 'designed to create 
new offenses to augment the ability of the 
United States to vindicate significant acts of 
theft, fraud, and bribery involving Federal 
monies which are disbursed to private 
organizations or State and local governments 
pursuant to a Federal program.'” We 
observed "[t]he Senate Report expressly 
notes that Congress wished the new statutory 
provision to be interpreted 'consistent with 
the purpose of this section to protect the 
integrity of the vast sums of money 
distributed through Federal programs from 
theft, fraud, and undue influence by 
bribery.'" And "[w]e quote[d] extensively 
from the legislative history to illustrate that 
Congress intended § 666 to redress particular 
deficiencies in identified existing statutes." 
We have subsequently reaffirmed our 
understanding that Congress 
intended Section 666 to focus on offenses 
involving fraud and theft, observing "that 
Congress intended to expand the federal 
government's prosecutorial power to 
encompass significant misapplication of 
federal funds at a local level." We have also 
"not[ed] that courts have been wary 
of interpreting § 666 too narrowly" and that 
"the Supreme Court has repeatedly avoided 
constructions of § 666 that would impose 
limits beyond those set out in the plain 
meaning of the statute." Although all of the 
relevant Supreme Court cases involve 
challenges to Section 666's bribery 
provisions, their discussion of the statute's 
text and legislative history validate our long-
established understanding of the statute's 
purpose and scope. 
In Salinas v. United States, for example, the 
petitioner contended the Government must 
prove a connection between a bribe and 
federal funds to obtain a conviction 
under Section 666(a)(1)(B). The Supreme 
Court disagreed, holding that Section 666's 
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bribery prohibition "is not confined to a 
business or transaction which affects federal 
funds." Relying upon the statute's 
"expansive, unqualified language, both as to 
the bribes forbidden and the entities 
covered," and "the broad definition of the 
'circumstances' to which the statute applies," 
the Court found "no textual basis for limiting 
the reach of the bribery prohibition." The 
Court held the statute was unambiguous on 
this point because it would "be 'plain to 
anyone reading the Act' that the statute 
encompasses the conduct at issue."  
The Court next addressed Section 
666 in Fischer v. United States. At issue was 
whether Medicare payments paid to a 
hospital constituted federal "benefits" for the 
purposes of Section 666(b). The petitioner 
argued the qualifying patient was the sole 
beneficiary of payments made under the 
Medicare program and that hospitals were 
merely being compensated for services 
rendered. The Court disagreed, holding that a 
federal assistance program can have multiple 
beneficiaries, and that participating health 
care organizations were also beneficiaries 
under the Medicare program. The Court 
reasoned, in part, that "[c]oupled with the 
broad substantive prohibitions of subsection 
(a), the language of subsection (b) reveals 
Congress' expansive, unambiguous intent to 
ensure the integrity of organizations 
participating in federal assistance programs." 
Finally, in Sabri v. United States, the 
Supreme Court addressed another challenge 
to Section 666's bribery provision. The 
petitioner argued, inter alia, that Section 
666(a)(2) could "never be applied 
constitutionally because it fails to require 
proof of any connection between a bribe or 
kickback and some federal money." The 
Court disagreed, holding that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause gives Congress the power 
"to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated 
under [its Spending Clause] power are in fact 
spent for the general welfare, and not frittered 
away in graft or on projects undermined 
when funds are siphoned off or corrupt public 
officers are derelict about demanding value 
for dollars." The Court thus held "[i]t is 
certainly enough that the statutes condition 
the offense on a threshold amount of federal 
dollars defining the federal interest, such as 
that provided here." To confirm its 
understanding of the statute, the Court relied 
upon the same legislative history we 
discussed extensively in Cicco: 
For those of us who accept help from 
legislative history, it is worth noting 
that the legislative record confirms 
that § 666(a)(2) is an instance of 
necessary and proper legislation. The 
design was generally to 'protect the 
integrity of the vast sums of money 
distributed through Federal programs 
from theft, fraud, and undue influence 
by bribery,' see S.Rep. No. 98-225, p. 
370 (1983), in contrast to prior federal 
law affording only two limited 
opportunities to prosecute such 
threats to the federal interest: 18 
U.S.C. § 641, the federal theft statute, 
and § 201, the federal bribery law. 
Those laws had proven inadequate to 
the task. The [federal theft statute] 
went only to outright theft of 
unadulterated federal funds . . . . 
"Congress was within its prerogative 
to protect spending objects from the 
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menace of local administrators on the 
take."  
Recognizing that the statute was intended to 
address offenses involving fraud and theft, 
the Court held that 
Defendants' reliance on United States v. 
Thompson, is also misplaced. In that case, 
Thompson, a Wisconsin state procurement 
official, was prosecuted for steering a 
contract to a local travel agency, allegedly in 
violation of state procurement statutes and 
regulations.  The government's theory had 
been that Thompson "'intentionally 
misapplie[d]' more than $5,000 by diverting 
it" away from the firm that should have been 
selected under the state's procurement 
regulations. The Seventh Circuit was not 
convinced that Thompson's decision actually 
violated the state's regulations. And it 
observed that, unlike "[a]pproving a payment 
for goods or services not supplied," her 
conduct "d[id] not sound like 'misapplication' 
of funds." Significantly, the firm she selected 
was actually the low bidder, and "[t]he 
federal government saved money because of 
Thompson's decisions." The Seventh Circuit 
turned to the statute's caption—"Theft or 
bribery concerning programs receiving 
Federal funds"—because "the word 
'misapplies' is not a defined term." Relying 
on that caption and the Rule of Lenity, the 
Seventh Circuit adopted a more narrow 
reading of intentional misapplication "that 
limits § 666 to theft, extortion, bribery, and 
similarly corrupt acts." The Court further 
commented it did not believe a state official's 
violation of state regulations and statutes—
even if intentional—would violate Section 
666 "unless the public employee is on the 
take."  
Thompson is distinguishable. Thompson 
applied the state's procurement regulations in 
a way that actually saved the federal 
government money and caused no loss. 
Defendants, on the other hand, lied in order 
to obtain public employee labor from 
fourteen Port Authority employees. They 
forced the Port Authority to pay unnecessary 
overtime to toll workers and diverted well-
paid professional staff away from legitimate 
Port Authority business. Their fraud is 
soundly within the scope of conduct 
Congress sought to proscribe in Section 666. 
We hold that, at a minimum, the Government 
offered a valid theory that Defendants 
fraudulently obtained, knowingly converted, 
or intentionally misapplied the labor of Port 
Authority employees, and that it offered 
evidence sufficient to sustain Defendants' 
convictions. 
It is well established that public employees' 
labor is property for the purposes of Section 
666.  
We have explained, in addressing 
Defendants' sufficiency challenge to the wire 
fraud counts, how they defrauded the Port 
Authority of the labor of fourteen public 
employees—eleven toll collectors paid 
overtime and three professional staff 
members—in furtherance of the scheme. 
Those public employees spent hours doing 
work that was unnecessary and furthered no 
legitimate Port Authority aim. Defendants 
were able to obtain these employees' labor 
only by lying about the purpose of the 
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realignment, claiming they were conducting 
a traffic study. 
Defendants argue they could not have 
misapplied Port Authority employee labor 
because they did not receive a "personal 
pecuniary benefit." We disagree. Defendants 
had Port Authority employees do work they 
would not have otherwise done to further 
their personal scheme. The fact Defendants 
sought to benefit politically, not 
monetarily, does not alter the fact they forced 
the Port Authority to pay toll workers 
overtime, and diverted the time of salaried 
professional staff, in furtherance of no 
legitimate purpose.  
Defendants argue this interpretation raises 
constitutional vagueness concerns. We 
disagree. At trial, the Government introduced 
evidence that, after Jersey City Mayor Steven 
Fulop declined to endorse Governor Christie, 
the Governor's office directed state agencies 
(including the Port Authority) to cancel 
meetings with Fulop and otherwise ignore 
him. In seeking to admit this evidence, the 
Government argued there was no danger of 
unfair prejudice because "[t]he mistreatment 
of Mayor Fulop, while hardly reflective of 
good government, was not criminal and thus, 
was less serious than the criminal conduct for 
which Defendants stand accused, conduct 
that needlessly imperiled public safety in Fort 
Lee and directly inconvenienced thousands 
of people." Defendants contend it is not clear 
why their mistreatment of Mayor Sokolich is 
criminal, but their mistreatment of Mayor 
Fulop was not, and that "[t]his inconsistency 
demonstrates the inherent arbitrariness of the 
government's interpretation of Section 666." 
Defendants again conflate motive with 
conduct. While their decision to punish 
Mayor Fulop may have been animated by the 
same desire to exact political revenge, there 
were no allegations they defrauded their 
federally funded employer in order to do so. 
Defendants also raise federalism concerns, 
arguing the Government is improperly 
attempting "to police state and local officials 
in the conduct of their official duties." As we 
have observed, Congress has a uniquely 
significant interest in safeguarding the Port 
Authority, an interstate agency created by its 
consent. But we also believe federalism 
arguments are especially inapposite in the 
context of Section 666. We have described 
how Congress enacted Section 
666 specifically to bring state and local 
officials within the scope of the federal 
criminal theft law. And as the Supreme Court 
has observed,  "Congress was within its 
prerogative to protect spending objects from 
the menace of local administrators." 
In sum, the Government presented evidence 
sufficient to prove Defendants fraudulently 
obtained, knowingly converted, or 
intentionally misapplied Port Authority 




Finally, Defendants contend there was 
insufficient evidence to meet the $5,000 
threshold because the Port Authority 
employees' wages are exempt under 18 
U.S.C. § 666(c)'s safe harbor for bona fide 
compensation, and the Government 
quantified only $3,696 in toll workers' wages. 
They also assert the costs the Port Authority 
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incurred in redoing the legitimate Center and 
Lemoine traffic study cannot satisfy the 
$5,000 threshold because they were not 
aware of the study and the costs represent 
consequential damages, not the value of 
misapplied property.  
The District Judge rejected these arguments, 
concluding "the Government introduced 
evidence that Defendants diverted Port 
Authority personnel to do work that was not 
part of the agency's 'usual course of business' 
when reconfiguring the access lanes," and 
that "[t]he jury could reasonably find that the 
value of compensation paid to Port Authority 
personnel, losses from a ruined traffic study, 
and the value of the lanes and toll booths 
were not bona fide and satisfied the 
$5,000.00 threshold."  
Without reaching the other costs presented to 
the jury (i.e., the value of the lanes and toll 
booths themselves, and the costs of redoing 
the Center and Lemoine traffic study), we 
hold the Government presented sufficient 
evidence that Defendants fraudulently 
obtained more than $5,000 worth of public 
employee labor. 
As to the cost of compensating overtime toll 
booth workers, the Government introduced, 
and Riva testified to, detailed payroll records 
showing eleven overtime toll booth workers 
were paid $3,696.09. The Government 
presented this number to the jury on a chart 
and reminded them of the specific figure in 
summation. 
As to the value of the time of Port Authority 
professional staff, and of Baroni and 
Wildstein themselves, the Government also 
presented witness testimony and detailed 
payroll records. On the first day of  trial, 
payroll records for the relevant Port 
Authority employees were admitted by 
stipulation. These records indicate an hourly 
rate of $43.79 for Hwang, $52.11 for Chung, 
$47.24 for Patel, $79.59 for Wildstein, and 
$153.67 for Baroni. Based on these rates and 
the hours Hwang, Chung, and Patel testified 
they worked on the sham traffic study, the 
evidence shows their time was valued at 
$437.90 ($43.79 x 10 hours), $729.54 
($52.11 x 14 hours), and $661.36 ($47.24 x 
14 hours), respectively. Cumulatively, the 
three Port Authority traffic engineers 
provided unnecessary labor valued at 
approximately $1,828.80. The value of the 
work done by Hwang, Chung, and Patel, 
taken with the $3,696.09 spent on overtime 
toll workers, satisfies the $5,000 threshold. 
Furthermore, based on Wildstein's testimony 
about the amount of time he and Baroni spent 
in furtherance of the scheme, the value of 
their time was, at a minimum, $4,294.80. 
This figure reflects approximately $1,989.75 
for Wildstein's time ($79.59 x 25 hours) and 
$2,305.05 for Baroni's time ($153.67 x 15 
hours). 
The Government reminded the jury of this 
evidence in summation: 
Based on Port Authority payroll 
records and testimony you've heard, 
about $5,000 in Port Authority 
salaries were paid for the time in 
connection for the lane reduction 
work performed by Tunnels, Bridges 
and Terminals, Miss Hwang, Mr. 
Chung, traffic engineering Mr. Patel, 
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as well as for Mr. Baroni and Mr. 
Wildstein's time spent to facilitate 
and conceal causing traffic problems 
in Fort Lee. Those service[s] were 
wasted. Those services were wasted 
for these lane reductions meant to 
punish the Mayor. 
Accordingly, we conclude the Government 
presented to the jury evidence sufficient to 
satisfy the $5,000 threshold. 
Defendants argue this compensation cannot 
count toward the threshold under the statute's 
exemption for "bona fide salary, wages, fees, 
or other compensation." According to 
Defendants, "all of the Port Authority staff 
responsibly performed actual work, in good 
faith, for facially legitimate Port Authority 
purposes." The Government responds this 
argument is "a red herring" because 
"Defendants fraudulently obtained and 
misapplied the services of [Port Authority] 
staff, not those employees' salaries." "But the 
best way of measuring the value of those 
services," according to the Government, "was 
to calculate what portion of those employees' 
salaries covered the time they spent 
unwittingly carrying out Defendants' 
vendetta." We agree. 
Section 666(c) has no application to the 
services of the eleven overtime toll booth 
workers, Hwang, Chung, or Patel. The 
Government offered evidence Defendants 
fraudulently obtained those public workers' 
services and labor; their salaries are merely a 
measure of the loss incurred by the Port 
Authority when it compensated those 
individuals for unnecessary, sham work.  
The charges involving the compensation paid 
to Baroni and Wildstein themselves are 
different, however. The accusation is 
essentially that they did not earn their salaries 
in good faith by accepting payment for time 
spent defrauding their employer, so their 
compensation for that time could not have 
been "bona fide." Section 666(c) thus could 
apply to exempt compensation paid to Baroni 
and Wildstein. " Whether wages are bona fide 
and earned in the usual course of business is 
a question of fact for the jury to decide."  
In this case, the judge instructed the jury that 
"[p]roperty does not include bona fide salary, 
wages, fees or other compensation paid or 
expenses paid or reimbursed in the ordinary 
course of business," and that "[c]ompensation 
for an employee's time and services obtained 
through deception is not legitimate or bona 
fide." This instruction allowed the jury 
properly to exclude Baroni and Wildstein's 
compensation under Section 666(c) only if it 
found they were both bona fide and paid in 
the usual course of business. 
Because the jury in this case was provided 
only a general verdict form, we do not know 
how it determined the $5,000 threshold was 
satisfied. The wire fraud convictions suggest 
the jury did not find Baroni and Wildstein's 
compensation "bona fide." But even if the 
jury determined Baroni and Wildstein's 
compensation was subject to the Section 
666(c)'s safe harbor, the value of the services 
of the eleven toll workers and of Hwang, 
Chung, and Patel—which was not subject to 
that exemption—was sufficient to satisfy the 
statute's $5,000 threshold. 
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In light of our holding, we need not address 
Defendants' argument the frustrated Center 
and Lemoine traffic study is not cognizable 
property under Section 666. 
* * * 
Because the Government offered evidence at 
trial sufficient to prove Defendants 
fraudulently obtained the labor of Port 
Authority employees, and that the value of 
that labor exceeded $5,000, Defendants' 
sufficiency challenge must fail. 
IV. 
Defendants also challenge the jury 
instructions on the Section 666 counts and 
the District Judge's refusal to instruct the jury 
it was required to find Defendants intended to 
punish Mayor Sokolich. 
Where, as here, a party has timely objected to 
the trial court's jury instructions, we exercise 
plenary review in determining whether the 
jury instructions stated the proper legal 
standard. "We must 'conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would 
have been the same absent the error'" for the 
error to be harmless. Our inquiry "is not 
whether, in a trial that occurred without the 
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been 
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict 
actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error."  
 
A. 
Defendants raise three challenges to the jury 
instructions on the Section 666 counts. They 
argue we should vacate and remand their 
convictions because the District Judge erred 
in instructing the jury: (1) to consider the 
value of the Center and Lemoine study in 
determining whether the $5,000 threshold 
was satisfied; (2) that the Government did not 
need to prove Defendants knew of the 
specific property fraudulently obtained, 
knowingly converted, or intentionally 
misapplied; and (3) that "[t]o intentionally 
misapply money or property" means to 
intentionally use money or property 
"knowing that the use is unauthorized or 
unjustifiable or wrongful." Because any error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we 
will affirm. 
1. 
Defendants contend that, even if there is 
evidence sufficient to prove Section 
666 violations, we should vacate their 
convictions and remand for retrial because 
the District Judge erroneously instructed the 
jury to consider the value of the Center and 
Lemoine traffic study. Because we can affirm 
Defendants' convictions solely on the value 
of public employee labor, we need not reach 
the Center and Lemoine study. 
We have already detailed the trial evidence 
establishing the value of the public 
employees' labor in addressing Defendants' 
sufficiency challenge. Our analysis there 
focused on whether the record, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Government, 
provided a sufficient basis for a rational juror 
to convict. But our inquiry here is different. 
Defendants contend that, even if the record 
contained sufficient evidence that the value 
of public employee labor exceeded $5,000, 
we cannot be certain beyond a reasonable 
doubt the jury actually considered all of that 
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time in light of its instructions. We disagree. 
No reasonable juror could have failed to 
credit the value of Port Authority employee 
labor Defendants used to effect their 
fraudulent scheme, which alone 
satisfies Section 666(a)(1)(A)(i)'s $5,000 
threshold. 
Defendants do not assert any error in the jury 
instructions as to the value of the public 
employee labor, and we find none. The 
Government presented overwhelming and 
undisputed evidence—which we described in 
analyzing Defendants' sufficiency 
challenge—concerning the amount of time 
Port Authority employees spent in 
furtherance of Defendants' scheme. 
As to the cost of compensating overtime 
tollbooth workers, the Government 
introduced, and Riva specifically testified to, 
detailed payroll records showing eleven 
overtime tollbooth workers were paid 
$3,696.09. The Government presented this 
number to the jury on a chart and referenced 
it in summation. 
The Government also elicited testimony from 
three members of the Port Authority's 
professional staff—Hwang, Chung, and 
Patel—about the time they spent collecting 
traffic data on the realignment, in furtherance 
of no legitimate Port Authority purpose, and 
testimony from Wildstein about the time he 
and Baroni spent in furtherance of the 
scheme. Detailed payroll records reveal the 
value of the traffic engineers' time was 
approximately $1,828.80. 
Defendants argue we cannot be confident the 
jury considered the traffic engineers' time 
because it was not presented a full calculation 
of the value of their hourly rate multiplied by 
the hours they claimed to have worked on the 
sham study. We disagree. The parties 
admitted the relevant payroll records by 
stipulation, the Government elicited 
testimony to establish the number of hours 
worked, and it reminded the jury of this 
evidence in summation, estimating that the 
value of the engineers' and Baroni and 
Wildstein's time exceeded $5,000—which is 
correct. The amount was over $6,000. 
Accordingly, the value of the work 
performed by Hwang, Chung, and Patel, 
taken together with the $3,696.09 spent on 
overtime toll workers, satisfies the $5,000 
threshold. The time Baroni and Wildstein 
spent plotting their fraud represents an 
additional $4,295. 
Because the jury was instructed 
"[c]ompensation for an employee's time and 
services obtained through deception is not 
legitimate or bona fide," and the Government 
presented overwhelming evidence 
Defendants fraudulently obtained Port 
Authority employee services, the jury 
necessarily found all the toll worker and 
professional staff time satisfied the $5,000 
threshold and was not subject to Section 
666(c)'s exclusion for bona fide 
compensation. As noted, even if the jury did 
not credit Baroni and Wildstein's 
compensation, the value of employee time 
Defendants obtained nonetheless exceeds 
$5,000. 
Defendants' convictions on the wire fraud 
counts confirm this conclusion. The jury 
found Defendants defrauded the Port 
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Authority and conspired to do so. The only 
fraudulent scheme before them was one to 
cause a traffic blockage in Fort Lee by 
conducting a sham traffic study. There is 
overwhelming evidence that the bridge lanes 
were altered, eleven toll collectors worked 
additional overtime hours as a result, and the 
traffic study was conducted with the help of 
several well-paid Port Authority engineers. 
Defendants do not argue the study was not 
conducted. At trial, they asserted they did not 
know it was a sham or barely participated in 
it—an argument the jury roundly rejected. 
Indeed, the jury was instructed that, if it 
found the Defendants believed the traffic 
study was legitimate, it was a complete 
defense. On appeal, they argue Baroni had 
the authority to conduct the study even if it 
was a sham. The jury could not have 
concluded that Defendants conspired to 
conduct a sham traffic study but then ignored 
the value of the employee labor necessary to 
effect that fraudulent scheme. As we have 
explained, the jury was presented with 
overwhelming and undisputed evidence 
demonstrating the value of the toll workers' 
and professional staff's time exceeds $5,000. 
 
2. 
Next, Defendants contend the District Court 
erred in instructing the jury it did not need to 
know of the specific property obtained. 
Defendants raise this argument to challenge 
the inclusion of the Center and Lemoine 
study in the jury instructions. Although we 
agree the instruction was erroneous, the error 
was harmless. 
The District Judge instructed the jury: 
The Government does not have to 
prove that the Defendants knew of the 
specific property obtained by fraud, 
knowingly converted, or intentionally 
misapplied, or that the value of the 
property met or exceeded $5,000. 
This addition to the Third Circuit's Model 
Jury Instruction was proposed by the 
Government. In proposed draft jury 
instructions submitted to the trial court, the 
Government "propose[d] keeping [this] 
language" on the following basis: 
As this Court recognized in denying 
Defendants' motions to dismiss the 
Indictment, the $5,000 requirement is 
a "jurisdictional element."  The Third 
Circuit has long held that a 
defendant's "knowledge of . . . 
jurisdictional fact[s]" is "irrelevant."  
At the charging conference, Defendants 
objected to this addition and requested the 
judge instruct the jury it had to be "at least 
reasonably foreseeable what property would 
be obtained." The Government responded 
that "[r]easonably foreseeable goes to mens 
rea, which the Third Circuit has held clearly 
does not extend to the jurisdictional elements 
of statutes like 666." The judge agreed and 
declined to instruct the jury the property at 
issue had to be reasonably foreseeable to 
Defendants. 
Defendants argue this was error because the 
"Section 666's jurisdictional element is the 
requirement that the victim be a federal 
program beneficiary," and that "[t]he $5,000 
threshold is a de minimis exception, below 
which Congress simply chose not to 
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authorize prosecution." We agree  Section 
666(b) is the statute's jurisdictional provision 
in the sense that this provision provides the 
jurisdictional hook "tying the proscribed 
conduct to the area of federal concern 
delineated by the statute," here Congress's 
Spending Clause power. But Section 
666(a)(1)(A)(i)'s requirement that the value 
of affected property be at least $5,000 can be 
described as jurisdictional in the sense that it 
is a "jurisdictional floor" below which 
Congress has determined there is insufficient 
federal interest in prosecution. 
In any event, the affected property is not part 
of Section 666(a)(1)(A)(i)'s $5,000 
requirement. That provision requires only 
that the property "is valued at $5,000 or 
more." The property is the direct object of the 
conduct element, Section 666(a)(1)(A), 
which provides that one who "embezzles, 
steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without 
authority knowingly converts to the use of 
any person other than the rightful owner or 
intentionally misapplies, property" violates 
the statute. 
While the jury need not have found that 
Defendants knew the value of the property, it 
was error for the trial judge to instruct the 
jury "[t]he Government d[id] not have to 
prove that the Defendants knew of the 
specific property obtained by fraud, 
knowingly converted, or intentionally 
misapplied." Such an instruction runs the risk 
of negating the statute's mens 
rea requirement and thus relieving the 
Government of its burden of proof on an 
essential element of the crime. We do not 
believe, for example, one could intend to 
misapply something one does not know 
exists; to instruct the jury otherwise would 
seemingly dispense with the intent 
requirement. 
But because we need not reach nor credit the 
Center and Lemoine study to affirm 
Defendants' convictions, the error was 
harmless. There is overwhelming evidence 
Defendants knew of the property fraudulently 
obtained or intentionally misapplied, 
including the work of fourteen of Baroni's 
subordinates at the Port Authority. 
 
3. 
Defendants next challenge the District 
Judge's definition of intentional 
misapplication as ambiguous. We disagree. 
Following the Third Circuit Model Jury 
Instruction, the judge instructed the jury: 
To intentionally misapply money or 
property means to intentionally use 
money or property of the Port 
Authority knowing that the use is 
unauthorized or unjustifiable or 
wrongful. Misapplication includes 
the wrongful use of the money or 
property for an unauthorized purpose, 
even if the use actually benefitted the 
Port Authority. 
Defendants argue that "unjustifiable or 
wrongful" is overbroad and ambiguous. 
Defendants raised this same argument in 
pretrial motions and at the charging 
conference. The Government responded 
these are common terms and have been used 
in numerous intentional misapplication cases 
going back decades. Kelly's lawyer suggested 
that the judge "just define what unjustifiable 
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and wrongful are," but when asked for 
proposed definitions, had nothing to offer. 
The judge overruled Defendants' objection 
because the terms are not "inherently vague" 
and were not "strong legal term[s]."  
On appeal, Defendants argue these terms are 
so broad that the jury could have convicted if 
it believed the lane realignment was "a bad 
idea," unjustifiable "as a policy matter," or 
that Baroni should have sought Executive 
Director Foye's approval. We disagree. 
Other instructions in the District Judge's 
thorough and comprehensive charge 
foreclose the possibility the jury convicted 
defendants for lawful but imprudent conduct, 
e.g., because the jury thought the lane 
reductions were "a bad idea." These include 
the requirement that $5,000 worth of property 
be stolen or misapplied and that the 
misapplication be "for an unauthorized 
purpose." The judge also told the jury that it 
had to be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the purpose of the lane reductions 
was not a legitimate traffic study and that 
Defendants' good faith would be a complete 
defense to the charges. Because the jury was 
instructed that Defendants could not be 
convicted if they believed in good faith that 
the reductions were part of a legitimate traffic 
study, a jury following its instructions could 
not have convicted Defendants based on its 
personal judgments about the wisdom and 
execution of the traffic study. 
Moreover, we observe that this definition, or 
even broader language, is contained in the 
model jury instructions in several of our sister 
circuits. It is included verbatim in the Section 
666 pattern jury instructions from the Eighth 
Circuit. The First Circuit's 18 U.S.C. § 
656 (theft, embezzlement, or misapplication 
by bank officer or employee) pattern 
instructions define "willful misapplication" 
to include "that [defendants] wrongfully used 
the bank's funds" without further clarifying 
what "wrongfully" means. The Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits both have pattern instructions 
for statutes containing "willful 
misapplication" that do not define those 
terms at all. Jurors are regularly trusted to 
understand the meaning of these ordinary 
words in criminal cases. 
 
B. 
Defendants also challenge the District 
Judge's refusal to instruct the jury it needed 
to find Defendants intended to punish Mayor 
Sokolich in order to convict. They contend 
this error affects every count and 
constructively amended the indictment, 
"permit[ing] the jury to convict based on 
conduct that was not unlawful." We disagree. 
Defendants requested the object of the 
conspiracy be defined throughout the jury 
charge as one "to misuse Port Authority 
property to facilitate and conceal the causing 
of traffic problems in Fort Lee as punishment 
of Mayor Sokolich." The trial court 
disagreed, ruling "the purpose or the object of 
the conspiracy being to punish Mayor 
Sokolich goes to motive," which is "not an 
element of the crime" and so "not an element 
that has to be proven."  
During deliberations, the jury sent a note 
asking: "Can you be guilty of conspiracy 
without the act being intentionally punative 
[sic] toward Mayor Socholich [sic]." The 
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judge responded: "Yes. Please consider this 
along with all other instructions that have 
been given to you."  
In their post-trial motions, Defendants argued 
the punishment of Mayor Sokolich was "an 
essential element of each of the charged 
offenses," and that the failure to instruct the 
jury on this point relieved the Government of 
its burden of proof. The trial judge again 
disagreed, explaining that "any punitive goal 
Defendants may have had goes to their 
motive for violating the charged statutes, 
[but] is not an essential element of any of the 
crimes charged." We agree. 
Defendants argue the "intent to punish 
Sokolich [is] an essential element of the mens 
rea of the charged offenses." Once again, 
Defendants conflate motive with mens 
rea intent and conduct. As we recently 
explained in Hassan v. City of New York: 
[T]here's a difference between 
"intent" and "motive." "[A] defendant 
acts intentionally when he desires 
a  particular result, without reference 
to the reason for such desire. Motive, 
on the other hand, is the reason why 
the defendant desires the result." In 
other words, "intent" asks whether a 
person acts "intentionally or 
accidentally," while "motive" asks, 
"If he did it intentionally, why did he 
do it?" This fundamental "distinction 
between motive and intent runs all 
through the law."  
The District Judge properly instructed the 
jury, for example, that to find Defendants 
guilty of wire fraud, the Government was 
required to prove they "knowingly devised a 
scheme to defraud or to obtain money or 
property by materially false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises," and 
that they "acted with intent to defraud." This 
describes the conduct proscribed by the 
statute and the required mens rea. The intent 
to punish Mayor Sokolich may explain 
Defendants' motive—why Defendants 
intended to defraud the Port Authority in this 
case—but it is distinct from mens rea and is 
not a required element of any of the charged 
offenses.  
Indeed, following the Third Circuit Model 
Jury Instructions, the District Judge charged 
the jury on this critical difference between 
motive and intent: 
Intent and motive are different 
concepts. Motive is what prompts a 
person to act. Intent refers only to the 
state of mind with which the 
particular act is done. Personal 
advancement and financial gain, for 
example, are motives for much of 
human conduct. However, these 
motives may prompt one person to 
intentionally do something perfectly 
acceptable, while prompting another 
person to intentionally do an act that 
is a crime. Motive is not an element 
of the offense with which a defendant 
is charged. Proof of bad motive is not 
required to convict. Further, proof of 
bad motive alone does not establish 
that the defendant is guilty. And proof 
of good motive alone does not 
establish that the defendant is not 
guilty. Evidence of the defendant's 
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motive may, however, help you to 
determine his or her intent. 
The judge specifically instructed the jury that 
evidence of motive may be relevant to 
establishing mens rea, thus allowing a juror 
who found evidence of motive lacking to vote 
for acquittal. Defendants were free to 
argue—and did argue—that they were not 
motivated by any desire to punish Mayor 
Sokolich. The jury's guilty verdict 
necessarily demonstrates no juror found 
motive so lacking as to raise a reasonable 
doubt concerning Defendants' guilt. 
Moreover, as we have explained, the 
comprehensive and thorough jury charge 
created no risk that Defendants were 
convicted on the basis of lawful conduct. 
And while the grand jury included language 
describing Defendants' motive to punish the 
mayor in the indictment, that language—
which did not describe an essential element 
of the charged offense—was merely 
surplusage. Because the jury instructions did 
not modify the essential elements of the 
offenses as charged in the indictment, there 
was no constructive amendment. 
Accordingly, we find no error in these 
instructions or the District Judge's response 
to the jury's question. 
* * * 
Because Defendants' sufficiency challenges 
to their wire fraud and Section 666 offenses 
fail, and because we find any error in the jury 
instructions was at worst harmless, we will 
affirm Defendants' judgments of convictions 
as to the wire fraud and Section 666 offenses. 
We now turn to the civil rights counts. 
 
V. 
Finally, Defendants challenge the sufficiency 
of Counts 8 and 9 of the indictment. In those 
counts, the grand jury charged Defendants 
with conspiring to violate, and substantively 
violating, the civil rights of Fort Lee 
residents. It alleged "[t]he object of the 
conspiracy was to interfere with the localized 
travel rights of the residents of Fort Lee for 
the illegitimate purpose of causing significant 
traffic problems in Fort Lee to punish Mayor 
Sokolich," and that Defendants "knowingly 
and willfully deprived the residents of Fort 
Lee of the rights, privileges, and immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, namely, the right to localized 
travel on public roadways free from 
restrictions unrelated to legitimate 
government objectives." Defendants argue 
the substantive due process right the grand 
jury identified—"the right to localized travel 
on public roadways free from restrictions 
unrelated to legitimate government 
objectives"—is not clearly established and 
thus cannot form the basis of the civil rights 
offenses charged in Counts 8 and 9. 
Defendants' attack on the sufficiency of 
Counts 8 and 9 of the indictment is a legal 
question over which our review is plenary. 
"[W]hether the alleged violation of 
substantive due process was clearly 
established . . . is a question of law over 
which our review is unrestricted."  
Section 241 makes it a crime for "two or 
more persons [to] conspire to injure, oppress, 
 217 
threaten, or intimidate any person in any 
State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, 
or District in the free exercise or enjoyment 
of any right or privilege secured to him by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States," 
and Section 242 makes it a crime for a person 
"under color of any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, or custom, to willfully subject[] 
any person in any State, Territory, 
Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured or protected by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States."  
"[I]n lieu of describing the specific conduct it 
forbids, each statute's general terms 
incorporate constitutional law by reference." 
The statutes' scope is limited to "rights fairly 
warned of, having been 'made specific' by the 
time of the charged conduct." The Supreme 
Court has held that "the object of the 'clearly 
established' immunity standard is not 
different from that of 'fair warning' as it 
relates to law 'made specific' for the purpose 
of validly applying" the criminal civil rights 
statutes. Accordingly, we apply the same test 
as in qualified immunity cases, asking 
whether the right allegedly deprived was 
clearly established.  
Before trial, Defendants moved to dismiss the 
indictment, arguing that there is no 
constitutional right to localized travel on 
public roadways and that, even if such a right 
did exist, it had not yet been clearly 
established. As the District Court noted when 
denying the motion, our Court recognized 
a Fourteenth Amendment due process right 
to intrastate travel nearly three decades ago. 
Specifically, in reviewing a city ordinance 
that prohibited cars from driving three or 
more times through certain overcrowded 
streets during evening hours, we held there is 
"[a] due process right of localized movement 
on the public roadways," which we 
alternately described as "the right to move 
freely about one's neighborhood or town, 
even by automobile." We further held no 
other constitutional provision could provide 
the source of the right. We nonetheless 
upheld the ordinance because it was narrowly 
tailored to meet the significant city objectives 
of protecting public safety and reducing 
intense traffic congestion. 
Contrary to the District Court's holding, 
however, and according to the Supreme 
Court's qualified immunity 
precedent, Lutz alone could not have put 
Defendants on notice that they were violating 
a constitutional right. "A Government 
official's conduct violates clearly established 
law when, at the time of the challenged 
conduct, 'the contours of a right are 
sufficiently clear' that every 'reasonable 
official would have understood that what he 
is doing violates that right.'" "To determine 
whether the right is clearly established, we 
look at the state of the law when the [conduct] 
occurred," here 2013. The Supreme Court 
has suggested that a single binding case from 
the defendant's jurisdiction is insufficient to 
give notice that certain conduct could lead to 
criminal punishment. Instead, "[w]e look first 
to applicable Supreme Court precedent." A 
relevant Supreme Court holding ends the 
inquiry. "[I]f none exists, it may be possible 
that a 'robust consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority' in the Court[s] of Appeals could 
clearly establish a right for purposes of 
qualified immunity."  
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The Supreme Court has never recognized an 
intrastate travel right. Far from a "robust 
consensus" in the Courts of Appeals that the 
right exists, the law across the circuits is 
uncertain. And most often our sister circuits 
have considered the matter in reviewing 
challenges to municipal residency 
requirements, not government action 
prohibiting free movement in public spaces, 
undermining the notice those opinions might 
have provided to Defendants as to the 
criminal nature of their conduct. 
In addition to our opinion in Lutz, the First, 
Second, and Sixth Circuits have recognized a 
right to intrastate travel, though they have 
described it at varying levels of generality.   
On the other hand, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have treated the 
question more skeptically, often hesitating to 
recognize a due process intrastate travel right 
and sometimes explicitly rejecting theories 
rooted in other constitutional provisions.  
The D.C. Circuit is internally conflicted but 
has not yet set precedent. A plurality of the 
Court sitting en banc suggested a due process 
right to intrastate travel might exist but did 
not reach the question.  In separate opinions, 
another plurality concluded a right to 
intrastate travel exists and ought to be subject 
to intermediate scrutiny. 
Simply put, although four circuits (including 
our own) have found some form of a 
constitutional right to intrastate travel, there 
is hardly a "robust consensus" that the right 
exists, let alone clarity as to its contours. 
Although Lutz is both clear and binding in 
our jurisdiction, this area of law as a whole is 
far from settled. Based on the Supreme 
Court's qualified immunity precedent, we 
hold the District Court erred in 
concluding Lutz, standing alone, provided 
fair warning that Defendants conduct was 
illegal, especially in view of the state of the 
law in our sister circuits.  "[W]hether or not 
the constitutional rule applied by the court 
below was correct, it was not 'beyond 
debate.'"  
Accordingly, we will reverse and vacate 
Defendants' civil rights convictions and 
remand with instructions to dismiss Counts 8 
and 9 of the indictment under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 12(b). Because we 
reverse and vacate Defendants' convictions, 
we need not reach their arguments 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm 
Defendants' judgments of convictions as to 
the wire fraud and Section 666 counts 
(Counts 1 through 7), and we will reverse and 
vacate only as to the civil rights counts 
(Counts 8 and 9). Because we have reversed 
and vacated two counts of the indictment, we 
will vacate Defendants' sentences on the 
remaining counts of convictions. We will 
remand with instructions to dismiss only 
Counts 8 and 9 of the indictment and to 











June 28, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Friday agreed to 
hear an appeal in the so-called Bridgegate 
case against two former associates of ex-New 
Jersey Gov. Chris Christie who were 
convicted of reducing local access lanes to 
the George Washington Bridge in a political 
revenge scheme. 
 
The justices granted a petition from Bridget 
Anne Kelly, a onetime aide to the governor, 
to take a second look at a Third Circuit 
opinion last fall that upheld most of the 
convictions for her and former Port Authority 
of New York and New Jersey executive 
William E. Baroni Jr. 
 
“I am grateful and encouraged that the 
Supreme Court has decided to hear my case, 
and hopeful that this process will provide 
another opportunity for the truth to come out 
— for my sake, and more importantly, for the 
sake of my children. I am thankful to the 
court for granting this opportunity,” Kelly 
said Friday in a statement. 
 
Baroni attorney Michael A. Levy of Sidley 
Austin LLP told Law360 on Friday, “Bill 
Baroni is grateful to the Supreme Court for 
choosing to accept this case, and he is 
confident that the court will conclude that 
neither he nor Bridget Kelly committed any 
crime.” 
Matthew Reilly, a spokesman for the U.S. 
Attorney's Office for the District of New 
Jersey, said Friday that the office declined to 
comment. 
The Third Circuit’s Nov. 27 precedential 
decision upheld the bulk of the charges 
against Kelly and Baroni, but tossed claims 
they deprived residents of Fort Lee, New 
Jersey, of their civil rights to travel freely. 
 
Besides those civil rights charges, they were 
convicted at trial in November 2016 of 
misusing the Port Authority’s resources and 
committing wire fraud. 
 
Following the circuit opinion, a New Jersey 
federal judge in February resentenced Baroni 
to an 18-month prison sentence instead of the 
two-year term he originally received. In 
April, the judge handed down a 13-month 
prison sentence to Kelly, down from the 18 
months she initially faced. 
 
In fighting their convictions, Kelly and 
Baroni have blasted the government’s theory 
as improperly turning “routine” political 
activity into criminal conduct. Kelly pointed 
in her petition to “the nearly limitless array of 




“Under the decision below, any official 
(federal, state, or local) who conceals or 
misrepresents her subjective motive for 
making an otherwise-lawful decision — 
including by purporting to act for public-
policy reasons without admitting to her 
ulterior political goals, commonly known as 
political ‘spin’ — has thereby defrauded the 
government of property (her own labor if 
nothing else),” according to the petition. 
 
Urging the high court to pass on the appeal, 
the government said the fact that Kelly was 
“politically motivated to carry out her 
fraudulent scheme is irrelevant to her guilt,” 
adding that she and Baroni fraudulently 
obtained Port Authority employees’ labor 
under the guise of conducting a traffic study. 
 
“Whether petitioner and Baroni were 
motivated by political animus toward the 
mayor of Fort Lee or by a desire for personal 
gain, their criminal liability would be 
unchanged, because their conduct constituted 
a ‘scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses,’” according to 
the government’s opposition brief. 
 
Prosecutors have said that Kelly and Baroni 
conspired with former Port Authority 
executive David Wildstein to close two of 
three local access lanes to the bridge during a 
week in September 2013, causing extensive 
traffic jams in Fort Lee, as retaliation against 
borough Mayor Mark Sokolich for not 
endorsing Christie’s 2013 reelection bid. 
 
The three conspirators concocted a bogus 
story that the lane reductions were for a 
traffic study, prosecutors said. Baroni and 
Kelly both testified during the trial that they 
did not take part in the political payback 
scheme, claiming that Wildstein duped them 
into believing the lane closures were for a 
legitimate traffic study. 
 
Wildstein, who pled guilty and cooperated 
with the government, was sentenced in July 
2017 to three years of probation. 
 
The government is represented by Jeffrey B. 
Wall of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office, 
and Brian A. Benczkowski and Andrew 
Laing of the U.S. Department of Justice's 
Criminal Division. 
 
Kelly is represented by Yaakov M. Roth, 
Michael A. Carvin, Anthony J. Dick and 
Vivek Suri of Jones Day and Michael D. 
Critchley of Critchley Kinum & Denoia LLC. 
 
The case is Bridget Anne Kelly v. U.S., case 
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June 28, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether 
two allies of former New Jersey Governor 
Chris Christie were improperly convicted for 
their roles in the George Washington Bridge 
lane-closing scandal, accepting a case that 
could make it harder to prosecute public 
officials for fraud. 
The justices agreed to hear an appeal from 
Bridget Anne Kelly, who has been scheduled 
to start a 13-month prison term next month. 
The case will also affect Bill Baroni, who was 
convicted alongside Kelly and is serving an 
18-month sentence. 
The convictions stem from the 
2013 “Bridgegate” scheme, which created 
crippling traffic jams to punish the mayor of 
Fort Lee, New Jersey, for failing to endorse 
Christie’s re-election bid that year. A federal 
appeals court upheld Kelly’s and Baroni’s 
fraud convictions while tossing out other 
charges. 
Kelly contends that decision stretched the 
law so far that public officials will now risk 
prison time when they harbor secret personal 
or political motives for a decision they make. 
The ruling “is a playbook for how to 
prosecute political adversaries, and 
transforms the federal judiciary into a 
Ministry of Truth for every public official in 
the nation,” she argued in her appeal. 
‘Traffic Problems’ 
Kelly, who had been Christie’s deputy chief 
of staff, gained notoriety because of an email 
she sent about a month before the closing of 
two access lanes to the bridge. “Time for 
some traffic problems in Fort Lee,” Kelly 
wrote. 
Prosecutors said Kelly worked with Baroni, 
then the deputy executive director of the Port 
Authority, to close the lanes under the guise 
of conducting a traffic study. 
Christie, a Republican, denied knowledge of 
the lane closings and wasn’t charged in the 
plot, though it helped end his presidential 
ambitions. His second term as governor 
ended in 2018. 
The Trump administration urged the 
Supreme Court not to hear the appeal. In 
court papers, the Justice Department said the 
scheme met the requirements of the federal 
fraud statutes because it forced the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, 
which runs the bridge, to pay thousands of 
dollars of overtime wages. 
Kelly “does not dispute the trial evidence 
showing that the Port Authority spent several 
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thousands of dollars paying employees for 
unnecessary work that served no legitimate 
Port Authority function,” the government 
argued. 
The Supreme Court in recent years has 
narrowed the reach of the federal fraud laws. 
In 2016 the court tossed out the conviction of 
former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell, 
saying it wasn’t clear he had done more than 
set up meetings and take other informal 
actions on behalf of a supporter. 
The court will hear arguments and rule in the 
nine-month term that starts in October. 
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June 28, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Friday said it will 
review the case against a former aide to New 
Jersey Gov. Chris Christie who was 
convicted of helping to orchestrate 
Bridgegate, keeping alive the years-long saga 
surrounding the 2013 lane closures at the 
George Washington Bridge.  
The court, its term ending, said it would hear 
an appeal by Bridget Anne Kelly, a former 
deputy chief of staff to Christie who 
conspired with other allies of the governor to 
create the massive traffic jam — now said to 
be a bizarre act of political retribution. 
Kelly and Bill Baroni, a former Republican 
state lawmaker who served as Christie’s 
deputy executive director of the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, 
were both convicted in 2016 for roles in the 
scandal. Baroni is serving an 18-month 
federal prison sentence, while Kelly is 
scheduled to start serving a 13-month term on 
July 10. 
While the Supreme Court did not say what, 
specifically, it will review, Kelly has argued 
the case misapplied federal fraud statutes to 
ordinary political conduct. 
“If there is one thing this country does not 
need right now, it is a rule of law allowing a 
public official to be locked up based on a jury 
determination that she ‘lied’ by purporting to 
act in the public interest or by concealing her 
‘political’ purposes,” attorneys Michael 
Critchley and Yaakov M. Roth argued in 
their brief to petition the court to hear the 
case. “There is no end to the (bipartisan) 
mischief such a regime would facilitate, or 
the chilling effect it would carry.” 
Kelly and Baroni, who has also joined in the 
Supreme Court appeal, had previously 
exhausted all other legal avenues after having 
some of their convictions tossed by an 
appeals court, leading to slight reductions in 
their sentences. In November, a panel of 
judges sitting on the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit upheld the seven wire 
fraud and conspiracy counts, but dismissed 
two civil rights-related convictions.  
The duo worked with a third conspirator — 
David Wildstein, who pleaded guilty and 
testified against them — to orchestrate the 
political retribution scheme, which Wildstein 
said was designed to punish the Democratic 
mayor of Fort Lee, N.J., for refusing to 
endorse Christie's reelection campaign. 
Wildstein received probation and is currently 
operating a political news site in New Jersey.  
Over the course of several days in September 
2013, the three closed off two local access 
lanes to the George Washington Bridge 
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during the morning commute, clogging roads 
for hours in the densely-populated Bergen 
County town. Kelly sent Wildstein the now-
infamous email stating that it was "time for 
some traffic problems in Fort Lee," sparking 
the lane closures. 
While Kelly has maintained she did not know 
the true reason for lane closures, believing 
them to be part of a traffic study, she testified 
under oath that Christie knew about the plan 
ahead of time — an allegation the former 
governor had repeatedly denied.  
After being resentenced earlier this year in 
U.S. District Court in New Jersey, Kelly 
unleashed on Christie, who had served as the 
head of President Donald Trump’s transition 
and is now an attorney in private practice and 
a political commentator for ABC News. 
Kelly called Christie a “bully” and said he 
was able to “escape justice.” 
"The fact that I am on these steps in place of 
others from the Christie administration — 
including the governor himself — does not 
prove my guilt," Kelly said outside the 
federal courthouse in April. "It only proves 
that justice is not blind. It has favorites. It 
misses the mark. It misses the truth. And it 
picks winners and losers that are sometimes 
beyond anyone's control." 
The federal government's case against Kelly 
and Baroni relied largely on a law barring 
officials from misapplying property from an 
organization receiving federal funds — in 
this case the Port Authority, a bistate agency 
that operates the bridge. 
Kelly was deputy chief of staff in charge of 
the Christie administration's Office of 
Intergovernmental Affairs — an organization 
that, according to testimony from numerous 
witnesses testimony and other information 
that came out during the trial, worked as a 
publicly-funded arm of Christie's reelection 
campaign. 
Kelly and Baroni argued that prosecuting 
them under that federal law would 
criminalize normal political conduct. The 
appeals court disagreed. 
"To execute their scheme, they conscripted 
fourteen Port Authority employees to do 
sham work in pursuit of no legitimate Port 
Authority aim. That Defendants were 
politically motivated does not remove their 
intentional conduct from the ambit of the 
federal criminal law," Judge Anthony Scirica 
wrote in the circuit court opinion.  
In Kelly's request for a rehearing before the 
full 3rd Circuit, which was denied, Critchley 
and Roth argued the court's ruling could set a 
set a "dangerous and untenable." 
"Taken seriously, it would allow any federal, 
state, or local official to be indicted based on 
nothing more than the (ubiquitous) allegation 
that she lied in claiming to act in the public 
interest," the lawyers wrote, giving examples 
of potential convictions. "These implications 
are astounding — and grave. There is nothing 
easier than accusing a public official of 
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Federal prosecutors have often relied on a 
powerful criminal statute to bring high-
profile corruption cases, including 
the college admissions scandal that ensnared 
Hollywood celebrities and a string of bribery 
investigations that targeted college basketball 
programs. 
But now, a key theory of that statute could be 
gutted because of a challenge by two 
defendants in another well-known case — 
“Bridgegate,” the September 2013 closing of 
access lanes to the George Washington 
Bridge, which connects Manhattan and New 
Jersey, to punish a mayor for refusing to offer 
a campaign endorsement. 
The United States Supreme Court, in a 
decision that surprised legal experts, last 
week agreed to hear an appeal of the 
defendants’ corruption convictions in a move 
that could significantly weaken the ability of 
prosecutors to go after what they determine 
to be political malfeasance. 
The court’s decision to take on the appeal by 
the defendants, Bridget Anne Kelly and Bill 
Baroni, suggests that the justices are open to 
overturning their convictions, legal experts 
said, and follows other rulings that have 
chipped away at federal corruption laws. 
“There has been this stream of cases coming 
from the Supreme Court that has continued to 
limit prosecutorial discretion and 
prosecutorial authority when it comes to 
corruption cases,” said Jessica Tillipman, an 
assistant dean at the George Washington 
University Law School. “So the fact that they 
took on another corruption case to me signals 
that there’s a good chance that the statutes 
will be further narrowed once again.” 
The bridge scheme drew national attention 
and undermined the presidential ambitions of 
the then-New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie. Ms. 
Kelly and Mr. Baroni, top aides to Mr. 
Christie, were charged with orchestrating the 
closing of the lanes leading to the bridge.  
At issue in the case is a fraud theory used to 
prosecute under the mail and wire fraud 
statutes known as a “right to control.” It rests 
on the idea that the owner of an asset is 
defrauded when somebody uses that asset 
and lies about what they are using it for. In 
the college admissions scandal, for example, 
prosecutors said offers of acceptance to 
universities were misused. 
The court has already significantly raised the 
bar when it comes to prosecuting politicians, 
and what was once viewed as illegal is being 
increasingly regarded as normal political 
behavior, legal experts said. 
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One of the most significant decisions came in 
2016, when the Supreme Court overturned 
the corruption conviction of former Gov. Bob 
McDonnell of Virginia, who had been 
accused of accepting luxury items, loans and 
vacations in exchange for helping a local 
businessman.  
In its unanimous ruling, the court said the 
gifts were permissible because in setting up 
meetings and making introductions for the 
businessman, Mr. McDonnell had not 
betrayed his office or, as the law says, taken 
an “official act.’’ To prove corruption, the 
court said there had to be a clear official 
government decision or act, essentially 
creating a more stringent definition of the 
law. 
The McDonnell decision upended several 
high-profile federal prosecutions, including 
cases involving Sheldon Silver, the once 
powerful speaker of the New York 
Assembly, Dean G. Skelos, the former 
majority leader of the New York Senate, and 
Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey. All 
three had already been indicted at the time of 
the decision.  
A federal appeals court overturned the 
convictions of Mr. Silver and Mr. Skelos. 
Still, appellate judges made clear that 
sufficient evidence existed to prove the men 
had acted corruptly.  
Mr. Silver and Mr. Skelos were found guilty 
at new trials after juries were presented a 
more narrow definition of what constituted 
corrupt behavior.  
In Mr. Menendez’s case, a judge declared a 
mistrial after jurors could not reach a verdict 
on charges that the senator had provided 
favors to a wealthy donor in exchange for 
lavish gifts.  
Federal prosecutors abandoned efforts to try 
Mr. Menendez after the judge threw out 
several counts of the charges, saying that the 
prosecution had not proved a quid pro quo 
under the definition laid out by the 
McDonnell decision. 
The appeal in the Bridgegate case is now 
testing another aspect of federal corruption 
law.  
“What’s always marked this case from being 
a little different than standard corruption 
cases was that this wasn’t about personal 
gain, or at least personal gain in a monetary 
sense,” said Daniel C. Richman, a professor 
at Columbia Law School and a former federal 
prosecutor. “If money isn’t nakedly involved, 
you end up having more complex and 
contestable liability theories.” 
The defense team for Ms. Kelly and Mr. 
Baroni argue that even if they did hatch a 
scheme to block the access lanes, which they 
have denied, it would not constitute a crime 
because there was no personal financial or 
material gain, and the agency that operates 
the bridge, the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey, was never defrauded.  
In the end, the defense lawyers argued, the 
affair was nothing more than the rough and 
tumble of political gamesmanship, likening it 
to a mayor directing his public works 
department to plow the streets of his political 
opponents last during a snowstorm.  
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Zephyr Teachout, a law professor at Fordham 
University and a former candidate for New 
York attorney general, said it’s likely the 
defense will argue that Bridgegate was just 
politics. “And this court has been extremely 
sympathetic to that kind of argument,” she 
said.  
The hearing before the Supreme Court, likely 
in December or January, will prolong a 
political saga that has plagued Mr. Christie 
and his allies for more than five years.  
Sparked by the now infamous “Time for 
some traffic problems in Fort Lee” email sent 
by Ms. Kelly, the scandal engulfed the 
Christie administration, leading 
to indictments for Mr. Baroni and Ms. Kelly 
in 2015, and their conviction in November 
2016.  
While the Christie administration said the 
lane closings were ostensibly part of a traffic 
study, an investigation revealed that they 
were political retribution against the mayor 
of Fort Lee, a town at the foot of the George 
Washington Bridge, for not endorsing Mr. 
Christie’s re-election. Mr. Christie has denied 
any knowledge or involvement in the 
scheme. 
The closings led to days of massive traffic 
jams near the world’s busiest bridge.  
Both Ms. Kelly and Mr. Baroni appealed 
their convictions and were able to get part of 
their sentences reduced. In February, Mr. 
Baroni was sentenced to 18 months in prison. 
He reported to a federal corrections facility in 
Pennsylvania in April. Ms. Kelly 
was sentenced to 13 months and was to 
report to prison later this summer, in what 
many thought would be the final chapter in 
the protracted scandal.  
Now, following the Supreme Court’s 
decision to take up the case, Mr. Baroni has 
been released from prison on bail and Ms. 
Kelly will not have to report to prison until 
the Supreme Court renders its decision.  
Michael Critchley, a lawyer for Ms. Kelly, 
has steadfastly maintained that federal 
prosecutors stretched the boundaries of the 
law to make a case against his client. 
“We’ve always said this was an indictment in 
search of a crime,” he said. “You may 
question political motives, but the Supreme 
Court will say are political motives enough 
for holding someone criminally liable for an 
offense?” 
The United States solicitor general’s office 
had recommended that the Supreme Court 
not take up the case, pointing to the 
“approximately $1828.80 for the labor 
necessary to carry out the phony traffic 
study” as evidence that the Port Authority 
was indeed defrauded of resources. 
The solicitor general’s office also took 
exception to the mayor and snowplow 
analogy.  
“Those examples, in contrast to the facts of 
her case, involve officials who possess 
unilateral authority over discretionary 
resources, therefore do not need to lie to 
allocate those resources,” the solicitor 
general’s office wrote. 
But now that the court has agreed to hear 
arguments, some legal experts say the case 
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could again reframe what is acceptable 
political conduct.  
“One does wonder, implicitly, how the 
Supreme Court got to this extraordinarily 
cynical view of politics and public service 
where this dodgy behavior is just part and 
parcel of the political game,” said Dan 
Weiner, a senior counsel at the Brennan 
Center for Justice. “I would like to see the 
courts grapple more earnestly with the 
thinking that, whether these decisions are 
correct or not, allowing conduct like this to 
go unsanctioned and any suggestion that this 
is just politics is just corrosive. And that has 





























































March 29, 2017 
 
Two former allies of Gov. Chris Christie 
were sentenced Wednesday to prison terms 
for their roles in the George Washington 
Bridge lane closures, a bizarre political stunt 
that was designed to help the governor’s 
career but ended up halting his rapid march 
toward the White House. 
Bill Baroni, a former Republican state 
senator who served as Christie’s top 
appointee at the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey, was sentenced to a 24 
months of incarceration. Bridget Anne Kelly, 
Baroni’s co-defendant and a former deputy 
chief of staff to Christie, was sentenced in the 
afternoon to 18 months in prison. 
Both will also serve one year of probation, 
complete 500 hours of community service 
and pay fines and restitution, U.S. District 
Court Judge Susan Wigenton ruled.  
“What occurred in September 2013 was an 
outrageous abuse of power,” Wigenton told a 
packed court room. “The fact there was no 
financial gain underscores the significance of 
power to create chaos at the drop of a hat.” 
She called it a “sad day for the state of New 
Jersey.” 
Baroni remained stoic as the judge read the 
sentence, and was smiling when he walked 
into the hallway. Kelly wiped away tears as 
she learned her future and dabbed her eyes 
with a tissue as she left the courtroom. 
Kelly and Baroni were convicted in 
November after a dramatic, six-week trial in 
which David Wildstein, a dark political 
operative who admitted masterminding the 
scheme, testified against them in hopes of 
reducing his own yet-to-be-determined 
punishment. A jury found Kelly and Baroni 
guilty on multiple counts of conspiracy, fraud 
and civil rights violations. 
All three attempted to implicate Christie 
when they took the witness stand last year, 
but the governor maintains he knew nothing 
about the plot, which was aimed at the 
Democratic mayor of Fort Lee who refused 
to endorse his 2013 re-election bid. The lane 
closures caused days if gridlock in Fort Lee, 
where the bridge is located. 
Both Baroni, 45, and Kelly, 44, continue to 
maintain their own innocence and plan to 
appeal their convictions, saying they thought 
all along that the lane closures were part of a 
legitimate traffic study, not the act of political 
retribution the incident is now known to be. 
In court on Wednesday, Baroni apologized 
for not stopping the plan and said he’d let 
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everyone down — friends, family and the 
people he was supposed to be serving in his 
job at the bi-state agency. 
“I failed,” said Baroni, wearing a dark suit 
and clutching his remarks in his hand. “I 
made the wrong choices, took the wrong 
guidance, listened to the wrong people.” 
Kelly’s lead attorney, Michael Critchley, said 
his client was reluctant to apologize for fear 
of hurting her chance on appeal. He said the 
balancing act felt “like schizophrenia.” 
But Kelly, through tears, did say she was 
remorseful. 
“I do not take the allegation in this case 
lightly,” Kelly said, her voice cracking as she 
stood in court. “I realize how disruptive and 
frustrating the lane realignment was for the 
residents of Fort Lee. I never intended to 
harm anyone. I am sorry if my actions in any 
way caused any harm.” 
Both defendants faced as much as 20 years in 
prison under the most serious counts for 
which they were convicted. Sentencing 
guidelines call for much shorter terms, and 
prosecutors initially recommended in a pre-
sentencing memorandum that each receive a 
sentence at the bottom or below a 37- to 46-
month range. 
The prosecutors were more specific on 
Wednesday, suggesting a term of 24 months 
to 30 months and also that Kelly receive a 
slightly more lenient sentence. 
But the prosecutors said in court and in their 
brief earlier in the week that Baroni and Kelly 
committed serious crimes — “a stunningly 
brazen and vindictive abuse of power,” they 
wrote in the memo — and should each 
receive a “meaningful prison sentence.” 
“Those are the actions out of the playbook of 
some dictator in a banana republic,” assistant 
U.S. Attorney Lee Cortes said in court. “It is 
incomprehensible that such actions could 
take place here in the United States.” 
Defense attorneys for Baroni and Kelly 
argued for probation, given the service both 
have provided to their communities, as well 
as the lack of prior criminal histories. Baroni, 
his attorneys noted, has become a notable 
figure in the gay-rights movement, overcame 
obesity and was an informant for the FBI. 
And Kelly, her lawyer said, is a single mother 
of four who’s engaged in civic and charitable 
work and remains deeply tied to her 
community. She’s “no monster,” her lawyers 
wrote in their memo. 
Critchley spoke at length about how he’d 
come to care deeply about Kelly and her 
family, which he said had suffered greatly. 
He said Kelly’s daughter dropped her college 
plans and her younger children were having 
trouble at school. 
“Your mother has been a poster child for the 
past three years on every TV and every 
newspaper in the region,” Critchley said. 
“They see the gossip when they walk into a 
store.” 
The sentences, Wigenton said, took into 
account many of the personal issues raised. 
She said Baroni, who is a lawyer, received a 
tougher sentence because of his position and 
background in government and politics. 
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Both defendants, the judge said, had betrayed 
the public trust and did so for political 
reason.  
“The orchestrated misuse of the Port 
Authority resources was for only one reason, 
and that was to send a message,” Wigenton 
said. “The situation could have been fatal.” 
Wednesday's sentencings come just weeks 
after David Samson, a longtime friend and 
mentor to Christie, was sentenced in a 
separate corruption case spawned out the 
investigation into the lane closures. 
Despite admitting he shook down United 
Airlines so he could more easily reach his 
South Carolina estate, Samson, a former Port 
Authority chairman, was sentenced to spend 
a year confined to that very same house, 
known as “Rest Period.” Samson, 77, also a 
former state attorney general, avoided any 
prison time and was given four years’ 
probation, 3,600 hours of community service 
and a $100,000 fine. 
Samson’s terms are sure to draw comparisons 
this week to the sentences given to Baroni 
and Kelly, neither of whom were accused of 
doing anything for their own personal 
benefit. 
The story of their undoing is one that 
captivated the political world from the 
moment it was revealed in early 2014, 
months after Christie won re-election and just 
his presidential ambitions were being given 
serious attention. 
That all evaporate when reporters were 
leaked a series of emails and text messages 
that revealed for the first time that the lane 
closures were part of a political revenge 
scheme. One message, sent by Kelly to 
Wildstein, came to symbolize the the whole 
affair: “Time for some traffic problems in 
Fort Lee.” 
The two were accused of closing lanes to the 
bridge in an effort to punish Mark Sokolich, 
the Democratic mayor of the Fort Lee, after 
he refused to back Christie’s re-election. 
The plan caused days of gridlock near the 
bridge as the mayor’s pleas for help were 
repeatedly ignored — at the Port Authority, 
where Baroni was deputy executive director, 
and in Trenton, where Kelly was in charge of 
intergovernmental affairs. 
In an interview on Wednesday, Sokolich said 
the whole ordeal remained to him a “mind-
boggling series of events.” 
He said he thought the verdict was just. 
“I have nothing but respect for the court and 
Judge Wigenton,” Sokolich, who testified at 
the trial, said after Baroni was sentenced. “I 
am certainly not a person to question it. I 
thought it was fair.” 
The trial also included testimony from some 
of Christie’s closest aides and advisers. There 
were numerous revelations about how the 
governor’s office was used, from the earliest 
days of his first term, to advance the 
governor’s political interests. 
Testimony and evidence showed in 
remarkable detail how Christie’s Office of 
Intergovernmental Affairs — what was, on 
paper, a liaison unit for local officials — was 
used as a political shop that dangled all sorts 
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of “goodies” in front of mayors who were 
considered targets for endorsing the 
Republican’s re-election bid. 
The office worked furiously to gain the trust 
of politicians from both parties. Mayors in 
some of the smallest of towns were meant to 
feel special. They were offered tickets to NFL 
games, breakfast with the governor, small 
grants from the Port Authority, and even steel 
recovered from the ashes of the World Trade 
Center. 
Those who stood in the way faced the 
governor’s wrath, some testified. 
“It was clear to me that the environment in 
Trenton created a culture that you’re either 
with us or you’re against us,” Wigenton said 
at the sentencing. 
Christie was mentioned at every turn during 
the trial. There were claims he not only knew 
about the lane closures but approved the plan, 
believing it to be the traffic study Kelly and 
Baroni had spoken about. 
Numerous witnesses — including several 
who are still in his good graces and were 
never accused of any wrongdoing — said 
Christie was told of the lane closures long 
before he said he was. There was also the 
assertion that Christie’s campaign manager, 
Bill Stepien, now a top aide to President 
Donald Trump, was aware of Wildstein’s 
plans. 
The governor, who appeared with the 
president at the White House on Wednesday 
for a discussion about opioid addiction, has 
said none of that is true. 
Asked about the sentencing by "Today 
Show" host Matt Lauer on Wednesday 
morning, Christie declined to comment on 
whether he thought the two deserve jail time. 
“The judge will do what the judge believes is 
appropriate, Matt, and it's not my role or 
anybody else's role other than the judge in 
that courtroom who has passed sentence on 
people who have committed crimes,” 
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Former Christie administration appointee 
Bill Baroni and administration official 
Bridget Anne Kelly will likely serve at least 
some prison time, as a federal appeals panel 
upheld most of their convictions over their 
roles in the 2013 Bridgegate scandal.  
In a decision issued Tuesday, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the seven 
wire fraud and conspiracy counts Kelly and 
Baroni were convicted of in 2016 over the 
George Washington Bridge lane closures 
three years earlier — an act of political 
retribution against Fort Lee’s mayor, who 
refused to endorse Gov. Chris Christie’s 
reelection. 
The three-judge panel did dismiss two civil 
rights-related convictions, meaning Baroni 
and Kelly — who last year were sentenced to 
24 and 18 months in prison, respectively — 
will have to be re-sentenced. 
The U.S. Attorney’s Office in New Jersey, 
which prosecuted the case, said in a statement 
that it’s “reviewing the opinion and is 
grateful for the court’s consideration of all of 
the issues raised in the appeal.” 
Lawyers representing Baroni and Kelly said 
they are evaluating further appeals. 
“We are gratified that the Court of Appeals 
concluded that Bill Baroni did not violate 
anyone’s constitutional rights and his 
sentence has now been vacated,” Michael A. 
Levy, a Sidley Austin LLP partner, said in an 
emailed statement. “What remains from this 
unprecedented prosecution are convictions 
only for the supposed misapplication of a few 
thousand dollars of Port Authority resources 
over less than one week. We disagree that any 
resources were misapplied and are evaluating 
further appellate options.” 
“While we are pleased that the Third Circuit 
rejected the civil rights charges, we are 
disappointed that the Court did not similarly 
reject the government’s unprecedented 
application of the wire fraud and 
misapplication statutes,” Michael Critchley, 
a lawyer representing Kelly, said in an email. 
“We still believe that the remaining charges 
are not legally sustainable and intend to 
petition the United States Supreme Court to 
review this case.” 
With the help of a third conspirator, David 
Wildstein, who pleaded guilty and testified 
against them, Baroni and Kelly helped 
orchestrate a scheme to close Fort Lee’s 
access lanes to the busiest bridge in the 
country, tying up traffic for hours in the 
densely-populated Bergen County town. 
Kelly sent Wildstein the infamous email 
stating that it was “time for some traffic 
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problems in Fort Lee,” sparking the lane 
closures.  
Former Gov. Chris Christie was never 
charged in the case, but testimony painted an 
unflattering picture of his administration and 
damaged his presidential aspirations. Some 
testimony during the trial also contradicted 
Christie’s previous statements about when he 
was notified of the lane closures.  
The federal government’s case relied largely 
on a law barring officials from misapplying 
property from an organization receiving 
federal funds — in this case the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, 
where Baroni was deputy executive director, 
New Jersey’s top staffer. 
Kelly was deputy chief of staff in charge of 
the Christie administration’s Office of 
Intergovernmental Affairs — an organization 
that, according to numerous witness’ 
testimony and other information that came 
out during the Bridgegate trial — in many 
ways worked as a publicly-funded arm of 
Christie’s reelection campaign. 
Kelly and Baroni argued that prosecuting 
them using that federal law would 
criminalize normal political conduct. 
“Offering an analogy, Kelly contends 
Defendants’ conduct is ‘materially 
indistinguishable’ from that of a mayor who, 
after a heavy snowfall, directs city employees 
to plow the streets of a ward that supported 
her before getting to a ward that supported 
her opponent,” Judge Anthony Scirica wrote 
for the panel, which also included Judges 
Thomas Ambro and Eugene Siler, Jr. 
The argument didn’t get far with the appeals 
court. 
“To execute their scheme, they conscripted 
fourteen Port Authority employees to do 
sham work in pursuit of no legitimate Port 
Authority aim. That Defendants were 
politically motivated does not remove their 
intentional conduct from the ambit of the 
federal criminal law,” Scirica wrote. “We 
hold that, at a minimum, the Government 
offered a valid theory that Defendants 
fraudulently obtained, knowingly converted, 
or intentionally misapplied the labor of Port 
Authority employees, and that it offered 
evidence sufficient to sustain Defendants’ 
convictions.”  
But the panel did agree with Baroni and Kelly 
that they should not have been convicted for 
violating drivers’ civil rights by denying 
them intrastate travel between New York and 
New Jersey. 
“Simply put, although four circuits 
(including our own) have found some form of 
a constitutional right to intrastate travel, there 
is hardly a ‘robust consensus’ that the right 
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
MCKAY, Chief Judge:
The defendant, Evangelisto Ramon, appeals 
his conviction and sentence. Finding no error, 
we affirm his conviction and sentence. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On May 21, 2015, the defendant was indicted 
on one count of second-degree murder. The 
defendant appeared for arraignment on June 
1, 2015 and entered a plea of not guilty. On 
July 16, 2015, the trial court denied the 
defendant's motion to suppress the statement. 
On March 20, 2016, the trial court granted the 
defendant's motion for a speedy trial. A pre-
trial conference was conducted by the trial 
court on June 10, 2016. Trial was set for June 
20, 2016.  
On June 20, 2016, the trial court once again 
denied the defense motion to exclude the 
statement. Trial was continued to June 21, 
2016. 
The defendant's case proceeded to trial by 
jury on June 21, 2016 and concluded on June 
22, 2016. The defendant was found guilty of 
second-degree murder by a ten of twelve-jury 
verdict. 
The defendant filed a motion for new trial and 
a motion for post-verdict judgment of 
acquittal on July 6, 2016. On July 12, 2016, 
the defendant appeared for sentencing and his 
motions for new trial and for post-verdict 
judgment of acquittal were denied. The 
defendant waived sentencing delays and was 
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sentenced to life imprisonment at the 
Louisiana Department of Corrections at hard 
labor without benefit of parole, probation or 
suspension of sentence. The defendant filed a 
motion for appeal on July 12, 2016. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
On November 26, 2014, the dead body of a 
woman, later identified as Trinece Fedison 
(the "victim"), was found inside a trash can in 
a wooded area behind 3308 Danneel Street in 
New Orleans. 
Robert Heim ("Mr. Heim"), a code 
enforcement officer for the City of New 
Orleans, testified that on the morning of 
November 26, 2014 between 9:00 and 10:00 
a.m., he was inspecting blighted property in 
the wooded area behind the house located at 
3308 Danneel Street. Mr. Heim noticed trash 
and various discarded items in the overgrown 
brush area. The woman who resided nearby 
called his attention to a trash can in the rear 
of the alley way and asked him to pull it out 
to the street. The woman said the trash can 
did not belong to her. When Mr. Heim 
attempted to move the trash can, he found it 
was very heavy. Because he was unable to 
move the trash can, Mr. Heim lifted the lid 
and discovered the dead body of a woman, 
later identified as the victim. He immediately 
called 911. Mr. Heim said it was apparent the 
victim was a woman and was deceased. 
Jerome Fedison ("Jerome"), the victim's 
nephew, testified that on the afternoon before 
his aunt's body was discovered, he stopped at 
his cousin's house at about 3:30 p.m. While 
waiting for a friend, Jerome called his aunt 
(the victim) on the phone. She told him she 
was sick. About thirty-minutes later, he saw 
his aunt walking around the corner. He saw 
two Spanish men he had never seen before 
standing on the corner near his aunt. One of 
the men rode off on a bicycle, and the other 
remained on the corner. Jerome flashed his 
truck's lights to let his aunt know he 
was present and waved at her. She waved 
back. His aunt then went back to talk to the 
Spanish man and then went inside the house 
on the corner with the man. Jerome remained 
outside his cousin's house for approximately 
30-40 minutes and then left. During that time, 
he never saw his aunt come out of the corner 
house. 
On Thanksgiving morning, the morning his 
aunt's body was found, Jerome looked down 
the street and saw a man exiting the Spanish 
man's house. Knowing that the Spanish man 
was the last person he saw his aunt with, 
Jerome approached the man in the street and 
confronted him. Jerome told the man, "I 
know what you did. You gonna [sic] feel me 
partner, for real." The man stood silent for ten 
minutes "like a damn ghost." Jerome 
identified the defendant at trial as the Spanish 
man he had last seen with his aunt. 
New Orleans Police Homicide Detective 
Nicholas Williams ("Detective Williams") 
testified he assisted in the investigation of the 
Trinece Fedison murder. He grew up with 
Trinece and her family. Detective Williams 
learned from the victim's family that Jerome 
had information on a possible suspect. He 
subsequently took a recorded statement from 
Jerome, which he turned over to Detective 
Bruce Brueggeman ("Detective 
Brueggeman"). In his statement, Jerome 
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furnished a description and address of the 
suspected perpetrator. 
Darryl Schuermann testified he was the 
operations manager for Romeo Pappa Boats, 
where the defendant worked as an AB 
seaman. Romeo Pappa Boats' office was 
located in Houma, and there was a mobile 
home located on the property. The trailer was 
used to lodge outgoing crewmen from out of 
town for the night before a crew change so 
that the crewmen did not have to travel in the 
early morning hours. A retired Coast Guard 
officer named Gene lived on the property and 
looked after the property. Gene called Mr. 
Scheurmann over the weekend and informed 
him that the defendant had been staying in the 
trailer for several days. 
When Mr. Scheurmann arrived at work on 
the Monday morning following 
Thanksgiving, the defendant came into his 
office and said he needed to talk to him. The 
defendant told Mr. Scheurmann that he was 
sexually involved with a prostitute, the 
victim, and when she was leaving his house, 
he heard a commotion. The defendant told 
Mr. Scheurmann he saw a black SUV with 
two black men, who were harassing her. 
The defendant stated that after the victim's 
body was discovered, one of her family 
members approached him on the street and 
threatened to kill him, saying; "I know you 
did it. I'm going to kill you." The defendant 
explained that he had been staying in the 
trailer that weekend because he feared for his 
life. Mr. Scheurmann advised the defendant 
to talk to the police. The defendant indicated 
he was willing to talk to the police. Mr. 
Scheurmann contacted the lead detective and 
arranged an interview. When questioned 
relating to the defendant's previous 
employment, Mr. Scheurmann stated the 
defendant had been a butcher in New York. 
NOPD Homicide Detective Brueggeman 
testified he was the lead detective assigned to 
investigate the victim's murder. Upon 
viewing the crime scene, Detective 
Brueggeman suspected that a sexual assault 
had occurred, so he requested that a sexual 
assault kit be completed. He learned that the 
trash can in which the body was found 
belonged to a church located across the street 
from the crime scene. He surmised that the 
murder probably happened within the 
immediate area because the trash would have 
been too heavy to move with the body of a 
large woman inside. Detective Brueggeman 
interviewed a neighbor who lived in an 
apartment complex next to the wooded lot, 
who told him that while she was in bed in the 
early morning hours, she heard a garbage can 
being rolled across the street and over a curb. 
Detective Brueggeman interviewed the 
victim's boyfriend, who stated that he was 
with several family members at the time of 
the murder. Because the alibi was confirmed 
by his family members, the victim's 
boyfriend was eliminated as a suspect. 
Detective Williams furnished Detective 
Brueggeman with the recorded statement he 
had taken from the victim's nephew, Jerome. 
Detective Brueggeman received a phone call 
from Darryl Schuermann. The detective 
immediately drove to Houma to meet with 
Mr. Scheurmann and the defendant. At that 
time, Detective Brueggeman did not consider 
the defendant a suspect in the victim's 
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murder. The defendant told the detective that 
he had had sex with the victim just prior to 
her murder. Detective Brueggeman obtained 
a buccal swab from the defendant. 
When Detective Brueggeman received the 
results of the DNA testing, it revealed a 
match between the defendant's DNA and the 
DNA found in the victim's vagina. The 
defendant's DNA was also found on the 
handles of the trash can in which the victim's 
body had been found. The DNA reports were 
later introduced into evidence. 
After receiving the DNA results, Detective 
Brueggeman obtained a warrant for the 
defendant's arrest, and the defendant was 
apprehended. Detective Brueggeman, after 
providing the defendant with his rights in 
accordance with Miranda, obtained a second 
statement from the defendant. Detective 
Brueggeman informed the defendant there 
was some physical evidence. In response to 
learning the police had physical evidence, the 
defendant immediately told Detective 
Brueggeman about his prints being on a 
garbage can lid. The defendant stated that he 
had touched the garbage can lid when he 
placed a bag of garbage in the church garbage 
can immediately after having sex with the 
victim. After further questioning, the 
defendant said the church was located across 
the street from his house. The defendant told 
the detective that the last time he saw the 
victim was when she was leaving his 
residence. The defendant stated, as the victim 
was leaving, a black vehicle, possibly a 
Buick, pulled up, and the men inside called 
her name. The victim appeared to know the 
men, immediately got into the vehicle, and 
the vehicle drove off. The detective noticed 
that the defendant's account of the victim's 
encounter with the men in the black vehicle 
differed from the account he had given to 
Darryl Schuermann in which he asserted the 
men were harassing the victim. The 
defendant was unable to describe the men in 
the black car. 
Suggesting that the defendant had been 
profiled based on his ethnicity, Detective 
Brueggeman was asked on cross examination 
why someone had said, "[I]t was possibly 
Hispanic due to a knife being involved?" 
Detective Brueggeman replied: "Some of the 
people we spoke to like Jerome, some of the 
people in the black community, they feel as if 
somebody is a victim of [a] stab wound 
chances are it's probably from a Mexican. 
Those aren't my words but they think its 
Mexican or Hispanic because they like to use 
knives." 
Detective Brueggeman stated he learned 
during his investigation that the victim had a 
drug problem; however, only the defendant 
stated she was a prostitute. Detective 
Brueggeman reviewed the victim's criminal 
history and found nothing to lead him to 
believe the victim was a prostitute. There 
were no arrests for prostitution and nothing 
to suggest the victim was a prostitute. 
Dr. Erin O'Sullivan ("Dr. O'Sullivan"), a 
forensic pathologist for the Orleans Parish 
Coroner's Office, performed the autopsy on 
the victim's body on November 28, 2014. Dr. 
O'Sullivan stated the death was classified as 
a homicide. Dr. O'Sullivan determined that 
Trinece had sustained six stab wounds in the 
abdomen and lower right side of the back. 
Additionally, the victim sustained an "in 
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size" [sic] wound on the interior of her neck, 
cutting into her vertebrae. In other words, in 
colloquial terms, her throat was slit. The 
victim also had a contusion on her back and 
her right eye, consistent with a struggle. 
Dr. O'Sullivan performed a sexual activity 
test on the victim at the request of the police. 
Dr. O'Sullivan determined that the cause of 
the victim's death were the stab wounds to the 
abdomen and neck. Based on the rigor state 
of the victim, Dr. O'Sullivan determined the 
time of death to be between the night of 
November 25, 2014 and the morning of 
November 26, 2014. Dr. O'Sullivan took 
fingernail clippings, which she preserved for 
evidence. Dr. O'Sullivan stated the victim 
had lost a lot of blood internally. Dr. 
O'Sullivan explained the abdominal wounds 
would not cause massive external bleeding 
and the wound to the neck may have had 
more external bleeding. Dr. O'Sullivan 
explained the neck wound may not have had 
much external bleeding if it was the last 
wound inflicted. 
Stacey Williams ("Ms. Williams"), a forensic 
DNA analyst for the State Police Crime Lab, 
was accepted as an expert in the field of 
forensic DNA analysis. Ms. Williams 
performed the DNA analysis with respect to 
samples related to the victim murder 
investigation. The testing revealed that the 
defendant's DNA was found in the victim's 
vagina and also on the handles of the trash 
can in which her body was found. There were 
three contributors of contact (touch) DNA on 
the left handle of the garbage can. The 
defendant could not be excluded as the major 
contributor of the DNA, and the victim could 
not be excluded as the minor contributor. It 
was also concluded that there were two 
contributors to the contact DNA found on the 
right handle of the garbage can. The 
defendant could not be excluded as a minor 
contributor, while the victim could not be 
excluded as a major contributor. Assuming 
one contributor, the probability of finding the 
same profile from an unrelated random 
individual other than the defendant would be 
one in 18.4 quadrillion, which is two to three 
times the earth's population. Testing of the 
victim's fingernail clippings revealed the 
DNA of the victim's own blood. Further 
testing revealed the DNA mixture of at least 
two male individuals, but no profiles could be 




A review for errors patent on the face of the 
record reveals none. 
 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 1 
In the first assignment of error, the defendant 
(pro se) and counsel contend the evidence 
was insufficient to support his conviction. 
The defendant asserts the evidence presented 
at trial was circumstantial and failed to 
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence. 
The defendant was found guilty of second-
degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 
14:30.1, which provides in relevant part: "A. 
Second degree murder is the killing of a 
human being: (1) When the offender has a 
specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily 
harm...." 
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The standard for review of a claim of 
insufficiency of the evidence was laid out by 
the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia: 
...the relevant question is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This familiar standard gives full play 
to the responsibility of the trier of fact to 
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh 
the evidence, and to draw reasonable 
inferences from basic facts to ultimate 
facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty 
of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as 
weigher of the evidence is preserved through 
a legal conclusion that upon judicial 
review all of the evidence is to be considered 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution.  
"Under the Jackson standard, the rational 
credibility determinations of the trier of fact 
are not to be second guessed by a reviewing 
court." Further, "a factfinder's credibility 
determination is entitled to great weight and 
should not be disturbed unless it is contrary 
to the evidence." But, where there is no direct 
evidence presented proving one or more of 
the elements of the offense, La. R.S. 
15:438 governs circumstantial evidence and 
provides "assuming every fact to be proved 
that the evidence tends to prove, in order to 
convict, it must exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence." "Stated differently, 
the reviewer as a matter of law, can affirm the 
conviction only if the reasonable hypothesis 
is the one favorable to the State and there is 
no extant reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence." "This test is not separate from 
the Jackson standard; rather it simply 
requires that 'all evidence, both direct and 
circumstantial, must be sufficient to satisfy a 
rational juror that the defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  
In the case sub judice, some of the evidence 
may be susceptible of innocent explanation. 
However, “under the Jackson standard, if 
rational triers of fact could disagree as to the 
interpretation of evidence, the rational fact 
finder's view of all of the evidence most 
favorable to the prosecution must be 
adopted." Therefore, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the State, a 
rational juror could have found that the State 
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The defendant asserts that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to prove his 
identity as the murderer of the victim. A 
review of the evidence and testimony 
presented at trial reflects Jerome saw the 
victim at approximately 4 p.m. the day before 
her body was discovered. Jerome had noticed 
two men on the corner he had never seen 
before. Jerome thought the two men were 
Hispanic. Jerome opined the two men were 
behaving suspiciously and were selling drugs 
in front of the church. As Jerome saw the 
victim coming around the corner, he flashed 
his headlights and waved to her. One of the 
men left on a bicycle. The victim waved to 
Jerome but turned around and went back to 
the man on to the corner. The victim and the 
man spoke briefly and then went into the 
corner house. Jerome waited outside the 
house for thirty-five to forty minutes but 
never saw the victim exit the house. 
Jerome identified the defendant as the last 
person with whom the victim was seen. 
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DNA testing revealed a match between the 
defendant's DNA and the DNA found in the 
victim's vagina. The defendant's DNA was 
also found on the handles of the trash can in 
which the victim's body had been found. Ms. 
Williams believed the high volume of the 
defendant's DNA found on the handle of the 
trash can was due to some form of the 
defendant's sweat or other substance on the 
handle. 
Testimony was also given at trial that the 
defendant left the area following the murder. 
In addition, the defendant gave conflicting 
stories regarding what transpired when the 
victim left his residence. The defendant could 
not identify the type of vehicle or give a 
description of the men in the vehicle. An 
unopened condom was found with the victim 
and the defendant's seminal fluid was found 
in her vagina. Detective Brueggeman 
testified the condition of the victim when she 
was found led him to believe a sexual assault 
had occurred. Pictures of the crime scene, 
including the body of the victim in the 
condition in which she was found, were 
introduced into evidence. The defendant told 
Detective Brueggeman that he lifted the lid of 
the trash can to deposit trash, however, the 
defendant was the major contributor to the 
DNA found on the handle of the trash can 
suggesting he moved the trash can rather than 
simply lift the lid to deposit garbage into it. 
The evidence presented by the State 
including the testimony of the witnesses 
provided sufficient evidence, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, to 
support the jury's verdict of guilty. This claim 
is without merit. 
 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2 
The defendant and counsel contend the State 
made improper comments during its opening 
statement and closing arguments asserting 
that he raped and/or sexually assaulted the 
victim. The defendant asserts the comments 
influenced the jury and contributed to the 
verdict because it undermined his defense 
that his sexual contact with the victim was 
consensual. 
La. C.Cr.P. art. 774 relates to the scope of 
argument and provides as follows: 
The argument shall be confined to evidence 
admitted, to the lack of evidence, to 
conclusions of fact that the state or defendant 
may draw therefrom, and to the law 
applicable to the case. The argument shall not 
appeal to prejudice. 
The State's rebuttal shall be confined to 
answering the argument of the defendant. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. 
Reed summarized the law relevant to alleged 
improper remarks during argument as 
follows: 
... Louisiana jurisprudence on prosecutorial 
misconduct allows prosecutors considerable 
latitude in choosing closing argument 
tactics. The trial judge has wide discretion in 
controlling the scope of closing argument. 
Even if the prosecutor exceeds these bounds, 
a reviewing court will not reverse a 
conviction due to an improper remark during 
closing argument unless the court is 
thoroughly convinced the argument 
influenced the jury and contributed to the 
verdict, "as much credit should be accorded 
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the good sense and fair mindedness of jurors 
who have seen the evidence and heard the 
arguments, and have been instructed 
repeatedly by the trial judge that arguments 
of counsel are not evidence."  
The defendant asserts he was prejudiced by 
the following statement made by the 
prosecutor during opening statements: 
When they take her out of the trash can you 
are going to learn that immediately the initial 
officers say she was raped. She was half 
naked. Her underwear shoved down to her 
knees. Her pants shoved down beside her 
ankles, a bra shoved up over her breasts, she 
had two socks on, no shoes and no shirt. And 
the initial detectives know right away that 
this woman had been raped and murdered. 
The defendant contends he was prejudiced by 
the State's reference to sexual assault or rape 
during opening, closing, and rebuttal 
arguments. However, the defendant admitted 
sexual contact with the victim during his 
initial conversation with Detective 
Brueggeman but asserted it was consensual. 
The trial court informed the jury, prior to 
opening statements, that opening statements 
were not evidence. Following the defendant's 
objection to the State's assertion that the 
victim was raped prior to her murder, the trial 
court, outside the presence of the jury, heard 
argument from the State as well as the 
defense. The State contended that the sexual 
assault of the victim was part of a continuing 
act which resulted in her murder. The trial 
court ruled that while the defense was entitled 
to assert the sexual contact was consensual, 
the State was entitled to argue that the sexual 
contact was not consensual and was a sexual 
assault. The trial court cautioned the State to 
avoid the use of the word "rape" when 
referring to the sexual assault. 
This Court will not reverse a conviction for 
alleged improper opening, closing, or rebuttal 
arguments unless it is "thoroughly 
convinced" that the argument influenced the 
jury and contributed to the verdict. The jury 
in the case sub judice was presented with 
evidence consisting of photographs of the 
victim as she was found in the trash can. The 
victim's clothing was partially removed, the 
defendant's seminal fluid was found in her 
vagina, and she had been stabbed multiple 
times. From this evidence, the jury 
reasonably could have found the victim had 
been sexually assaulted prior to her murder. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that the use of the term "rape" or 
"sexual assault" by the State in its opening, 
closing, or rebuttal arguments did not 
influence the jury or contribute to the verdict. 
This claim is without merit. 
PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
NUMBER 3 
The defendant asserts his conviction was 
based solely on racial profiling. The 
defendant asserts that because the victim's 
nephew, Jerome, stated during testimony that 
when he found out his aunt was stabbed, he 
thought the crime had been committed by a 
"Spanish guy." However, Jerome stated: "A 
Spanish guy had to do it. If [sic] not really 
that, I really went straight to the last person I 
saw her with...." 
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Detective Brueggeman, the lead detective 
investigating the murder, testified that the 
defendant was not considered a suspect in the 
murder at their first meeting. Detective 
Brueggeman stated the fact that the 
defendant's DNA was found on the trash can 
handles in which the victim was found lead 
him to suspect the defendant. Detective 
Brueggeman confirmed that some of the 
people he spoke to during the investigation of 
the murder suspected it was committed by a 
Spanish individual because they believed 
when someone was stabbed it was probably 
by a Mexican. Detective Brueggeman stated 
those were not his words but were the 
suspicions of some members of the black 
community. Detective Brueggeman detailed 
the evidence which lead him to suspect the 
defendant had committed the murder. 
Detective Brueggeman concluded the murder 
was committed by someone who lived nearby 
because of where the trash can was hidden. It 
was also determined that the trash can would 
have been difficult to move due to the weight 
of the victim's body inside it. In addition, it 
was determined that the trash can was 
originally stored next to a church which was 
across the street from the defendant's 
residence. 
A review of the record demonstrates that 
there was substantial evidence linking the 
defendant to the murder. The defendant has 
not established that he was investigated based 
on racial profiling as he asserts. This claim is 
without merit. 
PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
NUMBER 4 
In his final assignment of error, the defendant 
contends the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to require a unanimous jury verdict. 
The defendant contends that Louisiana's 
statutory scheme which permits non-
unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital felony 
cases should be declared unconstitutional. In 
particular, he claims that La. Const. Art. I, 
Sec. 17 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 782 violate 
the equal protection Clause. 
 La. Const. Art. I, Section 17(A) provides 
that a case "in which the punishment is 
necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be 
tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of 
whom must concur to render a verdict." 
Additionally, La. C.Cr.P. art. 
782(A) provides in part that "[c]ases in which 
punishment is necessarily confinement at 
hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed 
of twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to 
render a verdict." 
In Apodaca v. Oregon, the United States 
Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he purpose of trial by jury is to prevent 
oppression by the Government by providing 
a 'safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the 
complaint, biased, or eccentric judge.'  'Given 
this purpose, the essential feature of a jury 
obviously lies in the interposition between 
the accused and his accuser of the 
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen 
...' A requirement of unanimity, however, 
does not materially contribute to the exercise 
of this commonsense judgment. As we said 
in Williams, a jury will come to such a 
judgment as long as it consists of a group of 
laymen representative of a cross section of 
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the community who have the duty and the 
opportunity to deliberate, free from outside 
attempts at intimidation, on the question of a 
defendant's guilt. In terms of this function we 
perceive no difference between juries 
required to act unanimously and those 
permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10 
to two or 11 to one. Requiring unanimity 
would obviously produce hung juries in some 
situations where non-unanimous juries will 
convict or acquit. But in either case, the 
interest of the defendant in having the 
judgment of his peers interposed between 
himself and the officers of the State who 
prosecute and judge him is equally well 
served. 
In State v. Bertrand, the trial court found 
that La. C.Cr.P. art. 782 (A) violated 
the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution, relative to 
the number of jurors needed to concur to 
render a verdict in cases in which punishment 
is necessarily confinement at hard labor, the 
same issue raised by the defendant in the 
instant case. On direct appeal by the State, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, stating in 
its conclusion: 
Due to this Court's prior determinations 
that Article 782 withstands constitutional 
scrutiny, and  because we are not 
presumptuous enough to suppose, upon mere 
speculation, that the United States Supreme 
Court's still valid determination that non-
unanimous 12 person jury verdicts are 
constitutional may someday be overturned, 
we find that the trial court erred in ruling 
that Article 782 violated the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments. With respect to 
that ruling, it should go without saying that a 
trial judge is not at liberty to ignore the 
controlling jurisprudence of superior courts. 
This Court cited and relied 
on Bertrand in State v. Hickman, to reject the 
argument that the trial court had erred in 
denying the defendant's motion to declare La. 
C.Cr.P. art. 782(A) unconstitutional as 
violative of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
As stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court 
in Bertrand, under current jurisprudence 
from the U.S. Supreme Court, non-
unanimous twelve-person jury verdicts are 
constitutional, and La. C.Cr.P. art. 782(A) is 
constitutional. Accordingly, there is no merit 
in this assignment of error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, we affirm 






















March 18, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday accepted two 
important criminal justice cases for next term 
but turned down a Georgia death-row inmate 
who said a juror in his case used racist 
language and a bed-and-breakfast owner who 
declined to offer a room to a lesbian couple. 
As they began shaping their docket for the 
term that starts in October, the justices 
accepted a case from Louisiana that asks 
whether the Constitution requires unanimous 
jury verdicts for serious criminal convictions. 
Louisiana and Oregon do not require 
unanimity for major crimes, and attorneys 
representing defendants convicted in those 
states for years have urged the Supreme 
Court to revisit the question. 
In rulings in 1972, the court said the 
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, which 
recognizes the right to a “speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury,” does not mean 
states must require a unanimous jury. At the 
same time, the court has required unanimity 
in federal trials. 
The question is similar to one the court 
faced earlier this term, when it ruled the 
Eighth Amendment ban on excessive fines 
applies to state and local governments, not 
just the federal government. 
The Louisiana case was brought by 
Evangelisto Ramos, convicted of second-
degree murder in 2016 on a 10-to-2 jury vote 
and sentenced to life in prison. His attorneys 
said Louisiana’s law was a Jim Crow attempt 
to diminish the impact of African Americans 
serving on juries. 
The state’s voters in 2018 passed a 
referendum requiring unanimous verdicts in 
felony trials. But it was prospective to 2019 
and would not affect Ramos. 
Louisiana opposed Ramos’s request. 
“Thousands of final convictions in these two 
states could be upset if such a new rule were 
later declared retroactive,” wrote the state’s 
attorney general, Jeff Landry (R). 
The case is Ramos v. Louisiana. 
In Kahler v. Kansas, attorneys for James 
Kraig Kahler ask the court to decide whether 
a state may abolish the insanity defense. 
Kahler was convicted and sentenced to death 
for killing his wife, Karen, his daughters 
Lauren and Emily, and Karen’s grandmother 
in 2009. 
Kahler’s attorneys argued he was so mentally 
ill he did not understand his actions. 
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But, “in Kansas, along with four other states, 
it is not a defense to criminal liability that 
mental illness prevented the defendant from 
knowing his actions were wrong,” 
Washington lawyer Jeffrey T. Green told the 
Supreme Court. 
“So long as he knowingly killed a human 
being — even if he did it because he believed 
the devil told him to, or because a delusion 
convinced him that his victim was trying to 
kill him, or because he lacked the ability to 
control his actions — he is guilty,” Green 
said. 
Green said the other states are Alaska, Idaho, 
Montana and Utah. 
The court also turned down a petition from 
Keith Tharpe, who is on Georgia’s death row. 
Tharpe was convicted in 1991 of killing his 
sister-in-law and raping his estranged wife. 
Seven years later, he discovered that a juror 
in the case harbored racist sentiments. The 
juror, Barney Gattie, believed there are “two 
types of black people: 1. Black folks and 2. 
N-----s,” according to an affidavit. 
The court did not provide an explanation for 
turning down Tharpe’s petition. But Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor wrote separately to say his 
plea turned not on the juror’s remarks but 
rather on procedural grounds that it appeared 
a lower court got right. 
“As this may be the end of the road for 
Tharpe’s juror-bias claim, however, we 
should not look away from the magnitude of 
the potential injustice that procedural barriers 
are shielding from judicial review,” 
Sotomayor wrote. 
The court also turned away without comment 
a petition from the owner of a Hawaii bed-
and-breakfast who turned away a lesbian 
couple. Phyllis Young said her Christian 
beliefs required her to refuse to rent a room 
in 2007 to a same-sex couple. 
A state court said Hawaii’s public-
accommodation law prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation. 
The Supreme Court is still considering a 
petition from an Oregon bakery that refused 
to make a wedding cake for a same-sex 
couple. 
Last term, the court ruled for a Colorado 
baker who made a similar rejection. But the 
court found alternative grounds for that 
ruling and did not address the question of 
whether business owners can claim religious 


















Jordan S. Rubin 
 
March 18, 2019 
 
Unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases 
could soon become the law of the land after 
the U.S. Supreme Court March 18 granted 
review on the issue for next term. 
 
If the justices decide that the federal Sixth 
Amendment unanimity right applies in state 
court, it will be the latest such instance of 
“incorporating” federal provisions to the 
states, an aspect of constitutional law brought 
to light recently this term with the high 
court’s closely watched decision in Timbs v. 
Indiana. 
 
Eighth Amendment excessive fines 
protections apply to the states, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg wrote for the court in Timbs, 
while noting in her opinion that the right to 
unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases is 
still an outlier that only applies federally. 
 
Nearly all courtrooms around the country 
already require unanimous convictions, 
except for Oregon and, until recently, 
Louisiana, which voted last November to 
outlaw the practice going forward. 
 
But the Louisiana ballot measure, which 
doesn’t apply retroactively, won’t save 
Evangelisto Ramos, whose appeal the 
Supreme Court just granted. 
 
“We are hopeful the Court took the case to 
restore the full protections of the Constitution 
to the State of Louisiana,” said Ramos’ 
attorney, G. Ben Cohen. 
 
Ramos was convicted of murder at a 
Louisiana state court trial in 2016. Ten of his 
12 jurors voted for guilt. 
 
The case is Ramos v. Louisiana, U.S., 18-

















“Are Unanimous Juries Required in State Criminal Cases? SCOTUS Will 
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The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to consider whether to overrule a 1972 case 
that allowed nonunanimous verdicts in state 
criminal trials. 
 
The court agreed to decide whether the Sixth 
Amendment requires unanimity in the case of 
Louisiana inmate Evangelisto Ramos, who 
was sentenced to life in prison after being 
convicted of second-degree murder in a 10-2 
jury vote. 
 
The case was based on circumstantial 
evidence, according to Ramos’ cert petition. 
He acknowledged having sex with the victim 
the night before her slaying, but said she was 
alive when he left her home. Ramos said she 
had gotten into a car with two other men as 
he left. 
 
Ramos had first raised the jury issue in a 
supplemental brief he filed himself in 
Louisiana state court. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the 1972 
decision, Apodaca v. Oregon, that the Sixth 
Amendment requires unanimous verdicts in 
federal criminal trials, but not in state 
criminal trials. Ramos is asking the court to 
rule that the same Sixth Amendment right 
applies to the states through the incorporation 
doctrine. 
 
When Ramos was convicted in 2016, only 
Oregon and Louisiana allowed 
nonunanimous verdicts in criminal trials. The 
states still required unanimity in cases of 
first-degree murder, the Associated 
Press reports. 
 
Louisiana voters amended the state 
constitution to bar nonunanimous verdicts in 
criminal cases four months ago, according to 
the Associated Press. The change took effect 
in January, but it does not apply retroactively. 
 
The ABA House of Delegates adopted a 
resolution in August 2018 urging states to 
require unanimity. In 2011, the ABA filed an 
amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to 
reconsider the 1972 Apodaca ruling. 
 





Mathena v. Malvo  
 
Ruling Below: Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 
Overview: Malvo was sentenced to four terms of life imprisonment without parole. SCOTUS 
issued a series of decisions holding that juvenile defendants could not be sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole. SCOTUS held that the new sentencing rules were retroactive. Malvo 
filed applications for writs of habeas corpus relief.  
 
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit erred in concluding—in direct conflict 
with Virginia’s highest court and other courts – that a decision of the Supreme Court, Montgomery 
v. Louisiana, addressing whether a new constitutional rule announced in an earlier decision, Miller 
v. Alabama, applies retroactively on collateral review may properly be interpreted as modifying 
and substantively expanding the very rule whose retroactivity was in question.   
 




Randall MATHENA, Chief Warden, Red Onion State Prison, Defendant- Appellant 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 
 
Decided on June 21, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: 
In Virginia in 2004, a defendant convicted of 
capital murder, who was at least 16 years old 
at the time of his crime, would be punished 
by either death or life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole, unless the judge 
suspended his sentence. After a Virginia jury 
convicted Lee Boyd Malvo of two counts of 
capital murder based on homicides that he 
committed in 2002 when he was 17 years old, 
it declined to recommend the death penalty, 
and he was instead sentenced in 2004 to 
two terms of life imprisonment without 
parole, in accordance with Virginia law. 
Thereafter, Malvo, again seeking to avoid the 
death penalty, pleaded guilty in another 
Virginia jurisdiction to one count of capital 
murder and one count of attempted capital 
murder — both of which he also committed 
when 17 years old — and received two 
additional terms of life imprisonment without 
parole. 
After Malvo was sentenced in those 
cases, the Supreme Court issued a series of 
decisions relating to the sentencing of 
defendants who committed serious crimes 
when under the age of 18. It held that such 
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defendants cannot be sentenced to death; that 
they cannot be sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole unless they 
committed a homicide offense that reflected 
their permanent incorrigibility; and that these 
rules relating to juvenile sentencing are to be 
applied retroactively, meaning that sentences 
that were legal when imposed must be 
vacated if they were imposed in violation of 
the Court's new rules.  
In these habeas cases filed under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254, we conclude that even though 
Malvo's life-without-parole sentences were 
fully legal when imposed, they must now be 
vacated because the retroactive constitutional 
rules for sentencing juveniles adopted 
subsequent to Malvo's sentencings were not 
satisfied during his sentencings. 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 
order vacating Malvo's four terms of life 
imprisonment without parole and remanding 
for resentencing to determine (1) whether 
Malvo qualifies as one of the rare juvenile 
offenders who may, consistent with 
the Eighth Amendment, be sentenced to life 
without the possibility of parole because his 
"crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility" or 
(2) whether those crimes instead "reflect the 
transient immaturity of youth," in which case 
he must receive a sentence short of life 






Over the course of almost seven weeks in the 
fall of 2002, Lee Malvo and John 
Muhammad — better known as the "D.C. 
Snipers" — murdered 12 individuals, 
inflicted grievous injuries on 6 others, and 
terrorized the entire Washington, D.C. 
metropolitan area, instilling an all-consuming 
fear into the community. 
The violence began on September 5, 2002, 
when Malvo — who was at the time 17 years 
old — ran up to a  man's car in Clinton, 
Maryland, shot him six times with a .22 
caliber handgun, and stole his laptop and 
$3,500 in cash. Ten days later, again in 
Clinton, Maryland, Malvo approached a man 
who was in the process of closing a liquor 
store and shot him in the abdomen at close 
range with the handgun.  
Muhammad and Malvo then went south for a 
short period. On September 21, Muhammad 
used a high-powered, long-range Bushmaster 
assault rifle to shoot two women who had just 
closed a liquor store in Montgomery, 
Alabama. Malvo was seen approaching the 
women as the shots were being fired and then 
rummaging through their purses. One of the 
women died from her wounds. Two days 
after that, a woman in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, was fatally shot in the head with a 
Bushmaster rifle after closing the store where 
she worked. Again, Malvo was seen fleeing 
the scene with her purse.  
Shortly thereafter, Muhammad and Malvo 
returned to the Washington, D.C. area and, 
from October 2 until their capture on October 
24, embarked on a series of indiscriminate 
sniper shootings with the Bushmaster rifle 
that left 10 more people dead, 3 seriously 
wounded, and the entire region "gripped by a 
paroxysm of fear," convinced that "every 
man, woman, and child was a likely 
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target." On October 2, shortly after 6 p.m., 
they shot and killed a man while he was in a 
grocery store parking lot in Montgomery 
County, Maryland. The next day, they 
murdered five people — four in the morning 
at different locations in Montgomery County, 
and a fifth that evening in Washington, 
D.C. The following day, they shot and 
seriously wounded a woman in Spotsylvania 
County, Virginia, while she was loading 
goods into her car. On October 7, they shot 
and gravely injured a 13-year-old boy in 
Prince George's County, Maryland, while he 
was on his way to school; two days later, they 
shot and killed a man at a gas station in Prince 
William County, Virginia; two days after 
that, they shot and killed another man at a gas 
station in Spotsylvania County, Virginia; and 
three days after that, they shot and killed a 
woman outside a Home Depot store in 
Fairfax County, Virginia. On October 19, 
they shot and seriously wounded a man while 
he was leaving a restaurant in Ashland, 
Virginia, and on October 22, they shot and 
killed a bus driver in Montgomery County, 
Maryland, the last of their sniper shootings.  
Malvo and Muhammad were apprehended in 
the early hours of October 24 at a rest area in 
Frederick County, Maryland, while sleeping 
in a blue Chevrolet Caprice. A loaded .223 
caliber Bushmaster rifle was found in the car, 
and a hole had been "cut into the lid of the 
trunk, just above the license plate, through 
which a rifle barrel could be projected." 
Modifications had also been made to the car's 
rear seat to allow access to the trunk area 
from the car's passenger compartment. After 
his arrest, Malvo told authorities in Virginia 
that "he and his 'father,' John Allen 
Muhammad, had acted as a sniper team . . . in 
an effort to extort ten million dollars from the 
'media and the government'" and that he had 
been the triggerman in 10 of the shootings. 
Later, however, when testifying as a witness 
at Muhammed's first-degree murder trial in 
Montgomery County, Maryland, Malvo 
stated that "he had been the actual shooter of 
[the 13-year old boy] in Prince George's 
County and of [the bus driver] in 
Montgomery County" and that "Muhammad 
had been the actual triggerman on all other 
occasions."  
In January 2003, a grand jury in Fairfax 
County, Virginia, returned an indictment 
charging Malvo as an adult with (1) capital 
murder in the commission of an act of 
terrorism, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 
18.2-31(13); (2) capital murder for killing 
more than one person within a three-year 
period, in violation of § 18.2-31(8); and (3) 
using a firearm in the commission of a felony, 
in violation of § 18.2-53.1. The prosecutor in 
that case sought the death penalty. Malvo 
pleaded not guilty to the charges, and, to 
ensure an impartial jury pool, the case was 
transferred to the Circuit Court for the City of 
Chesapeake, Virginia. 
At the trial, which took place during 
November and December 2003, Malvo 
acknowledged his involvement in the killings 
but asserted an insanity defense based on  the 
theory that he had been indoctrinated by 
Muhammad during his adolescence and was 
operating under Muhammad's control. To 
that end, defense counsel presented 
testimony from more than 40 witnesses who 
collectively described how Malvo was 
physically abused and largely abandoned as a 
child growing up in Jamaica and Antigua; 
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how, when he was 15 years old, he befriended 
John Muhammad, an American veteran who 
had taken his three children to live in Antigua 
without their mother's knowledge; how 
Muhammad became a surrogate father for 
Malvo and brought him illegally to the 
United States in May 2001; how Malvo 
briefly reunited with his mother in the United 
States but then moved across the country in 
October 2001 to rejoin Muhammad, who had 
recently lost custody of his children; and how 
Muhammad then intensively trained Malvo 
in military tactics for nearly a year, telling 
Malvo that he had a plan to get his children 
back and force America to reckon with its 
social injustices. The jury rejected Malvo's 
insanity defense and convicted him of all 
charges, including the two capital murder 
charges. 
At the sentencing phase of trial, the jury was 
instructed to choose between the death 
penalty and life imprisonment without 
parole. During this phase, Malvo's counsel 
presented additional evidence on Malvo's 
background and history, and he stressed 
Malvo's youth and immaturity in arguing that 
Malvo should be spared the death penalty. 
The jury returned its verdict on December 23, 
2003, finding "unanimously and beyond a 
reasonable doubt after consideration of 
[Malvo's] history and background that there 
[was] a probability that he would commit 
criminal acts of violence that constitute a 
continuing serious threat to society" and also 
"that his conduct in committing the offense 
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible 
or inhuman in that it involved depravity of 
mind." Nonetheless, the jury, "having 
considered all of the evidence in aggravation 
and mitigation of the offense," "fix[ed] his 
punishment at imprisonment for life" for each 
of his two capital murder convictions. 
After the jury was excused and a presentence 
report was prepared, the court conducted a 
final sentencing hearing on March 10, 2004, 
sentencing Malvo to two terms of life 
imprisonment, as required by Virginia 
law. Under Virginia law, a defendant 
sentenced to life imprisonment for a capital 
murder offense committed on or after 
January 1, 1995, is ineligible for any form of 
parole. The court also sentenced Malvo to 
three years' imprisonment for the firearm 
conviction. 
Following his conviction and sentencing in 
the Chesapeake City Circuit Court, Malvo 
entered an "Alford plea" pursuant to a plea 
agreement in the Circuit Court for the County 
of Spotsylvania, Virginia, pleading guilty to 
one count of capital murder, one count of 
attempted capital murder, and two counts of 
using a firearm in the commission of a felony. 
The plea agreement indicated that Malvo's 
attorney had advised Malvo that he faced 
death or imprisonment for a term of life for 
the capital murder charge and a sentence of 
20 years to life imprisonment for the 
attempted capital murder charge. In the 
agreement, Malvo waived his "right to an 
appeal" and admitted that "the 
Commonwealth ha[d] sufficient evidence to 
convict  [him]." The Commonwealth in turn 
agreed to dismiss two pending charges and 
agreed that sentencing Malvo to two terms of 
life imprisonment without parole, as well as 
eight years' imprisonment for the firearm 
offenses, was the "appropriate disposition in 
this case." 
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The Spotsylvania County Circuit Court held 
a plea and sentencing hearing on October 26, 
2004, at which it confirmed that Malvo 
understood "that by pleading guilty [he was] 
giving up constitutional rights" — 
specifically, his "right to a trial by jury" and 
his "right to confront and cross examine [his 
accusers]" — and that he was also "probably 
giving up [his] right to appeal any decisions 
made by this Court." After ensuring that 
Malvo understood the nature of the charges 
against him and had concluded, after 
consulting with his lawyers, that 
his Alford plea was "in [his] best interests," 
the court accepted Malvo's guilty pleas, 
finding that they "were freely, voluntarily, 
and intelligently made." It also "accepted and 
approved" the plea agreement itself. The 
court then sentenced Malvo to two terms of 
life imprisonment without parole for his 
capital murder and attempted capital murder 
convictions, plus eight years' imprisonment 
for the firearm convictions. 
 
B 
Nearly eight years after the conclusion of 
Malvo's Virginia prosecutions, the Supreme 
Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits juvenile homicide 
offenders from receiving "mandatory life-
without-parole sentences" and that, before 
sentencing such an offender to life without 
parole, the sentencing court must first 
consider the "offender's youth and attendant 
characteristics." In light of Miller, Malvo 
filed two applications for writs of habeas 
corpus in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, one challenging the life-
without-parole sentences imposed by the 
Chesapeake City Circuit Court and the other 
addressing the same sentences from the 
Spotsylvania County Circuit Court. 
The district court denied and dismissed with 
prejudice both applications, concluding 
that Miller was not "retroactively applicable 
to cases on collateral review," 28 U.S.C. § 
2244(d)(1)(C), and that Malvo's habeas 
applications therefore were time-barred 
under § 2244(d)'s 1-year period of limitation. 
After Malvo appealed, his case was placed in 
abeyance while this court and the Supreme 
Court addressed whether Miller was to be 
applied retroactively. On January 25, 2016, 
the Supreme Court held that "Miller 
announced a substantive rule that is 
retroactive in cases on collateral review." 
Accordingly, we remanded Malvo's case 
comprising his two habeas applications to the 
district court for further consideration in light 
of Montgomery. 
By memorandum and order dated May 26, 
2017, the district court granted both of 
Malvo's habeas applications, vacating his 
four sentences of life imprisonment without 
parole and remanding to the Chesapeake City 
Circuit Court and the Spotsylvania County 
Circuit Court for resentencing in accordance 
with Miller and Montgomery. In entering 
that order, the district court rejected the 
Warden's argument that because the trial 
courts retained discretion under Virginia law 
to suspend Malvo's life sentences in whole or 
in part, those sentences were not mandatory 
and therefore were not covered by 
the Miller rule. The court explained that the 
constitutional rule announced in Miller and 
restated in Montgomery provided relief not 
only from mandatory life-without-parole 
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sentences but also potentially 
from discretionary life-without-parole 
sentences. The district court also rejected the 
Warden's argument that in sentencing Malvo, 
the Chesapeake City Circuit Court had 
actually considered whether Malvo was one 
of those rare juvenile offenders whose crimes 
reflected irreparable corruption, as required 
by Miller. And finally, the court rejected the 
Warden's argument that Malvo, in entering 
the Alford plea in Spotsylvania County 
Circuit Court, waived the Eighth 
Amendment rights announced in Miller. In 
conclusion, the district court recognized that 
it was "completely possible that any 
resentencing conducted in accordance 
with Miller and Montgomery[might] result[] 
in the same sentences,", but it concluded that 
Malvo was entitled to the procedure 
described in those cases before 
being  sentenced to life without parole. 
From the district court's May 26, 2017 order, 
the Warden filed this appeal. 
 
II 
In its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court recognizes that persons under 
the age of 18 as a class are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing. Juveniles inherently lack 
maturity; they do not have a fully formed 
character and a fully developed sense of 
responsibility; and they are both more 
susceptible to external influences and less 
able to control their environment than are 
adults. Juveniles are also more capable of 
change than adults and therefore more 
capable of being reformed. Because of these 
attributes of youth, juveniles are not as 
morally culpable as adults when engaging in 
similar conduct. In light of these 
characteristics, the Court recognizes that 
juveniles as a class are less deserving of the 
most severe punishments. But it also 
recognizes that a rare few juveniles may 
nonetheless be found to be permanently 
incorrigible. 
Giving effect to these observations, the 
Supreme Court has developed a juvenile-
sentencing jurisprudence beginning with its 
2005 decision in Roper, where it held that the 
death penalty cannot be imposed on juvenile 
offenders. That decision was followed 
by Graham, where the Court held that "[t]he 
Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life 
without parole sentence on a juvenile 
offender who did not commit 
homicide."  The Graham Court explained 
that "[a] State is not required to guarantee 
eventual freedom to a juvenile offender 
convicted of a nonhomicide crime," but it 
must give such defendants "some meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."  
Two years later in Miller, the Court held that 
a juvenile offender convicted of homicide 
cannot receive a mandatory sentence of life 
without parole. It explained, "Such 
mandatory penalties, by their nature, 
preclude a sentencer from taking account of 
an offender's age and the wealth of 
characteristics and circumstances attendant 
to it." The Court stated, moreover, that not 
only must "a judge or jury . . . have the 
opportunity to consider mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the harshest 
possible penalty for juveniles,", but also the 
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sentencer must actually "take into 
account   how children are different, and how 
those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,"  The 
Court did not, however, adopt "a categorical 
bar on life without parole for juveniles," 
instead reserving the possibility that such a 
severe sentence could be appropriately 
imposed on "the rare juvenile offender whose 
crime reflects irreparable corruption,"  
Finally, in 2016, the Court 
decided Montgomery, holding 
that Miller announced a new "substantive 
rule" of constitutional law that applies 
retroactively "to juvenile offenders whose 
convictions and sentences were final 
when Miller was decided." Articulating 
the Miller rule, the Montgomery Court stated 
that "Miller requires that before sentencing a 
juvenile to life without parole, the sentencing 
judge [must] take into account 'how children 
are different, and how those differences 
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them 
to a lifetime in prison.'" It then stated: 
Miller . . . did more than require a sentencer 
to consider a juvenile offender's youth before 
imposing life without parole; it established 
that the penological justifications for life 
without parole collapse in light of the 
distinctive attributes of youth. Even if a court 
considers a child's age before sentencing him 
or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence 
still violates the Eighth Amendment for a 
child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet 
transient 
immaturity. Because Miller determined that 
sentencing a child to life without parole is 
excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects irreparable 
corruption, it rendered life without parole an 
unconstitutional penalty for a class of 
defendants because of their status — that is, 
juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the 
transient immaturity of youth. As a result, 
Miller announced a substantive rule of 
constitutional law. Like other substantive 
rules, Miller is retroactive because it 
necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a 
defendant — here, the vast majority of 
juvenile offenders — faces a punishment that 
the law cannot impose upon him. 
The Court explained further 
that Miller contained both a substantive rule 
and a procedural component: "Miller's 
substantive holding" was that "life without 
parole is an excessive sentence for children 
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity," 
and its procedural component implementing 
the substantive rule requires "[a] hearing 
where youth and its attendant circumstances 
are considered as sentencing factors" in order 
to "separate those juveniles who may be 
sentenced to life without parole from those 
who may not."  
 
III 
In this appeal, the Warden contends that 
notwithstanding this new Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence governing the sentencing of 
juveniles, the district court erred in awarding 
habeas corpus relief to Malvo, giving three 
reasons in support of his contention. First, he 
argues that "Malvo has no entitlement to 
relief under  Miller" because "Miller's new 
rule explicitly applies to mandatory life-
without-parole sentences," whereas "the 
Virginia Supreme Court has conclusively 
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held that Virginia does not impose mandatory 
sentences for any homicide offense" because 
judges retain the discretionary right to 
suspend sentences; second, that "Malvo 
received all that Miller would entitle him to 
during his trial in Chesapeake [City]" and 
therefore is not entitled to resentencing in that 
jurisdiction; and finally, that "Malvo's 
voluntary decision to enter into a plea 
agreement with stipulated sentences in 
Spotsylvania to eliminate the possibility of 
[the death penalty] waive[d] any claim he 
would have had under Miller" as to the two 
life-without-parole sentences he received in 
that jurisdiction. We consider these 
arguments in turn. 
 
A 
First, the Warden contends that because 
the Miller rule is limited 
to mandatory sentences of life imprisonment 
without parole, it does not implicate Malvo's 
sentences, which were, under Virginia law, 
subject to the sentencing court's discretion to 
suspend the sentence in whole or in part. He 
argues that because Malvo had 
the opportunity under Virginia law to request 
that his life sentences  be suspended, he did 
not receive mandatory life-without-parole 
sentences and therefore is not entitled to any 
relief under Miller. Responding to the district 
court's conclusion that Montgomery clarified 
that the rule in Miller applies more broadly 
than only to mandatory life-without-parole 
sentences, the Warden contends 
that Miller itself did not sweep so broadly 
and that only the Miller rule applying to 
mandatory sentences was made retroactive 
in Montgomery. Indeed, he argues that the 
district court violated the rule established 
in Teague "by crafting a new rule of 
constitutional law based on Montgomery's 
discussion of Miller and applying that new 
rule retroactively." In other words, as the 
Warden argues, "the principles of finality 
discussed in Teague prohibit federal courts 
from expanding new rules of constitutional 
law beyond their holdings," and "the correct 
approach is to recognize that . . . Miller's new 
rule is defined by Miller itself, 
not Montgomery." 
In response, Malvo contends that he did 
indeed receive mandatory life-without-parole 
sentences within the meaning 
of Miller because Virginia law provided then 
and still provides that when a jury declines to 
recommend the death penalty for a defendant 
convicted of capital murder, the defendant 
must be sentenced to life imprisonment 
without parole. He asserts further that 
Virginia trial courts were not aware at the 
time of his sentencings in 2004 that they were 
empowered to suspend capital murder 
sentences. Finally, he argues that, in any 
event, the Miller rule is not limited 
to mandatory life-without-parole sentences 
but also applies, as noted in Montgomery, 
to all life-without-parole sentences where the 
sentencing court did not resolve whether the 
juvenile offender was "irretrievably corrupt" 
or whether his crimes reflected his "transient 
immaturity." 
As the Warden asserts, the Virginia Supreme 
Court has now twice recognized that Virginia 
trial courts have long had the authority to 
suspend life sentences in whole or in part 
even following a capital murder conviction 
— an interpretation of Virginia law that is, of 
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course, binding here.  But also, as Malvo 
asserts, it is far from clear that anyone 
involved in Malvo's prosecutions actually 
understood at the time that Virginia trial 
courts retained their ordinary suspension 
authority following a conviction for capital 
murder. We need not, however, resolve 
whether any of Malvo's sentences were 
mandatory because Montgomery has now 
made clear that Miller's rule has applicability 
beyond those situations in which a juvenile 
homicide offender received a mandatory life-
without-parole sentence. 
To be sure, all the penalty schemes before the 
Supreme Court in 
both Miller and Montgomery were 
mandatory. Yet the Montgomery Court 
confirmed that, even though imposing a life-
without-parole sentence on a juvenile 
homicide offender pursuant to a mandatory 
penalty scheme necessarily violates 
the Eighth Amendment as construed 
in Miller, a sentencing 
judge also violates Miller's rule any time it 
imposes a discretionary life-without-parole 
sentence on a juvenile homicide offender 
without first concluding that the offender's 
"crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility," as 
distinct from "the transient immaturity of 
youth." And we are not free to conclude, as 
the Warden argues, that Montgomery's 
articulation of the Miller rule was mere 
dictum. To the contrary, Montgomery stated 
clearly that, under Miller, the Eighth 
Amendment bars life-without-parole 
sentences for all but those rare juvenile 
offenders whose crimes reflect permanent 
incorrigibility. Indeed, this scope was the 
basis for its holding that Miller announced a 
substantive rule that applies retroactively to 
cases on collateral review.  And 
because Montgomery explicitly articulated 
the rule in Miller that it was retroactively 
applying, the district court could not have 
violated Teague in applying that rule. The 
Warden may well critique the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Montgomery — as did 
Justice Scalia in dissent— but we are 
nonetheless bound by Montgomery's 
statement of the Miller rule. 
At bottom, we reject the Warden's argument 
that Malvo "has no entitlement to relief 
under Miller" on the ground 
that Miller applies only to mandatory life-
without-parole sentences and instead 
conclude that Miller's holding potentially 
applies to any case where a juvenile homicide 
offender was sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole. 
 
B 
The Warden next contends thateven 
if Miller applies to discretionary life-
without-parole sentences, "Malvo received 
all that Miller would entitle him to during his 
trial in Chesapeake," and thus the two life-
without-parole sentences that he received in 
that proceeding must be permitted to stand. In 
advancing this argument, the Warden notes 
that "[o]ver the course of six weeks, the jury 
heard an enormous amount of mitigation 
evidence that was nearly all focused on 
[Malvo's] youth, upbringing, and 
impressionability," and that it also "heard 
from multiple expert witnesses who testified 
specifically about how Malvo's age and 
upbringing affected his competency." He 
argues further that "the trial court and the jury 
actually considered [Malvo's mitigation] 
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evidence in imposing the sentences in this 
case" and that "the jury's finding of future 
dangerousness and vileness shows that 
Malvo is the 'rare juvenile offender whose 
crime reflect[ed] irreparable corruption.'" 
Moreover, according to the Warden, the fact 
"[t]hat Malvo chose not to use the evidence 
he introduced to argue for a sentence less than 
life without parole does not change the fact 
that he had the opportunity to present the 
relevant evidence and argue for leniency, 
which is all that the Eighth 
Amendment requires." 
The problem with the Warden's argument, 
however, is that, as a matter of Virginia law, 
the jury was not allowed to give a sentence 
less than life without parole. It was charged 
with deciding between the death penalty and 
life without parole, and it selected the more 
lenient of the two. Thus, even though the jury 
did find future dangerousness and vileness, as 
the Warden notes, it also considered Malvo's 
mitigation evidence and found that he 
deserved the lighter of the two sentences that 
it could give — life without parole. 
Moreover, the Chesapeake City jury was 
never charged with finding whether Malvo's 
crimes reflected irreparable corruption or 
permanent incorrigibility, a determination 
that is now a prerequisite to imposing a life-
without-parole sentence on a juvenile 
homicide offender. Nor were Malvo's "youth 
and attendant circumstances" considered by 
either the jury or the judge to determine 
whether to sentence him to life without parole 
or some lesser sentence.  
We thus conclude that Malvo's sentencing 
proceedings in the Chesapeake City Circuit 
Court did not satisfy the requirements of 
the Eighth Amendment as articulated 
in Miller and Montgomery. 
 
C 
Finally, the Warden contends that "Malvo's 
voluntary decision to enter into a plea 
agreement with stipulated [life-without-
parole] sentences in Spotsylvania . . . 
waive[d] any claim he would have had 
under Miller" as to those two sentences. The 
Warden notes that "Malvo received a 
substantial benefit" in "avoid[ing] a second 
trial at which he could have been sentenced 
to death" and contends that Malvo must 
therefore "be held to the terms of his 
bargain." He cites Brady v. United States, , 
and Dingle v. Stevenson,, to argue that both 
the "Supreme Court and this Court have made 
clear that guilty pleas are not open to revision 
when future changes in the law alter the 
calculus that caused the defendant to enter his 
plea." 
At the outset, we conclude that the resolution 
of this issue is not governed 
by Brady or Dingle. In Brady, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to a crime that carried the 
possibility of the death penalty in order to 
avoid that penalty, receiving instead a 50-
year sentence of imprisonment (later reduced 
to 30 years). When the Supreme Court later 
held that the death-penalty provision 
involved in Brady's case was 
unconstitutional, Brady sought to set aside 
his plea agreement as 
invalid. The Brady Court rejected Brady's 
argument, noting that "even if we assume that 
Brady would not have pleaded guilty except 
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for the death penalty provision . . ., this 
assumption merely identifies the penalty 
provision as a 'but for' cause of his plea," but 
it "does not necessarily prove that the plea 
was coerced and invalid as an involuntary 
act." Rather, "a plea of guilty is not invalid 
merely because entered to avoid the 
possibility of a death penalty," even one 
subsequently invalidated.  
In Dingle, we applied Brady to similar 
circumstances, concluding that a 
plea  agreement could not be set aside as 
involuntary and invalid because it was 
entered into by Dingle to avoid the death 
penalty when that penalty was later 
determined to be unconstitutional in the 
circumstances. We noted in Dingle that the 
Supreme Court had "not suggested that a 
substantive rule would stretch beyond the 
proscribed sentence to reopen guilty pleas 
with a different sentence."  
Thus, in both Brady and Dingle, the 
defendants sought to use new sentencing case 
law to attack their convictions — their guilty 
pleas — without any claim that the sentences 
they actually received were unlawful. The 
question in both cases was thus whether to set 
aside the guilty-plea convictions when 
the penalties that induced the pleas were 
later found to be unconstitutional. In both 
cases that relief was denied, and the 
legality vel nonof the avoided sentences was 
thus held not to cast doubt on the validity of 
the guilty plea. In this case, by distinction, 
Malvo seeks to challenge his sentences, not 
his guilty-plea convictions, on the ground 
that they were retroactively made 
unconstitutional under the rule announced 
in Miller. Thus, whereas the defendants 
in Brady and Dingle sought to use new 
sentencing law as a sword to attack the 
validity of their guilty pleas, here the Warden 
seeks to use Malvo's lawful guilty plea as a 
shield to insulate his allegedly unlawful life-
without-parole sentences from judicial 
review. We conclude that Brady and Dingle 
do not provide him with that shield. 
Nonetheless, that brings us to the more 
formidable question of whether Malvo 
waived his constitutional challenge to his 
sentences by signing the plea agreement. 
In that agreement, Malvo agreed that 
Virginia's summary of the facts could be 
proven in the case were it to go to trial, 
accepting that summary "in lieu of 
presentation of any evidence by the 
Commonwealth." And, after expressly 
waiving his rights to a speedy and public trial 
by jury, to compel the production of evidence 
and attendance of witnesses, to have a 
lawyer, to not testify against himself, and to 
be confronted by his accusers, he entered 
an Alford guilty plea and waived his right to 
an appeal. With respect to punishment, he 
stated in his plea agreement, "I understand 
that the Commonwealth's Attorney has 
agreed that the following specific punishment 
is the appropriate disposition in this case": 
"life in prison without parole" for the 
offenses of capital murder and attempted 
capital murder and a term of years for the 
other offenses. Finally, he acknowledged that 
"the Court [could] accept or reject this plea 
agreement." It is noteworthy, however, that in 
the plea agreement, Malvo did not himself 
agree that life-without-parole sentences were 
appropriate punishments for his crimes. That 
is not to say, of course, that Malvo did not 
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expect that he was avoiding the death penalty 
by receiving life sentences without parole.  
To begin, it is far from clear that a broad 
waiver of a substantive constitutional right, 
as the Warden maintains happened here, 
would even be enforceable.  
But, in any event, the plea agreement in this 
case does not provide any form 
of express waiver of Malvo's right to 
challenge the constitutionality of his sentence 
in a collateral proceeding in light of future 
Supreme Court holdings, nor was he advised 
during his plea colloquy that his Alford plea 
would have that effect. He did expressly 
waive constitutional rights relating to trial 
and his right to direct appeal, but nothing 
with respect to the right to pursue future 
habeas relief from his punishment. 
Consequently, the Warden's waiver argument 
must rest on some form 
of inherent or implied waiver of his right to 
challenge his sentences as unconstitutional. 
In the circumstances, we decline to hold that 
Malvo implicitly waived his right to argue, 
based on intervening Supreme Court 
holdings, that his sentences were ones that 
the State could not constitutionally impose on 
him. We thus conclude that, while Malvo's 
convictions remain valid, nothing in his plea 
agreement precludes him from  obtaining 
habeas relief under the new rule in Miller. 
Accordingly, we reject the Warden's 
argument that Malvo waived his right to 





To be clear, the crimes committed by Malvo 
and John Muhammad were the most heinous, 
random acts of premeditated violence 
conceivable, destroying lives and families 
and terrorizing the entire Washington, D.C. 
metropolitan area for over six weeks, 
instilling mortal fear daily in the citizens of 
that community. The Commonwealth of 
Virginia understandably sought the harshest 
penalties then available under the law, and 
the Warden now understandably seeks to 
sustain the penalties that were then legally 
imposed with arguments that are not without 
substantial force. 
But Malvo was 17 years old when he 
committed the murders, and he now has the 
retroactive benefit of new constitutional rules 
that treat juveniles differently for sentencing. 
Because we are bound to apply those 
constitutional rules, we affirm the district 
court's grant of habeas relief awarding Malvo 
new sentencings. We make this ruling not 
with any satisfaction but to sustain the law. 
As for Malvo, who knows but God how he 









“Supreme Court Will Hear Case of Lee Malvo, the D.C. Sniper” 
 
 




March 18, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
decide whether Lee Malvo, the younger of 
the two men who terrorized the Washington 
region with sniper shootings in the fall of 
2002, may challenge his sentences of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole. 
The court also agreed to hear constitutional 
challenges to state laws allowing non-
unanimous juries and barring the insanity 
defense. 
Mr. Malvo, now 34, was 17 when he and John 
Allen Muhammad killed 10 people in sniper 
attacks in Virginia, Maryland and the District 
of Columbia. Mr. Muhammad was sentenced 
to death, and he was executed in 2009. 
Mr. Malvo was sentenced to life in prison by 
judges in both Virginia and Maryland. He 
challenged his Virginia sentences 
under Supreme Court decisions that limited 
life sentences for juvenile offenders. 
The central legal issues in the case the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear, Mathena v. 
Malvo, No. 18-217, was whether Mr. Malvo 
had been sentenced under a law that made a 
life sentence mandatory and whether the 
Supreme Court decisions applied 
retroactively to Mr. Malvo. 
In June, a unanimous three-judge panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals, in 
Richmond, Va., ruled that Mr. Malvo was 
entitled to new sentencing hearings. 
 “To be clear,” Judge Paul V. 
Niemeyer wrote for the panel, “the crimes 
committed by Malvo and John Muhammad 
were the most heinous, random acts of 
premeditated violence conceivable, 
destroying lives and families and terrorizing 
the entire Washington, D.C., metropolitan 
area for over six weeks, instilling mortal fear 
daily in the citizens of that community.” 
“But Malvo was 17 years old when he 
committed the murders, and he now has the 
retroactive benefit of new constitutional rules 
that treat juveniles differently for 
sentencing,” Judge Niemeyer wrote. 
“We make this ruling not with any 
satisfaction but to sustain the law,” the judge 
concluded. “As for Malvo, who knows but 
God how he will bear the future.” 
Virginia officials asked the Supreme Court to 
review that ruling, noting that the state’s 
Supreme Court had come to the opposite 
conclusion on the legal question in the case. 
The United States Supreme Court also agreed 
to decide whether the Constitution allows 
non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases. 
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The case, Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924, 
concerns Evangelisto Ramos, a Louisiana 
man who was convicted in 2016 for killing a 
woman in New Orleans. The jury’s vote was 
10 to 2, which was enough under the state’s 
law at the time. Louisiana has since amended 
its state Constitution to bar non-unanimous 
verdicts, but the move came too late to help 
Mr. Ramos. 
Oregon is the last remaining state that allows 
non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases. 
In a pair of decisions in 1972, one each 
from Oregon and Louisiana, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Constitution does not 
require states to insist on unanimity. Critics 
say the decisions ignored the historical record 
and made assumptions about jury behavior 
that have been called into question by more 
recent research. 
The court also agreed to decide whether 
states may abolish the dominant version of 
the insanity defense. The case concerns 
James Kahler, who was sentenced to death 
for killing four family members. His lawyers 
said he suffered “from depression so severe 
that he experienced extreme emotional 
disturbance, dissociating him from reality.” 
“Although he knew that he was shooting 
human beings,” Mr. Kahler’s lawyers said of 
their client, “his mental state was so disturbed 
at the time that he was unable to control his 
actions.” 
Kansas is one of five states in which 
defendants cannot avoid criminal punishment 
by showing that their mental illness 
prevented them from knowing their actions 
were wrong. In their petition seeking 
review in the case, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-
6135, lawyers for Mr. Kahler wrote that the 
state’s approach “defies a fundamental, 
centuries-old precept of our legal system: 
People cannot be punished for crimes for 
which they are not morally culpable.” 
The Kansas law, they wrote, violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of due process. 
Lawyers for Kansas responded that the state 
had refined but not eliminated the insanity 
defense, allowing defendants to argue instead 
that “as a result of mental disease” they 

























March 18, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday said it will 
consider whether Lee Boyd Malvo, the 
teenage half of the Beltway snipers who 
terrorized the Washington region 16 years 
ago, may challenge his sentence of life in 
prison without parole. 
Malvo, 34, was a 17-year-old when he and 
John Allen Muhammad committed what 
Virginia officials called “one of the most 
notorious strings of terrorist acts in modern 
American history.” Between Sept. 5 and Oct. 
22, 2002, Muhammad and Malvo killed 10 
people and wounded others in sniper attacks 
in Virginia, Maryland and the District of 
Columbia. 
Muhammad was executed in 2009, but Malvo 
received sentences of life without parole in 
Virginia and Maryland. 
The Supreme Court’s actions announced 
Monday involve the Virginia sentences and 
will be heard in the term that starts in 
October. 
After a 2003 trial in which Malvo was 
convicted of shooting FBI analyst Linda 
Franklin outside a Fairfax County Home 
Depot store, a jury decided against the death 
penalty. Instead, it recommended life 
imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole. 
Since then, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on juvenile murderers has 
changed. It said the death penalty was off-
limits for juveniles, and in 2012 said that 
mandatory life sentences without the 
possibility of parole were unconstitutional for 
those under 18. 
A divided court found that sentencing a child 
to life without parole is excessive for all but 
“the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption.” In sentencing 
defendants 17 and younger, judges must now 
consider whether a juvenile’s crime reflects 
“irreparable corruption” or simply “the 
transient immaturity of youth.” 
The court has also said the rulings are 
retroactive. 
Some courts have interpreted the rulings to 
mean that mandatory life without parole laws 
are unconstitutional, but that those that offer 
a judge discretion are not. The Virginia 
Supreme Court ruled against Malvo. 
But a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 4th Circuit in Richmond said it was clear 
Malvo deserved a new sentencing: No judge 
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ever considered whether Malvo’s crime 
represented “irreparable corruption.” 
The unanimous panel said that the Beltway 
shootings “were the most heinous, random 
acts of premeditated violence conceivable, 
destroying lives and families and terrorizing 
the entire Washington, D.C., metropolitan 
area for over six weeks, instilling mortal fear 
daily in the citizens of that community.” 
But, “Malvo was 17 years old when he 
committed the murders, and he now has the 
retroactive benefit of new constitutional rules 
that treat juveniles differently for 
sentencing,” the judges concluded. 
The Virginia Supreme Court had found the 
commonwealth’s laws were not incompatible 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings 
because “Virginia law does not preclude a 
sentencing court from considering mitigating 
circumstances, whether they be age or 
anything else.” 
There are similar splits around the country 
Malvo’s Maryland sentences were upheld in 
2017. A state court judge said that the 
sentencing judge had specifically taken into 
account Malvo’s age and other mitigating 
factors — Malvo was brought illegally into 
the country by Muhammad, who was 25 
years his senior and masterminded the attacks 
— in deciding he deserved life imprisonment. 
That decision is on appeal to Maryland’s 
highest court. In addition, Malvo has 
challenged his sentences in federal court in 
Maryland. 






























Debra Cassens Weiss 
 
March 18, 2019  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide 
whether its decision banning mandatory 
sentences of life without parole for juveniles 
can be used to upend discretionary life-
without-parole sentences imposed on teens 
before the Supreme Court acted. 
The Supreme Court agreed to consider the 
question in the case of Lee Boyd Malvo, who 
was a teen when he and an older man killed 
10 people in a series of sniper slayings in the 
Washington, D.C., area in 2002, 
the Washington Post reports. Malvo was 
sentenced to life without parole in Virginia 
and Maryland; the Supreme Court will 
review the Virginia cases. 
The Supreme Court banned sentences of life 
without parole for juveniles in the 2012 
case, Miller v. Alabama. In 2016, the 
Supreme Court ruled in Montgomery v. 
Alabama that its ban on teen life-without-
parole sentences applies retroactively. 
The Richmond, Virginia-based 4th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Malvo’s 
case that the retroactivity decision allows 
reconsideration of discretionary life 
sentences as well as mandatory sentences, 
according to the state’s cert petition. 
An opposition brief filed for Malvo says the 
4th Circuit had ruled for Malvo because the  
\sentencing judge didn’t consider whether his 
crime reflected “irreparable corruption,” the 
only type of crime for which juvenile life 
sentences are allowed under the two 
precedents. 
The other convicted D.C. sniper, John Allen 
Muhammad, was executed in 2009. 
The case is Mathena v. Malvo. The 
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June 21, 2018 
 
A federal appeals court on Thursday said a 
sniper serving life in prison without parole 
over deadly shootings that traumatized the 
Washington, D.C. area in 2002 must be 
resentenced in Virginia because he was only 
17 at the time of his crimes. 
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals denied 
an appeal by prosecutors who said Lee Boyd 
Malvo need not be resentenced over his role 
in the D.C. sniper case, which left 10 people 
dead over three weeks in Washington, 
Maryland and Virginia. 
It cited recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
that mandatory life sentences without parole 
for juveniles were unconstitutional, and that 
this rule applied retroactively. 
“We make this ruling not with any 
satisfaction, but to sustain the law,” Circuit 
Judge Paul Niemeyer wrote for a three-judge 
panel of the Richmond, Virginia-based 
appeals court. “As for Malvo, who knows but 
God how he will bear the future.” 
Malvo, 33, had received four life sentences in 
Virginia, after being convicted of two 
murders and later entering a separate guilty 
plea to avoid the death penalty. He also 
received life without parole in Maryland. 
John Allen Muhammad, Malvo’s older 
accomplice, was also convicted over the 
shooting spree. He was executed in 2009 at 
age 48 in a Virginia state prison. 
Niemeyer called Malvo’s and Muhammad’s 
crimes “the most heinous, random acts of 
premeditated violence conceivable.” 
Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring had 
argued that Malvo’s sentences in that state 
were acceptable because the trial judge had 
discretion to impose lesser punishment. 
Charlotte Gomer, a spokeswoman for 
Herring, said that office may appeal to the 
entire 4th Circuit or the Supreme Court. 
“We are going to review the decision closely 
and decide how best to proceed in a way that 
ensures this convicted mass murderer faces 
justice for his heinous crimes,” she said. 
Craig Cooley, a lawyer for Malvo, said he 
was pleased with the decision. 
“In Lee’s case, the sheer number of 
convictions means he will still serve at least 
a very substantial portion of his life in 
prison,” he added. 
The appeals court said Malvo could be 
resentenced to life without parole if his 
crimes reflected “permanent incorrigibility,” 
or a lesser punishment if his crimes reflected 
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the “transient immaturity” associated with 
being 17. 
Thursday’s decision affirmed a May 2017 
ruling by U.S. District Judge Raymond 
Jackson in Norfolk, Virginia. 
Malvo and Muhammad were arrested after 
police found them sleeping at a Maryland rest 
area in a Chevrolet Caprice. 
The case is Malvo v Mathena, 4th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 17-6746. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
